

The OSCE Secretariat bears no responsibility for the content of this document and circulates it without altering its content. The distribution by OSCE Conference Services of this document is without prejudice to OSCE decisions, as set out in documents agreed by OSCE participating States.

FSC.EMI/60/22
14 April 2022

ENGLISH only



EMBASSY OF FINLAND
PERMANENT DELEGATION OF FINLAND
TO THE OSCE

PC0UC1KU-7

VERBAL NOTE

The Permanent Delegation of Finland to the OSCE presents its compliments to the Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE and to the Conflict Prevention Centre and has the honour to convey Finland's Annual Information Exchange on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in accordance with Decision 2/09 of the Forum for Security Co-operation.

The Permanent Delegation of Finland to the OSCE avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all the Permanent Missions and Delegations and to the Conflict Prevention Centre the assurances of its highest consideration.

14 April 2022

Encl

OF



To all Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE
to the Conflict Prevention Centre

V i e n n a

OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects on Security

FINLAND

Annual Information Exchange on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct

2022

INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

FINLAND's information, year 2021

Section I: Inter-State elements

1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism

1.1 To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, sub-regional and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party?

Conventions and protocols ratified or accepted by Finland:

Relevant United Nations Conventions

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York on 14 December 1973

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, done at New York on 17 December 1979

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, done at New York on 15 December 1997

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, done at New York on 9 December 1999

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963

Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done at Montréal on 4 April 2014

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970

Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010 and prevailing over the abovementioned Montreal Convention as between the States Parties to the Beijing Convention

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 26 October 1979 as amended 2005

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, done at Montreal on 1 March 1991

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, done at New York on 13 April 2005

Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October 2005

Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October 2005

Relevant Council of Europe Conventions

Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (ETS 196)

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS 90)

Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS 190)

Convention on Cybercrime (ETS 185)

Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (ETS 189)

European Convention on Extradition
(ETS 24)

Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition
(ETS 98)

European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(ETS 30)

Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(ETS 99)

European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes
(ETS 116)

Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS 141)

Other conventions and protocols signed by Finland

Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (ETS 198)

Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS 182)

Third Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (ETS 209)

The Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (ETS 217)

1.2 What national legislation has been adopted in your State to implement the above-mentioned agreements and arrangements?

The procedure for concluding international treaties is based on Chapter 8 of the Constitution of Finland. Due to the dualistic system, treaties and other international obligations must both be adopted in Finland and implemented domestically. The Finnish Constitution states that the provisions of international obligations, in so far as they are of a legislative nature, are otherwise significant, or otherwise require approval by the Parliament under the Constitution, are subject to acceptance of the Parliament (section 94).

Once the parliamentary approval has been obtained in cases where it is needed, the President will ratify the treaty according to section 93 of the Constitution. If there is no need for the parliamentary approval, the President will ratify the treaty after it has been signed. Provisions that are of legislative nature shall be brought into force by an Act of the Finnish Parliament (section 95). Other provisions than those of a legislative nature are to be brought into force by a Decree (of the Government), which specifically also indicates the date of entry into force of the obligation in Finland (section 95).

A separate Chapter 34(a) on terrorist offences was incorporated into the Penal Code on 1 February 2003. The Chapter originally covered offences made with terrorist intent and their preparation (Sections 1 and 2), directing of a terrorist group (Section 3), promotion of the activity of a terrorist group (Section 4) and financing of terrorism (Section 5). The Chapter also contains a provision defining terrorist intent (Section 6), a provision on the right of prosecution (Section 7) and a provision on corporate criminal liability (Section 8). The terrorist intent definition like the Chapter 34(a) itself are originally based on the EU Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA).

When the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was implemented in Finland, public incitement to an offence referred to in Chapter 17, Section 1 of the Penal Code was included among the offences carried out with terrorist intent listed under Chapter 34(a),

Section 1(1) (2) of the Code. On the same occasion Chapter 34(a) of the Penal Code was supplemented with separate provisions on giving training for the commission of a terrorist offence and on recruitment for the commission of a terrorist offence (nowadays Sections 4(a) and 4(c)). These amendments to the Penal Code came into force on 1 May 2008. Thus, the EU Council Framework Decision (2008/919/JHA) of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA did not require any changes in legislation as the obligations had already been implemented by the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

Receiving training for the commission of a terrorist offence and financing of a terrorist group were criminalized in the beginning of 2015 (Chapter 34(a), Sections 4(b) and 5(a) of the Penal Code). At the same time the provision regarding financing of terrorism was widened to cover the financing of other terrorist offences. These amendments were mainly based on national consideration.

Travelling abroad for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence (Chapter 34(a), Section 5(b) of the Penal Code) has been punishable in Finland since the beginning of December 2016. This provision with its original content was based on the Security Council Resolution 2178(2014).

Many Penal Code amendments required by the Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism came into force on 15 November 2018. The Penal Code was supplemented with provisions on an offence made with terrorist intent regarding a radiological weapon and facilitation of travelling abroad for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence (Chapter 34(a), Sections 1(a) and 5(c) of the Penal Code). Some forms of serious cybercrime offences (aggravated damage to data, aggravated interference with communications and aggravated interference in an information system) were included in Chapter 34(a), Section 1(1) regarding offences made with terrorist intent. The provision on receiving training for the commission of a terrorist offence (Section 4(b)) was widened to cover self-study and the provision on travelling abroad for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence was amended to cover all travels for such purposes regardless of the nationality of the traveller and the destination.

The Directive (EU) 2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime was transposed in Finland with the Act on the use of airline passenger record information for the purpose of combating terrorism and serious crime (657/2019). This Act in part also transposes the UN Security Council Resolution 2396 on 21 December 2017 on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts – foreign terrorist fighters.

1.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State?

The Ministry of the Interior has an overall responsibility for countering terrorism in Finland and, within its jurisdiction, the Finnish Police. The Finnish Police is the authority with primary responsibility for countering terrorist crime in Finland. However, the capability to effectively counter terrorism requires continuous and consistent cooperation not only between all security authorities but also with other authorities and a wide range of other actors. Co-operation between authorities is essential to counter-terrorism in order to make best possible use of the counter-terrorism resources available to the authorities and relevant organisations. Any challenges can be best addressed by taking advantage of the co-operation that already exists between authorities and of their general preparedness arrangements. In this, Finland relies on its special strength of an efficient and effective co-operation between authorities. Such an operating model is based on

a centralised intelligence processing and analysis. The Finnish system also benefits from the fact that the responsibilities and powers of different authorities are clearly laid down by law.

The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) is responsible for identifying, preventing and countering terrorism in Finland, maintaining terrorism-related situational awareness and producing terrorist threat assessments. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service plays a crucial role in the prevention of terrorist financing, the security clearance procedure and the countering of cyber threats. The counter-terrorism duties of the National Bureau of Investigation focus on activities during and after terrorist offences and the actual criminal investigation. The National Bureau of Investigation's Financial Intelligence Unit is responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Police departments have regional special response teams and officers with specialist training for dealing with explosives and CBRNE situations.

At the request of a commanding police officer, the Border Guard can provide equipment, personnel and special expert services to the police, if due to a specific threat, this is necessary to prevent an offence committed with terrorist intent, to apprehend a dangerous person, to disperse a crowd endangering public order and security through their gathering or unjustifiably obstructing traffic, or to protect against crimes and disturbances.

Intensive exchange of information between the security authorities and the law enforcement authorities is essential in the daily counterterrorism work. This activity is done through several institutions and organisations, such as Interpol, Europol, the PWGT (Police Working Group on Terrorism) and the CTG (Counter Terrorist Group).

The counterterrorism activity of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service aims at identifying the threats at earliest possible stage and preventing them from being realised. The following methods are used for achieving this aim:

- Identifying persons, networks and organisations active in Finland potentially posing a risk threat,
- Identifying the phenomena relating to terrorism, its development and the criminality connected with it,
- Monitoring and analysing of international terrorism and phenomena relating to it,
- Providing situation reports and threat assessments

As Police Supreme Command, National Police Board steers all police departments and the Police University of Finland. National Police Board and the subordinate units work in cooperation with the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service in order to identify the development leading to radicalisation, to conduct criminal investigation, to ensure exchange of information and to give training on terrorism and violent radicalization. Analyses are produced to anticipate trends in extremism in society. Community policing is seen as a significant activity for the prevention of violent radicalisation and recruitment of potential violent extremists. Ministry of the Interior publishes yearly a situation overview regarding violent extremism in Finland. It is an open document and is based on the information produced by the authorities and researchers. The main content of the situation overview reflects the activities of extremism groups in Finland and the main developments on this area including the activities in the Internet.

A practical step taken to raise awareness after the adoption of the first National Counter-terrorism Strategy in 2010 was the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordination Group, which is chaired by the Ministry of the Interior and includes more than 20 representatives from various ministries police units and other key organisations. The Coordination Group reviews the situation of terrorism in Finland at regular intervals, and each branch of government incorporates the reviews into its respective contingency plans and daily work, as appropriate. Situation reports produced by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service are distributed to different authorities as well as to businesses critical to the functioning of society, via an online portal of the National Emergency Supply Agency.

In Finland, violent radicalisation and extremism have been prevented systematically since 2012 when the first National Action Plan was confirmed. The second National Action Plan was confirmed in April 2016. And the current and third Action Plan was adopted by the Government as a resolution on 19 December 2019. The Action Plan was drawn up through broad cooperation between different authorities and civil society actors. In addition, as the implementation of the National Action Plan of 2016 was assessed by an external reviser in April 2019, the third National Action Plan is based on the experiences gained from earlier work and the results and recommendations of the assessment.

The main objective in preventing violent radicalization and extremism in Finland is to decrease the amount of incitement to violence and threat of violence justified by ideologies. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for developing and coordinating prevention of violent radicalization and extremism. The Ministry reports annually on the results of implementing the Action Plan to the Ministerial Working group on internal Security and Strengthening the rule of Law. Next implementation report will be published in March 2022. The national Plan is implemented in close cooperation with different authorities, NGO's and communities including religious communities. Despite the COVID-19 situation, the implementation of the Action Plan has advanced well.

The main objectives of the national Plan are:

- Reduce extremist violence and the threat of it.
- Promote the implementation of equality, freedom of speech and other constitutional rights.
- Ensure that structures and procedures based on multi-professional cooperation and allowing the authorities, NGOs and communities to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism are available nationally, regionally and locally.
- Detect and investigate efficiently hate crime, including hate speech that is deemed to meet the criteria of a crime and punishable. Combat speech that violates human dignity and is prohibited under the Non-Discrimination Act, as well as harassment prohibited under the Act on Equality. Support victims and identify the impacts of hate crime and illegal speech and harassment on the victim's reference group.
- Decrease the impacts of violent extremist movements on local communities and environments.
- People living in Finland, especially young people, consider influencing society and decision-making through legal means effective and meaningful. The view of the world and actions of violent extremist movements do not appear an attractive alternative.
- The knowledge of the authorities and NGOs for the prevention of violent extremism increases.

The tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces under the Defence Forces Act (551/2007) are:

- Military defence of Finland;
- Providing support for other authorities, which involves responding to non-military threats including situations involving terrorism;
- Participating in providing assistance based on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union, participating in territorial surveillance cooperation, providing other international assistance or participating in other types of international activities.
- Participating in international military crisis management and military tasks in other international crisis management.

The substantial part of preventing and combating terrorism per se falls to the mandate of the police, legal and other authorities. Nationally, the Defence Forces are prepared to support the police in protecting against and responding to terrorist crimes. The full range of the Defence Forces capabilities can be utilised to support the police, including use of necessary military force. However, the operations are always led by the police. The decisions on use of force are also always the responsibility of the police. Internationally, the Defence Forces participate in international military co-operation and in crisis management. The Defence Forces also take part in international and national exercises as well as in possible acts concerning Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict trafficking of WMD and related material.

1.4 Provide any additional relevant information on national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, e.g., those pertaining inter alia to:

- Financing of terrorism;
- Border controls;
- Travel document security;
- Container and supply chain security;
- Security of radioactive sources;
- Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes;
- Legal co-operation including extradition;
- Safe havens and shelter to terrorists and terrorist organisations.

National Counter-Terrorism strategy

Finland's priority in counter-terrorism is to prevent terrorism, which means eliminating the root causes and motivations of terrorism as well as factors relating to the spread of terrorism, which can lead to violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment.

The first National Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in 2010, the second in 2014 and the third in 2018. Current Strategy will be updated during 2021-2022. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy sets strategic counter-terrorism objectives, policies and actions. The objectives guide Finland's activities at national and international level. The strategic policies emphasise the active involvement of all actors in the prevention, detection and combatting of terrorism and in incident management. The strategic actions aim to increase the effectiveness of Finland's national and international counter-terrorism efforts.

The first National CBRNE Strategy was completed 2017. The main objectives are to improve national co-ordination and guide planning in connection with CBRNE issues. The Strategy

highlights e.g. maintaining common situational awareness, further development of risk-based approach to supervision, detecting and preventing intentional actions and enhancing the capacity for co-operation.

Civilian Intelligence Act entered into force in June 2019 together with the new military intelligence legislation and removing Finnish Security Intelligence Service's jurisdiction to conduct criminal investigation. Civilian Intelligence Act improves capabilities to protect against serious threats to national security. Such threats include terrorism, espionage by foreign states or disruption of critical infrastructure.

National Strategy to Prevent Violent Radicalisation and Extremism

The Ministry of the Interior published a report on 30 June 2021 which contains recommendations for developing the safety and security of the premises of religious communities, improving the monitoring of the security situation, and enhancing the training and expertise in safety and security matters. The report also draws attention to the organisation and management of the safety and security functions of the premises of religious communities and the guidance for these functions. Improving the security of the premises of religious communities was one action in the National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Radicalisation and Extremism.

Financing of terrorism

Financing of terrorism is criminalised in the Finnish Penal Code, in Chapter 34a, section 5. A person shall be sentenced for the financing of terrorism to imprisonment for at least four months and at most eight years, if he or she directly or indirectly provides or collects funds in order to finance, or is aware that these shall finance a terrorist offence or an offence of general endangerment as defined in Chapter 34 or Chapter 34 a (1) of the Penal Code. An attempt is punishable. The criminalisation of terrorist financing is consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, ratified by Finland in June 2002, and the EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism. The obligation to freeze terrorist assets imposed by the UN Security Council has been implemented in the EU by decisions and regulations adopted by the Council.

The Sanctions Act (Act on the Enforcement of Certain Obligations of Finland as a Member of the United Nations and of the European Union, Act No 659/1967), together with the Penal Code, provides for penalties and forfeitures to be imposed for violations of EU Council regulations, including those adopted to implement UN Security Council Resolutions. According to Chapter 46 of the Penal Code, a person who violates or attempts to violate a regulatory provision in a sanctions regulation shall be sentenced for a regulation offence to a fine or to imprisonment for no more than four years.

The legislation applied to the prevention of terrorist financing has been replaced with the Act on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (444/2017) and the Act on the Financial Intelligence Unit (445/2017). The Acts entered into force in July 2017. The legislation implemented Directive (EU) 2015/849 and the revised FATF recommendations of 2012. Apart from preventing and detecting money laundering and terrorist financing, the purpose of the legislation is to support investigations and the tracing and recovery of proceeds of crime.

Based on the fourth mutual evaluation report of the FATF, published in 2019, and on the recommendations proposed by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee following the report of the CTED on its follow-up visit to Finland in 2019 as well as based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 2462 (2019) and 2482 (2019), a government proposal for amendments to the terrorism financing provisions was submitted to the Parliament and approved on 9 April 2021. The adopted acts included a provision to criminalize financing of an individual terrorist. The provision does not require a link to a specific terrorist offence or the commission of a terrorist offence. In accordance with the definitions of the General Glossary of the FATF, it is punishable to finance a person who commits terrorist offences or participates in the commission of those offences. The adopted acts also included an amendment to the penalty scale of financing of a terrorist group.

The Act on the Freezing of Funds with a view to Combating Terrorism entered into force on 1 June 2013. The Act complements existing EU level freezing mechanisms and enables Finland to freeze funds of persons and entities suspected, prosecuted or convicted of involvement in terrorist crimes in Finland; of persons and entities designated by the Council of the European Union as being involved in terrorism within the EU; on the basis of a well-founded request by another State, persons and entities identified in that request as being involved in terrorism; and entities owned or controlled by any of the above. The Act also prohibits the making available, directly or indirectly, of funds and economic resources to designated persons or entities. As with EU Sanctions, violations of the national freezing measures are criminalized as regulation offences, and are subject to a punishment of up to four years imprisonment.

The Financial Supervisory Authority is the authority for supervision of Finland's financial and insurance sectors. Since 1 January 2009, this Authority has been responsible for most of the supervisory functions previously undertaken by the Financial Supervision Authority and the Insurance Supervisory Authority. The Financial Supervisory Authority supervises the enforcement of the new Act on Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing by the credit and financial institutions and provides training on the provisions of the new Act. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which functions in the National Bureau of Investigation, is responsible for detecting and preventing both money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

FIU has explicit powers to disclose information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for the purposes of applying the Sanctions Act and the Freezing Act. This is of relevance for the purposes of implementing targeted financial sanctions to prevent terrorist financing.

When money transfer services are provided by banks, full license is required and the services are supervised by the Financial Supervision Authority. Any alternative money transmitting business provided other than by banks requires registration, and AML/CFT laws are applied to it. The authority responsible for registering the business is Regional State Administrative Authority of Southern Finland.

Particularly with regard to the non-profit sector, a special license is needed for money collection and the running of a lottery in Finland. Money collection and the running of a lottery are supervised by the National Police Board. To prevent any misuse and criminal behaviour, the new Money Collection Act defines more efficient license conditions and allows, among other things, a more efficient supervision of accounts and practical operation on money collection.

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior have co-chaired a working group tasked with drafting a National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The Risk Assessment was approved in April 2021.

Border controls

The Finnish Border Guard is responsible for border control (checks and surveillance) at external land, sea and air borders in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code and national legislation. Customs and Police carry out border checks at certain border crossing points, namely at ports (cargo traffic) and at some small airports. Border Guard is implementing a development program for border surveillance capabilities.

Border Guard can prevent and combat terrorism mainly at border checks and by exchanging information with third country authorities. This is done in close co-operation with other law enforcement authorities (police, Finnish Security Intelligence Service and Customs). Co-operation is based on Law on Police, Customs and Border Guard co-operation. Co-operation is conducted by common use of databases, common operations, and common intelligence, risk analysis and investigations. The Border Guard is using a national Entry-Exit System (EES) into which third country nationals' border crossings are recorded. Other law enforcement authorities have an access into the EES. Furthermore, the Border Guard is using SIS (Schengen Information System), VIS (Visa Information System) and national databases, including Customs' and Police relevant databases, against which all third country nationals are checked upon border checks. Systematic checks of EU citizens against relevant databases were introduced in April 2017. Interpol's Database on Lost and Stolen Travel Documents (LSTD) is consulted and reported regularly.

Police and Border Guard have placed liaison officers in the certain Finnish consulates abroad. Liaison officers are participating in visa issuance processes and thus can identify possible terrorism indicators. Also Security and Intelligence Service has short term experts posted at the certain Finnish consulates, and they are focusing especially to counter terrorism. Border Guard is also participating to European Border and Coast Guard standing corps with personnel and technical equipment.

The Finnish Customs is responsible for checks on goods. Customs updates constantly the training program to make sure that Customs officers are able to take the possibility of terrorism into account in their daily work. There has been training concerning e.g. dual use goods and information of chemicals, different kind of biological weapons, radioactive materials and explosives. There are also many kinds of equipment in border points in use. Radiation detectors and different kind of x-ray machines are every day tools in ports, airports and land borders.

Travel document security

Passports in Finland are issued with biometric identifiers. Passports are equipped with high quality security features and security printed. The photo is laser-printed. Identity cards contain a chip with the citizen certificate.

At the moment into the microchip is stored the same information as on passports data page and a photo of the passport holder. In accordance with the EU regulations (latest 29 June 2009), two finger prints will be stored into the microchip.

Passports can be issued only within the national passport data system. The data system is controlled by the Finnish Police.

Container and supply chain security

Due to several regulations concerning EU common security and safety risk analysis Finnish Customs creates new organisational structures (National Risk Analysis Centre) and automated risk analysis systems. These improvements make the risk analysis more effective and better co-ordinated process.

There will also be national guidelines for security and safety risk analysis and examinations. Finnish Customs has good co-operation with licensing (e.g. dual use goods) authorities. Co-operation includes information sharing, training and common risk analysis.

There is also close co-operation with police and Border Guard.

Security of radioactive sources

With regard to security of radioactive sources and the regulatory control of the use of radiation in industry and in medical applications, Finland complies with the International Atomic Energy Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its implementing Import and Export Guidance (IAEA, Vienna, 2004). National regulations based on the Radiation Act includes specific requirements on the security of radioactive sources. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety and security of radioactive sources by prior authorisation, regular inspections and national register of radioactive sources. STUK regulation on security of radioactive sources applies the graded approach in regulatory control. Implementing guide on the security of radioactive sources and guidance on the security of radioactive material in transport has also been published by STUK.

Finnish CBRNE co-operation forum and operative actors within the forum aim to advance measures to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to illicit CBRN activities, and to enhance co-ordination and cooperation between national authorities involved in the counter-CBRN effort. The co-operation forum is led by the National Police Board, it has members from the relevant authorities and it is linked to several other counter-CBRN expert organisations. The updated national counter-terrorism strategy (2018) includes elements to further develop national CBRNE co-ordination. In accordance with the updated national counter-terrorism strategy (2018), a strategic CBRNE working group has been established under the Ministry of the Interior, to further develop national CBRNE co-ordination.

STUK, together with law enforcement authorities, operates a concept for on-site detection and off-site expert support for analysis, suitable for nuclear security in-field missions (first response with reachback). The emphasis is on data management: reliable radionuclide identification, real-time data transfer, and off-site expert analysis of radionuclide spectral information gathered by the in-field operative teams.

The Finnish authorities executed a joint project to develop the national nuclear security detection architecture for nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. The authorities have defined common requirements for future detection systems to optimize the compatibility and

information sharing. The key operational capability will be based on mobile or relocatable technology with remote expert support for the front-line officers (reach-back).

STUK contributes significantly to the work of ERNCIP (European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection) Thematic Group on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Radiological and Nuclear Threats. The main goal of the Group is to enhance the EU's internal security and facilitate the development of a single market for European security industry. Presently three topics are being analysed: Novel detection technologies for nuclear security, centralized alarm adjudication and robotics and advanced data management.

Finnish Customs controls border crossing traffic of radioactive materials through license control, examinations based on risk analysis and random selection, and also by radiation detection. While the implementation of radiation monitoring at borders is fully under the jurisdiction of the Finnish Customs, STUK's role is to provide expert advice. The co-operation between the two authorities involves concept planning, technical specifications, and operations: interpretation of alarms and analysis of measurement results. The activities also cover procuring new technical equipment, updating the old equipment, and updating operational procedures, such as data transfer to enable expert support by offsite analysis.

Joint training courses for the Finnish and Russian Customs authorities are organised within the bilateral cooperation programme of Finland and the Russian Federation in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. The courses include lectures and practical exercises at STUK, at the St. Petersburg Customs Academy, and at Customs points.

Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes

The role of internet and social media is significant, in terms of radicalising, disseminating of propaganda, recruitment and communication. Online, individuals find support and confirmation for extremist views and communicate with like-minded actors.

The use of the Internet for both an operational and propaganda purposes (violent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism) will continue to increase in the future.

Because of the technical and the multinational structure of the Internet, it makes it hard for the national authorities to efficiently control the use of the Internet for the terrorist purposes. Also the increasing technical capabilities of the violent extremists and the advanced and in many cases free security technology (e.g. anonymity, encryption) and communication makes it easier to communicate, disseminate material and use the Internet as an operational tool. In this regard, Finland underlines the importance of cooperation between public authorities and the private sector.

The Finnish Police Act and Coercive Measures Act regulates the counter-terrorism activities of the Finnish Police in the Internet environment. The EU Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online has entered into force in 2021 and will apply from 7 June 2022. Finland has started a legislative process to amend national legislation accordingly.

Internet and social media can be very useful tools for the law enforcement community to gather information but also prevent crimes and violent radicalisation on the Internet.

We have noticed that one best practice for using the Internet and social media to counter violent extremism is virtual community policing. In Finland, virtual community policing started in 2008. This refers to competent law enforcement authorities being openly present and active on Internet, especially on social media. The aim of this activity is to prevent or reduce the use of a specific social media or other Internet platform for radicalising or terrorist purposes, by being notified of or contacted on this kind of activity, as well as to identify this one self. The purpose is not in any way limit the freedom of speech online but to educate people, interact with them, raise awareness and provide an easy way to contact the police. The key for success has proven to be bilateral and confidential low-threshold communication channel. Activities on the social media platform include providing contact-information (telephone number or email address), answering questions, (request) being added to groups, participating in discussions, flagging illegal content, identifying users that need help as well as searching for criminal activity.

We have also created so called Net Tip system where people can submit non-emergency information to the Police. The tips can involve any suspicious material users find on the Internet.

The Finnish Cyber Security Strategy was approved in 2019. It sets out the key national objectives for the development of the cyber environment and the safeguarding of related vital functions. The strategy also aims to support the development of accessible and reliable digital services and business development. The strategy is based on the general principles of Finland's cyber security strategy of 2013.

The core of the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy 2019 consists of three strategic guidelines. Those guidelines are the following:

- Development of International Cooperation
- Better Coordination of Cyber Security Management
- Development of Cyber Security Competence

The first guideline focuses on the protection of the cyber environment without borders. In other words, Finland strives to secure its cyber environment while enjoying active support internationally and through EU cooperation. International cooperation relies heavily on the existing international law and international treaties as well as the EU's renewed cyber security strategy and key legislative projects. However, to solve international cyber security challenges, Finland must also play an active role in the European Union and in key international organisations.

The second guideline stresses the importance of improving the overall state of national cyber security through a development programme and by promoting cooperation in planning and monitoring. Thus, the earlier implementation programme will be replaced by a cyber security development programme. The programme will concretise national cyber security policies and clarify the overall picture of cyber security projects, research and development programmes. As an example, the post of Cyber Security Director has already been established at the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

The third guideline aims to ensure the national cyber security competence by identifying requirements and strengthening education and research. The enhancement of cyber security competence is considered vital for both the public administration and the business community. Therefore, national cyber security will be built in cooperation among the authorities, the business

community, organisations and citizens in such a way that everyone can contribute to our shared cyber security.

On 10 June 2021, Finland's Government also adopted a Cyber Security Development Programme. It is a concrete implementation plan on how to develop cyber security across sectors in the long term. It covers the years 2021-2030. Chapter 6 deals with national cyber security capabilities which provide the basis for functioning of society as a whole. Cyber security capabilities promote sovereignty in the cyber environment and citizens' confidence in the functioning of the digital society in all societal contexts. The primary goal of the development programme is to create an ecosystem of cyber security in Finland, which will generate vitality and growth, increase the number of jobs in the sector, create the required competence and improve the resilience of the digital society and its tolerance of the different phenomena in the cyber environment. The development programme focus on four key themes from the point of view of growing the ecosystem. These four themes are: Top-level competence, Close collaboration, Strong domestic cyber security industry and Effective national cyber security capabilities.

As a key part of our national work on cybersecurity and of the EU 5G toolbox implementation process, new amendments were made to the law on telecommunications services. The new legislation came into force in the beginning of this year. The principal aim for updated legislation is to take better account of risks to national security or national defense, especially in the critical part of the telecommunication networks. As a part of the amendments to the law on telecommunications services, we established also a new body, Council on Network Security, which will enhance dialogue between different stakeholders. Key ministries, agencies and telecommunications companies are represented in the Council.

The Finnish Government Resolution 10.6.2021 proposes 37 measures to improve the level of information security and data protection in critical sectors of society. The implementation of the measures outlined in the resolution requires legislative amendments and more resources for example to the police in order to more efficiently investigate cybercrime cases in critical sectors and also more resources for the supervisory authorities. There must be statutory requirements for information security in all critical sectors and the auditing and monitoring of critical information systems must be more extensive. The information security in the public sector will be strengthened. Related to the Government Resolution a legislation project has begun where a unified legal basis for co-operation between authorities in situations of security breaches will be established in order to improve cooperation of the authorities to be more efficient and organized. The Act on Co-operation between Authorities in Preventing and Resolving Security Breaches would provide for the establishment of a co-operation group in security breach situations, for the proactive and incident-specific exchange of information between authorities and the temporary transfer of equipment, facilities and personnel to another authority. The preparation of the legal basis will also assess the strengthening of existing cooperation procedures and cooperation with the private sector.

The National Cyber Security Centre Finland (NCSC-FI) was established within Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority on 1 January 2014. From the beginning of 2019 NCSC-FI has been a part of a new government agency: Finnish Transport and Communications Agency (TRAFICOM), which started its operation 1.1.2019. TRAFICOM's duties in the fields of Incident Response (Computer Emergency Response Team Finland, CERT-FI), Information Assurance (National Communications Security Authority Finland, NCSA-FI) and contingency of telecommunications (National Regulatory Authority, NRA) were merged into the new NCSC-FI.

The NCSC-FI monitors cyber security threats and incidents of national interest and produces advanced situation awareness services to its many constituents. To facilitate that, the NCSC-FI collects and correlates information from a variety of sources.

Finnish telecommunications providers are obligated by law to report to NCSC-FI significant information security violations or threats to information security in the services and anything else that prevents or significantly interferes with telecommunication services. Telecommunication providers are also obliged to notify NCSC-FI of personal data breaches in their networks and services. NCSC-FI also acts as a national POC and CSIRT member under NIS directive. To complement the mandatory reporting, NCSC-FI also welcomes voluntary reports from all other organisations in public and private sector as well as from individuals and foreign parties.

NCSC-FI maintains the national information security situation awareness system. The global information security situation is constantly being monitored for threats, anomalous events, security incidents, and vulnerabilities in information systems that may be of relevance to Finnish interest. The situation reports are being circulated in form of blog entries, technical vulnerability notes, advisories and warnings as well as periodicals and technical guides. Public situation reports are being published on a web page. Those organisations that are considered to be part of or operating critical national infrastructures are invited to subscribe to NCSC-FI's limited circulation reports.

NCSC-FI provides vulnerability coordination services in an effort to minimise the harmful effects of faulty and vulnerable software to the end users and the public at large.

Following the best traditions of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), NCSC-FI is heavily networked. It is in contact on a daily basis with private sector organisations and various government agencies in Finland and abroad. Computer security incident handling is a concerted effort requiring operational level cooperation and active information exchange.

Legal co-operation including extradition

Finnish legislation contains prohibitions against extradition for political offences. According to Section 2(1) of the Act on Extradition between Finland and the other Nordic Countries, a Finnish citizen shall not be extradited for a political offence. Section 3 of the Act provides that a person who is not a Finnish citizen may be extradited for a political offence only if the offence or a similar act is punishable under Finnish law. According to Section 6 of the Extradition Act, no one shall be extradited for a political offence.

However, extradition is permitted if a political offence also includes or involves another offence which is not of a political nature, and if the act as a whole cannot be considered mainly political. In the Act on Extradition between Finland and other Member States of the European Union, the political nature of an offence is not a ground for refusing extradition.

In this context, the PIA refers to Finland's withdrawal of its reservation to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. The ground stated for the withdrawal was the changed interpretation of the concept of a political offence, amounting to the view that offences under Article 1 of the Convention cannot be deemed political in any circumstances. The change of interpretation was influenced by such factors as the anti-terrorist conventions adopted by the UN. These conventions oblige states to criminalise certain acts of violence and to take measures to

make the perpetrators liable. Finland did not consider it justifiable any longer to retain the widest possible discretion.

On the basis of the above, terrorist offences cannot be regarded as political offences. This interpretation has been reiterated again for instance in the context of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (Government bill HE 81/2007 vp). Article 20(1) of the Convention provides that none of the offences referred to in the Convention shall be regarded as a political offence. Other anti-terrorist conventions binding on Finland contain provisions to the same effect. Thus, in practice, Finland cannot refuse extradition on the ground of regarding a terrorist offence as a political offence. Following this principle does not necessitate an express legal provision thereon.

It is a different matter that Finland may refuse extradition on the ground that the person in question would be subjected to political persecution in the state requesting extradition. Section 5(1)(6) of the Act on Extradition between Finland and other Member States of the European Union and section 7 of the Extradition Act contain an express provision to this effect.

Safe havens and shelter to terrorists and terrorist organisations

Terrorist threat in Finland is at the level “elevated”. The greatest threat of a terrorist attack is posed by lone operators or small groups advocating far-right or radical Islamist ideology. Straightforward attacks using readily available instruments such as knives and vehicles remain most likely, but use of firearms and explosives is also possible.

Significant terrorist support activities can be found in Finland, and some 390 individuals are categorised as counter-terrorism target individuals by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. This figure has not changed significantly during the last two years. Many of these target individuals have received weapons training, been involved in armed conflict, or expressed a desire to take part in armed operations. The list of target individuals is not permanent, and individuals are continually added and removed.

The terrorist threat in Finland has remained at level two (elevated) on the four-point scale since 2017. According to the Terrorist Threat Assessment, published by the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service in March 2021, the greatest threat of a terrorist attack is posed by lone operators or small groups advocating far-right or radical Islamist ideology. Straightforward attacks using readily available instruments such as knives and vehicles remain most likely, but use of firearms and explosives is also possible. The threat of attacks arranged abroad by terrorist organizations operating in conflict areas is minimal in Finland.

Significant terrorist support activities can nevertheless be found in Finland, and some 390 individuals are categorized as counter-terrorism target individuals. This figure has not changed significantly since last year. Many of these target individuals have received weapons training, been involved in armed conflict, or expressed a desire to take part in armed operations. The list of target individuals is not permanent, and individuals are continually added and removed.

2. Stationing of armed forces on foreign territory

2.1 Provide information on stationing of your States armed forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law.

In Finland, military crisis management is regulated by the Act on Military Crisis Management. The Act takes into consideration the development of international crisis management activities, in order for Finland to be able to participate in full in crisis management tasks, especially within the framework of the United Nations, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and also in other forms of international crisis management. In accordance with the Act, Finland may participate in international military crisis management authorized by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, or exceptionally in other international military crisis management, with the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security or supporting humanitarian assistance operations or protecting the civilian population, taking into account the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law. The implementing party may be the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) or some other international organization or group of countries. The Act also includes regulations concerning soldiers' right to use force in crisis management missions.

In 2021, Finland took part in eleven (11) military crisis management operations or missions with approximately 400 troops.

The operations were led by NATO (KFOR, RS, NMI), by the EU (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali and EUTM Mosambik) and by the UN (UNIFIL, UNTSO and MINUSMA). Finland was also participating in OIR in Iraq and Kuwait.

For the year 2021 Finland designated a unit (Jaeger Company) for the NRF Pool of Forces.

The Finnish Defence Forces may also provide assistance, falling within its mandate, to another State, the European Union or an international organisation, taking into account the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law. At the request of a competent ministry or authority, the Defence Forces may also take part in providing international assistance to support another Finnish authority.

The law of giving and receiving military aid was applied for the first time in 2021. This law came into force in 2017, but it has never been activated before. Deployment of the Finnish Defence Forces to Kabul airport to support national and international evacuation operation was based on this law.

3. Implementation of other international commitments related to the Code of Conduct

3.1 Provide information on how your State ensures that commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an element of indivisible security are implemented in good faith.

Finland seeks to fulfil its obligations under international arms control agreements in an open and transparent manner, and to follow both the letter and the spirit of the commitments undertaken. The provisions of arms control treaties and other international obligations, insofar as they are of a legislative nature, are brought into force by a Government Act. As described in Section II of this

questionnaire, Finland has constitutionally established procedures to ensure that the performance of all authorities, officials and Government bodies is supervised.

3.2 Provide information on how your State pursues arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures with a view to enhancing security and stability in the OSCE area.

The Government Report on Finland's Foreign and Security Policy, published in October 2020, underlines the importance of arms control in strengthening predictability, stability and security. Finland aims at contributing actively to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to nuclear disarmament, to the global regulation of autonomous weapon systems, the control of conventional arms, and to curbing the illicit arms trade. These aims are promoted politically, with financing, and through practical support measures on the ground.

The Government's Defence Report, issued in September 2021, defines defence policy guidelines for maintaining, developing and utilising Finland's defence capabilities. The report and its implementation steer both the deepening of defence cooperation and the development of national legislation. In the report, the importance of international arms control and export control cooperation and confidence building measures is highlighted.

In the current security environment, the focus is increasingly on the implementation of existing commitments. Where formal verification regimes are absent, the role of confidence-building measures (CBMs) is highlighted. Arms control is increasingly linked to conflict prevention and crisis management, and to sustainable development.

Finland continues to value and implement its commitments under key instruments such as the 2011 Vienna Document and the Treaty on Open Skies. Finland participates in the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) work to modernize the Vienna Document and was one of the countries that put forward a proposal to update the Vienna Document in 2019.

Finland welcomes discussions on the future of conventional arms control in Europe. Finland supports endeavours contributing to military transparency, predictability and stability in Europe.

Finland shares the vision of full and general disarmament and strives for global reductions in all categories of arms. Finland engages in an open dialogue with civil society on disarmament and arms control issues.

Finland is active in international cooperation to prevent proliferation and the use of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The European Union's WMD Strategy serves as a guideline for Finnish action. Finland works actively to enhance the effectiveness of international export control regimes as a key tool to preventing proliferation.

Finland stresses the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and of all its three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Finland participates actively in the NPT 2020 Review Cycle, contributing especially to discussions on nuclear risk reduction. Finland takes part in the Stockholm initiative on nuclear disarmament and the CEND initiative, and supports the work of the IAEA with financing, training and expertise.

Finland contributes actively to international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, material and associated expertise. Finland is a strong supporter of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and contributes to their implementation with financing, training and expertise. Finland participates actively in the G7 Global Partnership Program and in international initiatives such as the GICNT (Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism), PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative), IPNDV (International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification) and NSCG (Nuclear Security Contact Group), and the Global Health Security Agenda.

The EU Strategy on small arms and light weapons (SALW) provides the framework for Finnish SALW related action. The regional activities of the EU and the OSCE in SALW control are of great importance for Finland. Finland fully supports the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and is a major donor to the UN Trust Facility for Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR).

Finland was one of the original co-authors of the UNGA resolution that eventually led to the negotiation and the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Finland continues to actively promote the implementation and universalisation of the treaty, including by contributing to the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund.

Finland is a State Party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and has ratified all its protocols and amended protocols. Finland participates actively in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

Finland acceded to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 2012 and complies fully with it (FTS 13/2012). Finland completed destruction of its anti-personnel mine stockpiles in 2015. Finland supports humanitarian mine action which reduces post-conflict threat and impact of landmines and unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions. During 2021–2025 Finland supports humanitarian mine action in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia and Ukraine with 15 million euros.

Finland supports the humanitarian aims of the Convention on Cluster Munitions but is nationally currently not in a position to join the convention. Finland follows closely the implementation of the convention, and continues to evaluate progress in military technologies and to monitor the situation. As of yet no such changes in conditions have taken place that would enable Finland's accession to the convention.

Finland monitors developments in the field of international arms control, anticipates their effects on national defence and takes them into account in Defence Forces development programmes. The defence establishment, for its part, fulfils the various obligations included in international arms control agreements as well as supports and participates in inter-authority cooperation relating to arms control.

Finland participates actively in international military and civilian crisis management. Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy is published in 2009 Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management was updated in April 2014.

In the OSCE area Finland has made substantial contributions, inter alia, to the EU civilian crisis management missions in Georgia (EUMM), Moldova/Ukraine (EUBAM), Ukraine (EUAM) and

Kosovo (EULEX). Since 2014, Finland has seconded civilian experts to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. In 2021 Finland also seconded to OSCE Secretariat, to the OSCE ODIHR, EUSR Azerbaidžan, EUSR Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nato StratCom CoE Latvia, OSCE Mission to Moldova as well as the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Finland has continued to support OSCE's projects and programs in fulfillment of the OSCE principles and commitments through extra-budgetary contributions. In 2021 about 750 000 Euros were channeled to different OSCE projects. The geographic focus of the project co-operation was in Central Asia and in Eastern Europe.

Finland is committed to UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, and has integrated them in internal and external policies. Finland underlines the need for comprehensive implementation of the 1325 agenda. Finland will continue to give political and financial support to further these aims in the OSCE and other international forums. Finland, together with Austria, Kazakhstan and Turkey, is a co-sponsor of the initiative to launch an OSCE wide action plan on Women, Peace and Security.

Section II: Intra-State elements

1. National planning and decision-making process

1.1 What is the national planning and decision-making process in determining/approving military posture and defence expenditures in your State?

(This reply also partly covers some aspects of question 2.1.)

The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). The Chief of Defence (CHOD) is responsible for all matters related to the exercise of military command, including operational readiness of the FDF. Administratively, the FDF and the CHOD are subordinate to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The MOD is responsible for the general guidance of the defence administration, as well as for the defence policy guidelines and international defence policy co-operation including resources of the FDF. The Defence Command functions as the supreme headquarters of the CHOD and also as the central administrative authority for the defence establishment. In addition to strategic planning and command, it is also responsible for the development and coordination of the activities of the individual services as well as for international co-operation. The three single service headquarters are responsible for the performance, development and operations of their own service in accordance with the tasks assigned by the CHOD, and will be supported by the introduction of the integrated, network-enabled C4I system.

Finnish Parliament makes the decisions on the central principles of defence by using its legislative, supervisory and budgetary powers in accordance with the Constitution. The Finnish Government is responsible for the highest executive power in all security situations. The Government also draws up reports on security and defence for Parliament to discuss and approve.

It is the task of the Government Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy to prepare and give guidance on important issues regarding foreign, security and defence policy.

All Ministries are responsible for preparations for crises and national defence arrangements in their respective areas of responsibility. Under the leadership of the State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, the officials responsible for readiness matters in the Ministries are in charge of readiness preparations in their sector and related work across the state administration. It is the remit of the Security Committee to assist the government and ministries in matters pertaining to comprehensive security. The Security Committee follows the development of Finnish society and its security and coordinates proactive preparedness which is related to comprehensive security.

The Ministry of Finance provides the guidelines for the defence budget, which is approved annually by the Parliament. The Ministry of Defence establishes the financial guidelines for defence planning. The Commander of the Defence Forces executes the financial steering of the Defence Forces.

Part of the defence expenditure is "outsourced", meaning that some areas (infrastructure, some logistics and maintenance), have been contracted at the central level (either by the MoD, Defence Command or any other central level defence institution) with service suppliers from outside the MoD and/or Defence Forces.

A decision to participate in a military crisis management operation is taken, on the basis of a government proposal, by the President of the Republic. Before making its proposal, the government must consult or report to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee or consult the Parliament, depending on the operation and Finnish contribution in question. The decision to place a military unit on high readiness (standby unit) in, for example an EU Battle Group for military crisis management operations, will also be taken by the President of the Republic on the basis of a government proposal submitted after the government has consulted the Parliament. During the operation the MOD may make minor adjustments to the Finnish contribution. The MOD may also decide to second individual military personnel to military tasks of limited nature in military crisis management or similar tasks in other international crisis management. In both situations, a prior consultation with the MFA is required.

1.2 How does your State ensure that its military capabilities take into account the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability?

Finland's foreign and security policy guidelines have been determined in the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (Prime Minister's Office Publications 32/2020). The goal of Finland's foreign and security policy is to strengthen Finland's international position, to secure its independence and territorial integrity, to strengthen Finland's security and prosperity and to ensure that the society functions efficiently. An important objective of the Finnish foreign and security policy is to take national action and to engage in international cooperation in order to prevent the emergence of armed conflicts and situations endangering Finland's security and society's ability to act, and Finland ending up a party to a military conflict. As a Member State of the European Union, Finland could not remain an outsider should threats to security emerge in its vicinity or elsewhere in Europe. This policy is supported by maintaining a credible national defence capability. By maintaining its defence capability, Finland prevents the use of military force against Finland, shows readiness to respond to the use or the threat of use of military force, and the capacity to repel any attacks against our country. Finland produces security and bears international responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security by participating in international crisis management.

The Government Report on Defence to Parliament provides the defence policy guidelines for the development of Finland's defence. The new Defence Report will be submitted during spring 2021. Finland ensures a credible defence in all circumstances and maintains and develops a defence, which is appropriately scaled to the security environment. The Nordic co-operation, the European Union, NATO partnership and other multilateral cooperation form the framework for Finland's international co-operation. In addition, bilateral defence co-operation especially with Sweden, Norway and the US is of great importance.

Finland continues to participate actively in international training and exercises, military crisis management and in other international co-operation and activities. Participation in military crisis management is part of conducting Finland's foreign and security policy and international co-operation. Finland participates in increasingly complex crisis management operations in ever more demanding and high-risk operating environments. Finland takes into account the changes in international crisis management and evaluates its participation in operations from the standpoint of effectiveness and national goals. By participating in military crisis management Finland simultaneously improves the Defence Forces' capabilities and capacities.

2. Existing structures and processes

2.1 What are the constitutionally established procedures for ensuring democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, intelligence services and the police?

All forces and services mentioned above are subordinate to politically nominated ministers of the Government, which in turn is accountable to the Parliament. The parliamentary committees regularly call in the ministers in their respective fields of competence to hearings on issues of concern. The parliamentary committees are also entitled to monitor the actions of the executive bodies. Individual MP's may pose questions in writing, to which the competent minister has the obligation to reply and also an oral questioning procedure is practiced.

All forces and services mentioned above base their action on relevant legislation, which defines the basis and limitations of their powers. No action may arbitrarily infringe on the fundamental rights of individuals, which are extensively enshrined in the Constitution since a reform in 1995. In case of violations a range of adequate legal and other recourse is available.

The respective forces and services are subjected as follows:

- Armed forces; same authorities and procedures as mentioned in answer to question 1.1.
- Internal security forces; no forces belonging to this category.
- Intelligence services; no separate governmental intelligence exists.
- Military intelligence operates within the Defence Command under the Ministry of Defence
- The Finnish Security Intelligence Service operates under the Ministry of Interior.
- All police activities are controlled (except The Finnish Security Intelligence Service) by the National Police Board.
- Finnish Border Guard is a central national authority responsible for border security in Finland operating under the Ministry of Interior.

These services are based on the relevant laws and controlled by the respective ministries, Government and Parliament and through that linked to the parliamentary control.

2.2 How is the fulfilment of these procedures ensured, and which constitutionally established authorities/institutions are responsible for exercising these procedures?

The Parliamentary Ombudsman has been charged with legal supervisory competence, which extends over the activities of all authorities and other bodies performing public functions. He or she may act on complaints or at his or her own initiative. The Ombudsman submits an annual report to the Parliament on his or her work, including observations on any shortcomings in legislation. Also the Chancellor of Justice of the Government supervises the lawfulness of the official acts of the Government, the President of the Republic and all authorities and other bodies performing public functions. The Chancellor of Justice submits an annual report to the Parliament and the Government on his or her activities and observations on how the law has been obeyed. The Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice may prosecute or order that charges be brought in matters falling within the purview of their supervision of legality. The State Financial Inspectors have the right to control the use of budgetary finances.

After Civil Intelligence Act and Military Intelligence Act entered into force, the Intelligence Ombudsman's office was established. The Intelligence Ombudsman is an independent authority and supervises the legality of civil and military intelligence and the realisation of basic and human rights in intelligence activities.

2.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces, and how does your State control that such forces act solely within the constitutional framework?

The main principles of Finland's defence specified in the Government's Defence Report to Parliament are the following:

- General conscription,
- Territorial defence,
- Defence Cooperation,
- Ability to provide and receive military assistance,
- Training conscripts for wartime units in the reserve and providing the units with the necessary material,
- Development of the peacetime command and administrative structure primarily to meet the wartime requirements,
- Responding to the military threats of various degrees by controlling the readiness of the Defence Forces.

The Army plays a decisive role in defending the country and repelling aggression. The Navy and The Air Force have important roles in territorial surveillance and in protection of territorial integrity.

Organisational oversight is conducted by the Ministry of Defence and the Parliament, especially through the Parliamentary Ombudsman, as well as through topic related authorities such as environmental authorities. Furthermore criminal cases that are not dealt with as disciplinary cases in the Defence Forces are prosecuted by public prosecutor and decided within the civilian court system.

The Border Guard is responsible for border security in Finland as part of Finland's internal security, subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. The main duties are to control Finland's borders on land and at sea, carry out border surveillance, conduct border checks on persons at land border crossing points, ports and airports, and perform search and rescue operations, particularly at sea. The Border Guard also performs police duties, seeks to prevent, expose and investigate severe cross-border crimes in collaboration with other law enforcement authorities in Finland and implements customs controls at border crossing points where the Finnish Customs is not present. The Finnish Border Guard carries out national defence tasks in collaboration with the Finnish Defence Forces.

3. Procedures related to different forces personnel

3.1 What kind of procedures for recruitment and call-up of personnel for service in your military, paramilitary and internal security forces does your State have?

Liability for military service is based on the Constitution, the reformed Conscription Act of 2007 and the Conscription Decree of 2007. Every male Finnish citizen is by law liable for military service and therefore subject to call-up. The period of liability is for male citizens between the ages of 18 to 60.

Under the Conscription Act of 2007, Regional Offices organise call-ups in every municipality, beginning no earlier than on 15 August and ending no later than on 15 December. The call-up is applied to 18 to 29 year-old men (only once). Information on and a notice of the call-up are sent by the Regional Office. A medical examination is also done in municipal health centres in advance to check the ability for military service.

The call-up takes one day during which general information is given. After the medical examination done by a physician, the fitness for military service is determined and the decision for military service is made or a three-man call-up board grants exemption from military service. The board consists of one senior officer, another officer of a lower rank and one representative from the municipality. In general, military service is carried out within the two years following call-up, at the age of 19 or 20 but at the latest before the end of the year when a man turns 30.

Since 1995, it has also been possible for women to perform military service on a voluntary basis. There are no call-ups for women but Regional Offices provide information and medical examinations. A female conscript has the rights and duties equal to those of a male one. The difference is that within 45 days from starting military service she has a right to leave without having to give an explanation or her superior can terminate the service but only for well-justified reasons. After the end of the 45-day period, she is equally liable for service as any man until the end of the age of 60.

The total amount of conscripts is around 20 500 of which some 650 conscripts complete their basic military training at the Border Guard Units. Conscript service at the Border Guard Units is similar to service in Units of the Defence Forces. Conscripts are selected through the call-up organization explained above.

3.2 What kind of exemptions or alternatives to military service does your State have?

Military service is compulsory for men, but on statutory grounds that have been provided in acts and decrees, there are some alternatives to the exemption from military service. Unarmed military service is allowed. For women the military service is possible on a voluntary basis.

A limited or permanent exemption for health reasons can be granted by the military authorities if the health or physical fitness does not fulfil the requirements for military service. A medical certificate is required.

Those registered as permanent residents on the autonomous Åland Islands have a right not to do military service. No alternative service is arranged and no application is required from them. However, they can serve on voluntary basis.

According to the reformed Non-Military Service Act (1446/2007) a man who on grounds of conviction is unable to perform any kind of military service within the Defence Forces will be exempted from military service and he will be liable for civilian service instead. A special application for exemption is required.

A Finnish man who has dual (or multiple) citizenship as well as a man who has been granted Finnish citizenship under the age of 30 are also required to perform military service, but if they have performed it in their second or previous country, they can be exempted from peacetime military service in Finland. A free-form application is required.

A Finnish man who has dual (or multiple) citizenship can be exempted from military service in peacetime if he lives permanently abroad, has no family ties in or connections to Finland, has no property in Finland and will receive no legacy from Finland. A free-form application is required. If living permanently abroad has continued at least 7 years, no application is required.

The legislation for all the above-mentioned cases is based on:

- Conscription Act 1438/2007,
- Conscription Decree 1443/2007,
- Act on Women's Voluntary Military Training 194/1995,
- Decree on Women's Voluntary Military Training 266/1995,
- Act on the Provision of Health Care in the Defence Forces 322/1987,
- Non-Military Service Act 1446/2007,
- Act on the Autonomy of the Åland Islands 1144/1991

3.3 What are the legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all forces personnel as well as conscripts?

Legal and administrative procedures protecting the rights of personnel in the Finnish Defence Forces are based, in general, on law. Protection of the personnel in regular employment is very much the same as with all state civil servants. Detailed provisions are laid down in the State Civil Servants Act (750/1994). The only major differences between personnel employed by the Defence Forces and other state civil servants is that defence personnel can be transferred to another office without their own consent and that there are certain restrictions on political activities for military personnel.

Legal protection of conscripts is based on clear rules of competence and procedures and on the supervisory function of the higher authorities. The constitution proclaims the basic norms and authorization to issue more specific rules and regulations. Conscripts are guaranteed by law the possibility to appeal over the actions of his/her military superiors. A conscript who is dissatisfied with the actions taken by his/her military superiors may have these actions investigated by a higher military superior. In case a military superior has imposed a disciplinary punishment on a conscript, he/she may appeal to a general Court of First Instance.

In addition to the above-mentioned, it is possible to have any actions by military personnel as well as complaints about their treatment, general facilities or medical care etc. in the Defence Forces to be investigated by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. These complaints can be issued in writing or directly to the Ombudsman via internet. The Ombudsman regularly visits several garrisons every year. During these visits, conscripts can discuss privately with the Ombudsman.

In 2020 the Finnish Defence Forces also launched a trial on the internal whistleblowing channel whereby any actions of military personnel can be brought to the attention of the legal division for further investigation.

4. Implementation of other political norms, principles, decisions and international humanitarian law

4.1 How does your State ensure that International Humanitarian Law and Law of War are made widely available, e.g. through military training programmes and regulations?

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Law of War are endorsed through military programmes and regulations at all levels. They are part of the training and education for officers taking BA (Bachelor of Military Science) and MA (Master of Military Science) degrees as well as for conscripts. Reservists are being trained in IHL in rehearsal training and exercises as well as in training provided by the National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK). There are over 20 legal advisors in the Finnish Defence Forces who teach and advise military personnel on International Humanitarian law thus ensuring that IHL and the Law of War are taken into account in the Finnish Defence Forces.

The Finnish Defence Forces conducts teaching and information sequences to all personnel including conscripts and reservists concerning International Humanitarian Law. This training is under constant development.

Personnel taking part in crisis management missions are given special training prior to the transfer to the area of operation. Personnel training for international operations receive special instructions on humanitarian law, the law of war and combating human trafficking as well as special rules of behaviour, which include among other things a zero-tolerance on human trafficking. The training was further developed in 2020 with special real-life simulating situations.

The Defence Forces send participants regularly to the following courses on IHL:

- Course in San Remo arranged by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law,
- Vienna Course on International Law for Military Advisers organized by Austrian Ministry of Defence, the ICRC and the European Security and Defence College,
- Course on LOAC for military personnel organized by the Finnish Red Cross,
- Courses in NATO School concerning IHL and other operational issues,

- Workshop on the Code of Conduct arranged by the Swiss General Staff and the Swiss Military College,
- Course on the Law of Armed Conflict for senior officers of armed forces medical services arranged by the International Committee of Military Medicine

Since 1988 the Government of Finland has, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, provided yearly financial support to the Finnish Red Cross for the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law in Finland. Dissemination has included tailored training for relevant professional military and civilian audiences, such as military staff, prosecutors and judges, as well as general IHL training for wider public.

In addition, Finland has an active national Committee for International Humanitarian Law that also promotes and disseminates IHL. This Committee works under the auspices of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and it brings together IHL experts from different ministries, the Defence Forces, universities and from organisations such as the Finnish Red Cross, the Finnish Branch of Amnesty International and the Finnish Society for the Law of War and Military Law. This national Committee was already established in 1993 with the mandate to especially:

- Co-ordinate the implementation and dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and other international humanitarian law instruments as well as,
- Promote international humanitarian law and raise awareness about the Geneva Conventions and their protocols,
- The committee also shares information about IHL training and different activities in Finland,
- Prepares for the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and other relevant international conferences,
- It also monitors new developments in international humanitarian law and consider their implications for Finland.

As a whole, the Committee offers a valuable venue for expert discussions on international humanitarian law. Stakeholders can easily share information and launch initiatives on IHL. We consider their role very important in enhancing both awareness and implementation of the Geneva Conventions.

4.2 What has been done to ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually accountable under national and international law for their actions?

To ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually held liable under national and international law for their actions, conscripts are trained to be fully familiar with the Code of Conduct in accordance with Article 83 of the 1977 Protocol I additional to the Geneva Convention. The training includes the basics of the Code of Conduct, the set of ten rules for the soldier (An updated version has been issued July 2013) and internationally recognized distinctive emblems. Each soldier is given a copy of the Soldier's Manual, which deals with the essential matters from the soldier's point of view.

Familiarization with the Code of Conduct takes place, as part of the training in security policy, during the basic training period for all conscripts. The combatant's training during the special training period includes lessons related to the Code of Conduct relevant to the training activities of the conscripts.

The Public Information Division of the Defence Staff has compiled the teaching material on security policies, which also includes material for teaching the Code of Conduct. This material includes instructions for the teacher, slides and videotapes. All company-level units have used this material.

See also answer to 4.1.

4.3 How does your State ensure that armed forces are not used to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity?

Finland adheres to most of the Conventions of IHL as well as to the human rights conventions. Finland has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (FTS 8/1976) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (FTS 5/1976). Finland is also a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (FTS 19/1990) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (FTS 60/1991) and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts (FTS 31/2002). Finland is also a party to the Hague Conventions of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (FTS 8/1955), The Additional Protocols I, II (FTS 82/1980) and III (of the Geneva Conventions (the declaration provided for in Article 90 of Protocol I was made when the Protocols were ratified) and The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (FTS 58/2002). The government of Finland respects these conventions and ensures that all people within its jurisdiction are guaranteed the rights and freedoms enacted in these conventions. The Finnish Constitution guarantees democracy, human rights, individual rights, human dignity, equality and justice.

4.4 What has been done to provide for the individual service member's exercise of his or her civil rights and how does your State ensure that the country's armed forces are politically neutral?

Protection of the personnel in regular employment is very much the same as with all state civil servants. Detailed provisions are laid down in the State Civil Servants Act. The only major differences between personnel employed by the Defence Forces and other state civil servants is that defence personnel can be transferred to another office without their own consent and that there are certain restrictions on political activities of military personnel (one cannot be a member of a political party nor be put up as a candidate for parliamentary elections).

Legal protection of conscripts is based on clear rules of competence and procedures and on the supervisory function of the authorities. The constitution proclaims the basic norms and authorization to issue more specific rules and regulations.

By virtue of the Conscript Act, no person may, without an acceptable reason, be placed in a different position due to age, origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, and state of health, disability, gender, sexual orientation or any other reason related to the individual.

In every Finnish garrison, there is a Conscript Committee whose main purpose is to look after and develop the service conditions of conscripts. The members of the Committee are chosen by election among those conscripts who serve in that garrison. Only conscripts have the right to vote in these elections. Finnish conscripts are also free to join the Union of Conscripts, which is a national organization for lobbying and representing the interests of conscripts.

According to the Finnish Penal Code, a soldier or a person in military service in the Border Guard (excluding conscripts), who joins a political party or an association engaged in, or clearly supportive of, party politics, or fails to resign the membership of a party or an association referred to above can be prosecuted for unlawful political activity.

4.5 How does your State ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law?

Under the Constitution of Finland, the competence to conclude treaties is given to the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government. According to the Constitution the acceptance by the Parliament of international obligations and their denouncement is required for such treaties and other international obligations that contain provisions of a legislative nature, are otherwise significant, or otherwise require approval by Parliament under the Constitution. The acceptance by the Parliament is required also for the denouncement of such obligations. The provisions of treaties and other international obligations, in so far as they are of a legislative nature, are brought into force by an Act. Otherwise, international obligations are brought into force by a Decree issued by the President of the Republic.

Finland follows the so-called dualistic tradition; i.e. treaties become internally applicable law only through a domestic legislative act. The incorporation is normally a statute of blanco, a legislative act, which merely refers to the treaty. The hierarchical level of the statute in blanco is either both an Act of Parliament and a decree issued by the President or merely a decree, depending on the consideration mentioned above.

Finland fosters the strengthening of multilateral cooperation and international law. Finland obeys its international obligations closely. This system is in-built in the Finnish Security and Defence policy so that for example when taking new international obligations Finland brings its internal law and workings into conformity with the obligations.

Section III: Public access and contact information

1. Public access

1.1 How is the public informed about the provisions of the Code of Conduct?

Parliamentary and administrative proceedings concerning defence matters are subject to the general rule on the publicity of official documents to which public access is guaranteed by law – The Act on the Openness of Government Activities. This access may only be limited on grounds of national security or on other grounds specified in law, which, inter alia, regulate classification of documents and handling of classified documents.

Mass media, the Internet as well as the publicity activities by the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces themselves are means to disseminate public information on defence matters. The Ministry of Defence has enhanced the possibilities of the general public to access defence information via a major project on developing communication through new technologies and providing access to Ministry's database. The website works in three different languages: Finnish, Swedish and English. Further information on defence matters is available at the Ministry's website at www.defmin.fi and at the website of the Defence Forces at www.mil.fi.

The Ministry of Defence Media and Communications Unit also replies to individual questions and letters from the public. Articles in the major daily papers and TV appearances are a frequent way to communicate to the public on the activities of the Ministry of Defence as well the Defence Forces.

It is highly significant for the Finnish policy of openness that the public not only have access to information but that they also understand the wider framework of our defence planning and the relevant background information related to the armed forces. This is demonstrated for example by distributing to the general public the Government's Defence Report to the Parliament in 2020.

1.2 What additional information related to the Code of Conduct, e.g., replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, is made publicly available in your State?

Besides the Code itself, there are no other publications regarding the Code translated into Finnish language. Naturally, foreign academic research with regard the subject is available through internet for any citizen in Finland.

1.3 How does your State ensure public access to information related to your State's armed forces?

See answer 1.1 of this section.

2. Contact information

2.1 Provide information on the national point of contact for the implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Unit for Security Policy and Crisis Management
Political Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
P. O. Box 176, 00023 Government, Finland
Email: POL-10@formin.fi

Defence Policy Department
Ministry of Defence
P. O. Box 31, 00131 Helsinki, Finland
Email: puolustusministerio@defmin.fi

Implementation of UNSCR 1325 "Women, Peace and Security" Voluntary information exchange

Finland is strongly committed to the implementation of Resolution 1325 and the eight resolutions following it. An important instrument in intensifying the implementation of the Resolution is the 1325 National Action Plan. The third National Action Plan, drawn up in interaction with the civil society, covered the period 2018–2021 and contains four main focus areas for increasing the

participation of women, and gender mainstreaming in conflict prevention and management as well as ensuring the protection of women and girls in conflicts. The update of the National Action Plan for the years 2022-2026 was launched in the autumn of 2021 under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Finnish defence sector (MoD and Defence Forces) has drafted an action plan on the development of gender-related activities and on the division of responsibilities in implementing these tasks within the MOD and Defence Forces. The revised action plan will ensure the implementation of all activities concerning the Finnish Defence Forces, as outlined in the National Action Plan for 1325. The main goals are related to recruitment of personnel, training of gender advisors and gender focal points and their placement in operations, developing operational activities, and education and training of officer students and staff in crisis management, code of conduct, research and follow-up. Most of the goals were achieved in 2021, but development work continues for some goals.

Participation

All activities in the field of peacekeeping aim at implementing UNSCR 1325 as outlined in the 1325 National Action Plan, including increasing the meaningful participation of women. Finland promotes full participation of women in conflict prevention, peace processes, mediation and peace building.

The Finnish Defence Forces strives to increase the number of women serving in the military and taking part in crisis management activities through, inter alia, information campaigns. The proportion of women has risen close to the target of 7% in recent years. At different times, however, the number of women varies. At the end of the year 2019 the proportion of women in military crisis management operations was 7.8%, at the end of the year 2020, the proportion was 4.7% and at the end of the year 2021 the proportion was 5.1 %..

Finland has sent four female employees to the Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). All of them have acted as a course director and teacher. The first one worked in 2014 and 2015. The second worked in 2016 and the third in 2017 - 2019. The fourth started in 2019 and her term of office continues until June 2021. After this, Finland will not send an employee, but Finland will send teachers to different courses.

Defence Forces aims at mainstreaming a gender perspective in the operational activities of Finnish troops in international assignments. Finland supports the recruitment of gender focal points to increase gender awareness in planning, implementation and evaluation of peacekeeping operations. Gender focal points have been introduced in all contingents with more than 50 troops. Finland trains Gender Focal Points in NCGM courses.

Finland regularly recruits women to civilian crisis management missions and deploys experts with specialized knowledge on 1325 and gender. The share of women among civilian crisis management personnel varied between 40–44% in 2021. In 2021, Finnish 1325 & gender experts worked in 12 assignments (Centre of Excellence in Civilian Crisis Management, UNMISS, UN Women, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia, EUAM Ukraine, EUCAP Sahel Mali, Council of Europe, Council of Europe Office in Kyiv, CoE for CCM and OSCE ODIHR).

In 2019 CMC Finland and the Finnish Defence Forces initiated conducting a research on how gender themes are being included in the planning and implementation of operations. The report will be completed in 2021. CMC Finland published a working paper in 2020 on the recruitment of women in civilian crisis management, with specific recommendations on how to further support the recruitment of women to achieve gender parity in civilian secondments.

Operational activities

Ensuring the security of the local population is included in the operational activities in military crisis management according to the mandate of the operation. Along with the development of gender activities, more attention is paid to the security and protection of women and girls. Finnish crisis management forces have taken action to prevent violence and to improve safety.

Together with the management and planning staff, the Finnish Gender Focal Points have directed the activities and data collection of the rotating patrols. Patrols are paying more systematic attention to the situation of women and children and to indications of possible human trafficking and other crime. This will make it possible to better focus Cmic's activities in support of the situation of women and children and to develop contacts with local women's NGOs. Contacts are used to gather information about women and to direct activities to support the work of organizations. Potential trafficking will be reported to the entire operation headquarters, which will plan possible follow-up. Findings and content related to gender activities are reported in the monthly and semi-annual reports submitted to Finland.

Female troops work regularly in rotating patrols, which shows the locals that also women can do traditional male jobs.

Finland exercises a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual harassment and abuse in all crisis management operations, which is emphasized in the rotation training of crisis management forces.

When training local security sector personnel, the Finnish crisis management forces also teach about human rights and physical security of women and girls.

The Finnish Defence Forces are planning to make an attachment for the operative guide for crisis management with specific instructions on how to implement a gender aspect in the planning and action of peacekeeping operations.

Protection

Finland promotes the full realization of human rights of women and girls, including engaging in special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence. Ensuring the security of the local population is included in the operational activities in crisis management according to the mandate of the operation. Along with the development of gender activities, more attention is paid to the security and protection of women and girls. Finnish crisis management forces have taken action to prevent violence and to improve safety. For instance, Finnish crisis management personnel have developed communication with local women and women's organizations to get better information about security threats.

Prevention

Finland emphasizes, both nationally and internationally, the importance of women's political, economic and social rights and participation and the prevention of violence against women.

Good progress is achieved in Civil-Military Cooperation activities. Furthermore, Finnish military and civilian crisis management personnel undertake to observe the Codes of Conduct of both the international organizations carrying out the operations and the Codes of Conduct adopted by Finnish public authorities. Finnish crisis management forces keep close contact with the local civil society and women's rights groups to gain information, which is used to ensure the security of local women and to better their position together with local authorities.

When training local security sector personnel, the Finnish crisis management forces also teach about human rights and physical security of women and girls. Female troops work regularly in rotating patrols, which shows the locals that also women can do traditional male jobs. Finland exercises a zero tolerance policy towards sexual harassment and abuse in all military and civilian crisis management operations, which is emphasized in the rotation training of crisis management forces.

The Finnish Defence Forces are planning to make an attachment for the operative guide for crisis management with specific instructions on how to implement a gender aspect in the planning and action of peacekeeping operations.

Cooperation and lessons learned

The main tool for implementing UNSCR 1325 is the National Action Plan. Different administrative branches as well as civil society organizations and the research community participate broadly in the implementation and follow-up of the National Action Plan. A follow-up/monitoring group, led by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, holds regular meetings to discuss the implementation of the NAP. These meetings are an excellent platform for sharing best practice and lessons learned. Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents a report to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament annually.

Education and training

Finland stresses the importance of gender equality issues in the crisis management training of both women and men at all levels. Peacekeepers leaving for operations are given mission specific rotation training at the Pori Brigade Crisis Management Centre, including training on gender in practice. The Pori Brigade is also responsible for giving the conscript training that is designated for international operations. This also includes training on gender matters.

Further training on crisis management for both military and civilian experts, both from Finland and from abroad, is organized by The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and its civilian counterpart Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC) operating together under the auspices of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management.

The gender perspective is also addressed in officer training. The master's studies at the National Defense University include the module for international training and comprehensive crisis management, one of the goals for students is to know how UNSCR 1325 affects their activities and to define different needs of women, men, girls and boys in the planning and execution of

operations. Some non-commissioned officers already have 1325-training, but the work to include all officers is still ongoing.

All Finnish Gender Advisers for military crisis management are trained at the NCGM in Sweden. Currently there are approximately 30 trained Finnish Gender Advisers. In the future, Finland will primarily send students to gender focal point courses, the implementation of which has begun at the NCGM. Some gender trainers and representatives of management have also taken part in relevant trainings at the Nordic Centre. Finland also trains managers and experts at the seminars of the NCGM. Gender Advisers for civilian crisis management missions are trained at the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden.

All civilian crisis management courses organized by CMC Finland include 1325 and gender aspects. This includes basic training required for all deployed staff, specialized courses on specific themes, and pre-deployment training, in which the topics are discussed in the context of the experts upcoming mission. 1325 and gender topics are also integrated into the practical field exercise of the basic course on civilian crisis management.

In 2021, 30 women and 19 men were trained in the Basic Course on Civilian Crisis Management. Specialized courses organized by CMC Finland had 64 participants (46 men, 18 women). 17 Finnish experts (11 women, 6 men) were sent to specialized courses organized by other institutions.

Further training on crisis management for both military and civilian experts, both from Finland and from abroad, is organized by The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and its civilian counterpart Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC) operating together under the auspices of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management.