Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council

Chairmanship: Austria

2017 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

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CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT

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CHAIRPERSON'S PERCEPTION

The 2017 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) took place in the context of a complex, unpredictable and unstable security environment. Against this background, the Conference was characterized by intensive discussions between the OSCE's 57 participating States, including contributions from Partners for Co-operation and international partner organizations.

Exchanges during the opening session clearly highlighted the need for trust and confidence between participating States as the backbone of a strong OSCE. The ASRC's guiding theme "Strengthening Security Through Dialogue" was reflected in the remarks of the Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), Minister Sebastian Kurz, who stressed that co-operation and willingness to compromise were essential for rebuilding trust and creating comprehensive security in the interest of all participating States. The CiO further emphasized the essential contribution of the OSCE to resolving the crisis in and around Ukraine and defusing tensions related to regional conflicts.

Many delegations referred to difficult and complex security challenges in the OSCE area, including protracted conflicts and evolving transnational threats. These challenges required common responses, with the OSCE being acknowledged as a valuable platform for dialogue in the service of peace and stability. In this context, much gratitude was expressed for the dedicated work of outgoing Secretary General Lamberto Zannier during his six years in office.

The erosion of the rules-based security order in Europe and the violation of fundamental commitments and principles of the OSCE were major concerns for many delegations, undermining the very foundations of co-operative security. While the root causes of this fundamental security crisis were contested, some delegations called for effective communication channels to reduce tensions and prevent military escalations. The Structured Dialogue was widely recognized as an important process to be used for de-escalation and the rebuilding of trust among participating States. In the same vein, many delegations highlighted the need to increase military predictability, transparency and stability.

During the special session on "Ensuring security and stability in the OSCE region in light of developments with respect to Ukraine" there was an intense debate on the crisis in and around Ukraine, which poses a severe challenge to the European security architecture. Interventions by delegations showed the need for new political and diplomatic dynamics to break the cycle of violence and distrust. There was broad agreement that the Minsk agreements represent the only viable path towards a lasting political solution to the conflict. Many delegations expressed appreciation for the different formats facilitating their implementation, including the Trilateral Contact Group and its working groups as well as the Normandy format.

Broad support was expressed for the work of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, which implements its mandate under very difficult circumstances. Many delegations called for an end to intimidation and hostile acts targeting SMM staff and assets, which impose restrictions on the mission's monitoring activities. Several delegations expressed concerns that those responsible for such acts were not being held accountable. Accordingly, the parties were called upon to guarantee the safety and security of SMM

monitors and to grant them unhindered access in line with the mission's mandate. Moreover, there was widespread concern regarding the worsening humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine, specifically related to the shelling of residential areas and the destruction of civilian infrastructure such as water and energy supply lines. Therefore, many delegations underlined the necessity of establishing a lasting and stable ceasefire.

The special session on the Structured Dialogue (SD) proved particularly useful and productive in that it brought together high-level experts from the capitals. Building on the outcomes of previous SD meetings, delegations focused on the risks emerging from the dynamics of diverging threat perceptions and military doctrines and force postures. Many delegations emphasized the need to ensure strategic stability in a security environment characterized by increasing unpredictability. Accordingly, there were calls for greater transparency and more dialogue to minimize risks and reduce uncertainties over force postures. Support was expressed for a systematic analysis or mapping of military capabilities and exercises in the OSCE area in order to identify facts and reduce ambiguities.

Regarding the thematic clustering of pertinent threat perceptions, there was widespread agreement on focusing further discussions on cluster 1 (challenges to the rules-based European security order) and cluster 3 (inter-State tension of politico-military nature). While some delegations considered that exchanges on threat perceptions should also include cybersecurity, hybrid threats, existing conflicts, terrorism and violent extremism, others underlined the need to keep a politico-military focus and to avoid duplication of efforts within other formats.

Discussions during the working session on the OSCE's conflict cycle toolbox showed that the Organization continues to learn important lessons from its response to the crisis in and around Ukraine, notably through the development of Standard Operating Procedures related to early action. Delegations agreed that conflict prevention and resolution lie at the heart of the OSCE's activities. In that regard, many stressed the relevance of Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on elements of the conflict cycle and called for continuous efforts by all of the OSCE's executive structures to strengthen the toolbox by adapting it to current challenges.

Contributions by keynote speakers and many delegations highlighted the need for a people-oriented approach, in particular with a view to addressing the needs of conflict-affected populations on the ground. Accordingly, there was broad agreement that ensuring the meaningful participation of women and civil society in all phases of the conflict cycle constitutes a prerequisite for long-lasting and sustainable peace. Participatory and inclusive processes were supported as an important element of building bridges across political divides, creating space for political agreements and paving the way for more democratic and equitable societies. Formal peace processes should thus be complemented by informal ones whenever possible and appropriate. The OSCE area provides numerous examples of such complementary processes, with many important lessons to be learned.

The working session on conflict and crisis situations in the OSCE area featured intense exchanges between delegations. Many stated that protracted conflicts constituted a major challenge, notably on account of their immense negative impact on affected regions and the livelihood of local populations. Hence, there was broad agreement that more must be done within agreed formats and in accordance with international law to reinvigorate efforts aimed at peaceful conflict resolution. In view of obvious differences and opposing positions,

the Chairmanship believes that discussions on existing conflicts are needed, with the ASRC providing a suitable platform for such exchanges while respecting the existing formats and taking into consideration that all these conflicts are different and display characteristics unique to them alone. Discussions concerning the contribution of Special Representatives of the CiO to conflict prevention and resolution provided valuable insights into possible ways to strengthen the instrument of the Special Representative.

Regarding the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, much support was expressed for the 5+2 format, with many delegations emphasizing the need for substantive results and expressing the wish for a meeting to take place in 2017. Concerning the conflict in Georgia, there was widespread support for the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. In that context, many delegations stated their concerns over increased military footprints and the humanitarian impact of measures restricting the freedom of movement of civilians. On the subject of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, many delegations referred to the significant work of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the CiO, while at the same time expressing alarm over current tensions and calling on the parties to adhere to the ceasefire regime. Differing positions and perceptions of the current state of affairs became apparent in the discussions.

There was general agreement that conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) remain essential pillars of the European security architecture, and as such valuable instruments for ensuring predictability and stability. Accordingly, efforts to reverse their continuous weakening must be reinforced. The task of adapting the OSCE's key mechanisms to current politico-military realities remains a crucial one. The modernization of the Vienna Document was mentioned as a priority issue by many delegations. Moreover, there was widespread support for strengthening incident response instruments and risk reduction mechanisms. At the same time, discussions made it clear that political will remains a key prerequisite to moving forward and that the restoration of confidence must be based on respect for international law and OSCE commitments and principles.

In today's globalized and interconnected world, transnational threats have to be addressed jointly and in a co-operative manner. Related activities have to be carried out with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Security and human rights are mutually reinforcing and not contradictory. Moreover, transnational threats, especially terrorism, must be countered through a comprehensive and integrated whole-of-society approach involving youth, women, civil society and the private sector, both at the national and international level.

In the light of the growing number of terror attacks, more must be done to fight destructive extremist ideologies, notably by offering valid alternative perspectives to groups at risk of becoming radicalized. The nexus between terrorism and organized crime deserves more attention. There are also numerous challenges in the area of cybersecurity, ranging from the protection of critical infrastructure to the safeguarding of fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy. Uncertainty and unpredictability are among the key characteristics of cyber incidents. To prevent tensions and their possible escalation, there was overall agreement that the OSCE should continue its work on the implementation and development of the relevant confidence-building measures (CBMs).

In conclusion, the Chairmanship would like to point out that while discussions during the 2017 ASRC were often controversial, reflecting the current political climate and tensions among participating States, the delegations did nevertheless succeed in conducting a sincere and open dialogue on critical issues, thereby addressing the most pressing security challenges in the OSCE area.

Greater co-operative security can only be achieved by enhancing dialogue and trust in all three dimensions. This year's ASRC has demonstrated that only a strong and effective OSCE will be able to successfully address prevailing challenges and contribute effectively to enhancing co-operative and comprehensive security. Participating States bear the ultimate responsibility for working together towards this common goal. The conclusions of the ASRC will guide the Chairmanship on its way to the Ministerial Council to be held in Vienna in December.

OPENING SESSION: EUROPEAN SECURITY

Opening addresses: Mr. S. Kurz, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria

                                        Mr. J.-P. Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (video message)

                                        Mr. L. Zannier, Secretary General, OSCE

Keynote speakers: Ms. R. E. Gottemoeller, Deputy Secretary-General, NATO

                                        Mr. A. Grushko, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO

In his opening address, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz underlined the urgent need to engage in dialogue and demonstrate willingness for compromise in order to rebuild trust and restore comprehensive security. He highlighted the difficult security environment, which was characterized by a bloc mentality reminiscent of the Cold War, a loss of trust and confidence, unresolved crises, and the threat of terrorism. Ongoing violence defined the critical situation in Eastern Ukraine, which was accompanied by daily ceasefire violations and threats to OSCE monitors. The Chairperson-in-Office spoke about the Chairmanship's efforts to contribute to defusing conflicts. It was necessary for all countries to work together closely on countering terrorism and violent extremism. He was confident that the Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area had the potential to strengthen political and military stability.

Reacting to the opening address, delegations emphasized the importance of continuing the dialogue and stressed the added value inherent in the Annual Security Review Conference. Regarding the current security crisis, one delegation pointed to the gradual expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which it said had created new dividing lines, so that the principle of indivisible security was no longer present among OSCE participating States. Delegations saw the fight against terrorism as one main challenge, but also mentioned other transnational threats such as risks stemming from the use of information and communication technologies, organized crime, and trafficking in human beings. While it was generally recognized that Europe was exposed to multiple challenges, delegations recalled the important role the OSCE could play in tackling these. Levels of transparency and predictability should be raised in order to minimize risks emanating from military build-up, military incidents, miscalculation and unintended escalation.

In her keynote speech, Ms. Rose E. Gottemoeller, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, highlighted the important role of the OSCE in facilitating constructive dialogue against a background of increasing tensions and declining trust. She was optimistic that the Euro-Atlantic community could make progress toward greater security through dialogue. The security system was challenged by a lack of respect for the rules-based international order and by violations of the fundamental values and principles of the OSCE by one participating State. NATO would continue to assist in negotiating a settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine while supporting the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. With regard to

the Structured Dialogue, Ms. Gottemoeller was confident that open and frank dialogue, in particular on threats to the rules-based security order, could contribute to progress being made.

In his video message, Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, underlined the importance of continued dialogue. He praised the partnership of the OSCE with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations. While the task of peacekeeping was more challenging today than ever before, Austria was an experienced and reliable partner of the United Nations in this field.

Keynote speaker Mr. Aleksandr Grushko, Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, said that the Western countries had not sought a genuinely inclusive European security architecture without dividing lines; NATO had systematically expanded eastwards, thus deepening the dividing lines in Europe. All the signs of a new arms race were now in evidence, fuelled by military build-up in NATO countries. The NATO-Russia Council and its working groups and contacts were frozen, despite successful examples of interaction and co-operation in the past. Moreover, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa in particular would require NATO and Russia to co-operate rather than seeing each other as strategic rivals. NATO would need to realize that there was no other option than to look for ways to de-escalate tensions and engage in practical co-operation on a collective, equal, and mutually respectful basis.

Mr. Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE, highlighted the rapidly evolving and complex security situation, which he said was characterized by tensions between States and the return of geopolitics, along with diverging threat perceptions and diminished trust and confidence among participating States. He called for pragmatic engagement and long-term efforts to revive co-operative security. The Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area offered grounds for cautious optimism that a renewed dialogue might also lead to a revival of discussions on conventional arms control and CSBMs. The misuse of information and communication technologies was one of the foremost threats needing to be tackled. Recalling the urgency of making progress in the crisis in and around Ukraine, which was the most challenging political and operational issue on the OSCE agenda, Mr. Zannier called for unwavering collective support for the Special Monitoring Mission. The OSCE would remain focused on conflict situations and on the task of strengthening its active involvement in the conflict cycle. Amongst the greatest challenges faced by the OSCE was that of countering terrorism and violent extremism, which would continue to necessitate innovative and flexible coalitions at all levels.

Discussion

All delegations welcomed the opportunity to engage in debates on the OSCE and the most pressing security threats and challenges. The Annual Security Review Conference continued to constitute a very valuable platform for discussion of the broad range of security issues; similarly, it still provided a comprehensive framework for revising the security work of the OSCE and its participating States. A number of delegations emphasized that the OSCE's key objective was to develop effective responses to common challenges.

Many participants said that the crisis in and around Ukraine was inseparable from the European security situation as a whole. In particular, the necessity to fully implement the Minsk agreements was mentioned. In this context, one delegation called to mind the dangerous consequences for the OSCE's fundamental principles and norms of the rules-based international system being undermined by the actions of one participating State. Another delegation stated that the participating State in question was violating these principles by its aggressive behaviour and the illegal annexation of foreign territory, and called for international solidarity on the matter.

The value of the Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area was highlighted. The importance of the topics that had already been discussed in open and frank ways indicated that it was a crucial step in the right direction. Reflecting on its scope, one delegation stated that it would be useful for the Structured Dialogue to have a broad agenda.

Regarding conventional arms control and CSBMs, many participants stated that the modernization of CSBMs and the Vienna Document could make an essential contribution to rebuilding trust and increasing military transparency and predictability. Others recalled the importance of a well-functioning conventional arms control regime. One delegation emphasized the importance of avoiding a new arms race. Some delegations also saw the Structured Dialogue process as a useful means of developing a common understanding and of reversing the negative trend in connection with these issues.

Delegations singled out terrorism and the radicalization and violent extremism that lead to terrorism as fundamental threats to the societies of OSCE participating States. Consensus-building was required if they were to be effectively countered. One delegation underlined the importance of working more closely together with youth and of looking for ways for young people to make a positive contribution to security. Furthermore, challenges stemming from information and communication technologies required joint action on the part of OSCE participating States, in particular by boosting transparency in cyberspace and ensuring that cyberspace is organized in a peaceful and open manner. Delegations underlined the need to incorporate a multidimensional approach into addressing transnational threats, notably by strengthening links with Partners for Co-operation.

The representative of a multilateral organization's secretariat elaborated on its strategies for ensuring security in the region, in particular by fighting terrorism and preventing conflicts with the help and co-operation of diverse partners and organizations.

One delegation stated that progress in non-proliferation could only be made in association with collaboration on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540.

Some delegations saw the prevention and resolution of conflicts as major priorities, to be pursued in particular by ensuring adherence to OSCE norms and principles and strengthening people-to-people ties. With reference to the protracted conflicts, one delegation stated that participating States would have to return to adherence to the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act and asserted that OSCE commitments should be equally applied without exception. With reference to the main challenges, another delegation turned to the subject of instability in its own neighbourhood and the use of force in protracted conflicts; in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the delegation was concerned that a certain participating State

had no interest in adhering to OSCE principles, relying instead on the use of force for conflict resolution. That participating State responded that the delegation clearly had too narrow an understanding of the ASRC security agenda.

Conclusions and suggestions

1.   The Annual Security Review Conference, as conceived in Porto Ministerial Council Decision No. 3 of 2002, could be used by the OSCE participating States more effectively as a platform for meaningful dialogue and constructive exchanges on the most pressing European security challenges and on how to strengthen the OSCE to address them collectively.

2.   There is a need for increased efforts on developing joint strategies for effectively countering transnational threats, in particular with regard to terrorism and cybersecurity. Strategies could include the use of preventive and rehabilitative measures, fighting root causes, and better co-operation with OSCE Partners for Co-operation.

3.   Participating States could well do further work on the implementation of the adopted sets of cyber CBMs.

4.   The crisis in and around Ukraine remains the most pressing challenge for the OSCE and its participating States. OSCE participating States reiterated the need for the Minsk agreements to be implemented. Many are convinced that the crisis in and around Ukraine is inseparable from the European security situation in a whole. A new political and diplomatic dynamic may be needed to break the cycle of violence in eastern Ukraine and improve the humanitarian situation for the civilian population, including measures to mitigate and reduce ecological risks in the conflict area.

5.   Broad support was expressed for the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) and its members. The participating States need to continue to promote the work of the SMM in eastern Ukraine and to call upon the two sides to facilitate the full implementation of the SMM's mandate and urgently stop threats against as well as harassment and/or intimidation of its members.

6.   It was widely recognized that the Structured Dialogue would be an important process for de-escalating the military and political situation. Participating States should continue to engage in the Structured Dialogue, in particular by involving their capitals in the process in order to foster a better common understanding on issues in the wider politico-military context.

7.   It was widely recognized that conventional arms control and CSBMs remain essential pillars of the European security architecture and valuable instruments for ensuring military transparency, predictability and stability. Participating States could further step up their efforts to reverse the current weakening of these instruments. Reinvigorating conventional arms control and modernizing the Vienna Document could contribute to adapting the politico-military toolbox to the realities of the strategic environment.

8.   Against the backdrop of increased politico-military tension, military build-up, and the potential for escalation due to military incidents, participating States could use the OSCE as a forum for making more frequent military-to-military contacts and establishing appropriate communication channels, as well as for further developing risk reduction mechanisms.

SPECIAL SESSION:
ENSURING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE OSCE REGION IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO UKRAINE

Keynote speakers: Mr. O. Makeiev, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Mr. R. Martin de Lagarde, Head of Department for Russia and Eastern Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France

Mr. A. Prothmann, Head of Task Force Ukraine, Federal Foreign Office of Germany

Mr. T. Mayr-Harting, Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia, European External Action Service (EEAS)

Moderator: Ambassador Alena Kupchyna, Permanent Representative of Belarus to the OSCE

Rapporteur: Ms. A. Klussmann, Permanent Mission of Germany to the OSCE

The moderator Ambassador Kupchyna opened the session by describing the crisis in and around Ukraine as one of the most problematic situations in the OSCE area and one that had a destabilizing effect on the entire European region. The OSCE was one of the few international organizations, if not the only one, that had made a meaningful positive contribution to the situation in eastern Ukraine; further, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) had a critically important task in its mandate of overseeing the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Ms. Kupchyna also referred to the mediation efforts in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), where a good number of decisions had been agreed upon in the fields of economics and security, though in her judgement there had been a lack of implementation on the ground. The Austrian Chairmanship was making priorities of further supporting the SMM Monitors and looking at the wider impact of the crisis on security in the OSCE area. Ms. Kupchyna recommended considering concrete steps for improving the situation on the ground, especially economic steps in the region.

The first keynote speaker, Oleksii Makeiev, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, emphasized that the conflict in and around Ukraine was having a critical impact on security in the OSCE area and asserted that Russian aggression in the Donbas region and its illegal occupation of Crimea were the main driving forces behind the conflict, referring in this connection to the OSCE fundamental principles relating to sovereignty and territorial integrity. He deplored the fact that the Russian Federation was continuing to train separatist forces and supplying them with personnel and equipment while at the same time attempting to "blind" the SMM. In addition, the Russian Federation was carrying out a creeping integration of the Donbas region into its socio-economic space by accepting travel documents of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, introducing its own currency, and seizing Ukrainian enterprises. Mr. Makeiev also deplored the deteriorating human rights situation in Crimea and the worsening situation of the population in the conflict

area caused by the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. In this regard, the "harvest ceasefire" agreed in the TCG on 24 June gave some cause for hope, though Mr. Makeiev deplored the disregard for it shown by the Russian Federation. While Ukraine remained committed to the Minsk agreements, it could not be expected to make progress on its political elements until there was a sustainable ceasefire including unimpeded access for the SMM and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The monitoring of the uncontrolled borders between the Russian Federation and Ukraine was at present a particularly crucial factor.

The second keynote speaker, Mr. Raphaël Martin de Lagarde, Head of Department for Russia and Eastern Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, recalled the spirit of the Minsk agreements, namely, to make progress on the political and security fronts, in particular with regard to the implementation of agreements. While France was part of the Normandy format, the OSCE was of crucial importance for implementation. Germany and France were continuing to make all possible efforts for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, for example through sanctions against the Russian Federation, which were in accord with the EU policy. While commending the Government of Ukraine for the progress it had made on such matters as constitutional questions, the special status of the Donbas region, local elections, and amnesties, he emphasized that progress needed to be made on security aspects (i.e., demining) in order for real political progress to be made. On the humanitarian level, he hoped that the sides will exchange complete lists of prisoners soon and called on the parties to work on an "all for all" exchange as foreseen by the Minsk agreements. Furthermore, he called on the *de facto* authorities to allow the return to the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk of humanitarian assistance provided by international organizations and NGOs, and to provide more crossing points for the local population, especially around Zolote.

The following keynote speaker, Andreas Prothmann, head of the Ukraine task force at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, said that improving the security situation was a pressing issue. According to the logic of the Minsk agreements a stable security situation was a prerequisite for all other steps, in particular for political steps. Three issues were of particular importance: a reliable ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and disengagement. Against this background, the speaker welcomed the "harvest ceasefire" agreed in the TCG on 24 June. He called on the parties to provide the SMM with unhindered and safe access throughout the conflict zone and on the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination to play its co-ordinating role in order to enable the sides to transmit mining maps and start on the marking and fencing of mined areas. So far, hardly any of the TCG's security-related agreements had been implemented. There was an increasing lack of co-operation between non-government-controlled and government-controlled areas, resulting in a further, and very worrying, disintegration of the Donbas region, where the local population was in a deplorable situation on account of the volatile security situation and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure. Further stabilizing the security situation and improving the situation of the SMM remained priority issues in the Normandy Format, in order to generate progress in the political field. Mr. Prothmann concluded with the assertion that the lack of progress was not due to the format but to lack of political will.

The last keynote speaker, Thomas Mayr-Harting, Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia, European External Action Service (EEAS), recalled that the crisis in and around Ukraine was not only a regional crisis, but posed a challenge to the whole European security architecture and, in addition, to the core principles and commitments of the OSCE. The key factor now was genuine political will to find acceptable solutions, as the main provisions of the Minsk agreements were clear enough, namely, first and foremost the

cessation of hostilities. He called on the parties guarantee the safety and security of SMM observers and to grant them unrestricted access to all conflict areas. He called on the Russian Federation to live up to its commitments and to use its influence over the separatists to ensure that they fulfil their obligations. The Russian Federation's recognition of travel documents of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, adoption of the rouble as currency, assumption of control over Ukrainian companies in Donetsk and Luhansk, and declaring the line of contact a "State border" of the so-called "DPR" were not in line with the letter or spirit of the Minsk agreements. Mr. Mayr-Harting also reiterated the call to all sides to withdraw heavy weapons and recalled that the EU sanctions against the Russian Federation were linked to the complete implementation of agreements of the Trilateral Contact Group. He was convinced that economic steps were the best tools for achieving and maintaining peace.

Discussion

A large number of delegations stressed that the crisis in and around Ukraine posed a serious challenge to European security, and called for respect for OSCE principles and international law in order for the crisis to be overcome. However, there was disagreement as to the nature of the crisis; while many delegations asserted that armed aggression was at its origin, one delegation underlined its internal nature.

There was broad agreement among delegations on the validity of the Minsk agreements and of the Minsk process with its various formats for facilitating implementation of the agreements. The majority of delegations expressed strong support for the Special Monitoring Mission and condemned attacks on its personnel and equipment. One delegation criticized the lack of representation of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, and the fact that there was no alternative to the TCG format. Recalling the death of an SMM monitor on 23 April, many delegations underlined the importance of the security and safety of monitors in high-risk areas; in addition, concerns were expressed that those responsible for such acts were not being held accountable. Furthermore, delegations underlined the importance of demining. In order to fulfil its mandate, the SMM required unimpeded access. All the delegations offered condolences to the family of the SMM monitor who died in action on 23 April 2017, with a number of delegations calling for a swift, thorough and impartial investigation of this incident.

A number of delegations deplored the worsening situation of the local population in eastern Ukraine. Citing United Nations reports, delegations expressed concern at the increase in the numbers of people affected by the conflict. The livelihood of the people in the conflict area was being endangered by the shelling of residential areas and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, notably water and energy supplies.

Special emphasis was therefore laid on the necessity of establishing a lasting and stable ceasefire. In that regard, delegations expressed hope in the so-called "harvest ceasefire" agreed in the TCG on 24 June, which had led to a reduction of hostilities, though not to their cessation.

Conclusions and suggestions

1.   Although diverging views on the crisis in and around Ukraine were presented, there was broad agreement on the necessity of the full implementation of the Minsk agreements if a sustainable political solution was to be reached.

2.   Many delegations expressed strong support for the SMM and highlighted its special role in the implementation of the Minsk agreements. All delegations called for an end to attacks on its personnel and equipment and to restrictions on its monitoring work. The fatal incident of 23 April was deplored by many and a swift, thorough and impartial investigation was called for.

3.   Against the background of the dire situation of the local population in eastern Ukraine, many delegations emphasized the necessity of reaching a sustainable ceasefire. Although no complete cessation of hostilities had so far been reached, the "harvest ceasefire" agreed in the TCG on 24 June was seen as an important step.

SPECIAL SESSION:
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE STRUCTURED DIALOGUE

Session introduction: Mr. Ł. Kulesa, Research Director, European Leadership
Network

Moderator: Mr. E. Pohl, Permanent Representative of Germany to the
OSCE

Rapporteur: Ms. M. Brandstetter, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre

Mr. Łukasz Kulesa, of the European Leadership Network, introduced the session by outlining the current situation in the OSCE area. Against the background of an eroding arms control architecture, changes in military force postures and an overall lack of trust, the potential for escalation had increased as evidenced by forward deployments, snap exercises, the increased combat readiness levels of air defence forces, proximity of forces and frequent military exercises. In his view, the gravity of the situation required more than mere routine actions to reduce those risks effectively. Multilateral strategic stability could be conducive to progress in risk reduction while dialogue continued on issues related to the international rules-based order. The building blocks for such strategic stability could be constructed on the basis of enhanced politico-military and military-to-military dialogue, effective de-escalation mechanisms and crisis management tools, as well as the full implementation of existing arms control mechanisms and their modernization.

Discussion

Following the keynote speech by Mr. Kulesa, participating States provided their assessments of the Structured Dialogue, the work of the Informal Working Group (IWG) *Structured Dialogue* and their views on the way forward.

Many participating States commended the work of the Chair of the IWG and said that the Structured Dialogue process had started well and should remain inclusive, well structured, driven by the participating States, and without predetermined outcomes. The spirit of the Hamburg Ministerial Council Declaration that had launched the Structured Dialogue should be preserved. Many participating States expressed support for the focus selected for the first thematic meetings on threat perceptions, military doctrines and military force postures, which were acknowledged to be connected and intertwined. Even though many participating States faced similar challenges, the meetings on those important but controversial topics had revealed both divergences and convergences among participating States. Many participating States noted the evolving security environment and the need to enhance transparency, trust and predictability in that regard.

Many participating States appreciated the thematic clustering of topics as suggested at the Structured Dialogue meeting of 7 April, underlining the politico-military focus of the process, and they attached particular importance to cluster 1 (Challenges to the rules-based European security order) and cluster 3 (Inter-State tension of a politico-military nature). Some participating States were in favour of also addressing interrelated issues such as cyber threats, hybrid warfare and protracted conflicts, or of widening the scope beyond the

politico-military realm to include terrorism and violent extremism, migration, xenophobia, and human rights. Other participating States called for the scope to be narrowed and for concentration on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). A note of caution was expressed to avoid the duplication of the efforts in other formats.

Many participating States were concerned about the violation of fundamental OSCE principles, asserting that the ongoing violations of the Helsinki Final Act posed a serious challenge to the European rules-based order, and they called for a return to the tenets of international law. A number of participating States, noting the need for a contemporary vision of security, welcomed future discussion on the concept of enhanced multilateral strategic stability. However, as one participating State noted, such a concept must not be interpreted as consolidating ongoing violations of the OSCE principles.

Many participating States characterized the European security environment as unstable and unpredictable with a high potential for escalation. A priority identified by many participating States for discussions within the Structured Dialogue was the minimization of risks from unintended military incidents. Participating States called for better risk management and de-escalation measures, including through fact-finding and clarification. Many participating States also noted that the ambiguity in the current military trends in force postures needed to be reduced. A better understanding of intentions was needed. In this regard, support was expressed for the idea of a systematic expert-level analysis, or "mapping", of force postures and military exercises. Participating States stressed that such mapping could provide more clarity on facts and figures and serve as a basis for future discussions. Some participating States said that such mapping should also include paramilitary forces, cyber threats and new technologies.

Many participating States stressed the need to fully implement existing politico-military commitments, since selective implementation contributed to ambiguity and unpredictability. Many participating States stressed the modernization of the Vienna Document as crucial to increasing transparency and trust and to dispel concerns about intentions. Attention was drawn to several proposals already made on the Vienna Document.

Several participating States noted that the opposing threat perceptions were aggravated when large scale and snap military exercises were conducted without transparency. In that regard, participating States were encouraged to provide voluntary briefings at FSC meetings. One participating State said that due to the lack of active communication channels, voluntary transparency measures often do not reach the addressee, and that in the current environment transparency measures would have a limited impact on political assessments.

Several participating States said that discussions on force postures revealed that the current tools for increasing transparency were not sufficient, and there was a need to adapt the existing conventional arms control and CSBM architecture to current security requirements. Some participating States said that the Structured Dialogue could assist the OSCE in producing a conceptual framework for a future conventional arms control regime. Other participating States expressed the view that conventional arms control was not a panacea to solve the problems of European security, but an element of stability in Europe.

Some participating States said that conflict settlement was an essential element for ensuring stability in the OSCE area and that conflict resolution and CSBMs were mutually reinforcing tools. Other participating States stressed that all previous attempts to discuss protracted conflicts outside their mandated formats had not been productive.

In conclusion, the Chair noted the widely shared view that the current security situation was volatile with a high potential for escalation. He summarized the discussion on possible building blocks to enhance multilateral strategic stability that were introduced into the discussion and noted widespread support for the proposal on conducting a common systematic analysis of trends in military force postures and exercises. Finally, he said that the Chairperson's Interim Report on the Structured Dialogue could serve as a basis for an interim assessment of the process at the Informal Meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers to be held in Mauerbach.

Conclusions and suggestions

1.   The European security environment was characterized as unstable and unpredictable, with a high potential for escalation. There were great concerns about the violation of fundamental OSCE principles; in particular, the ongoing violations of the Helsinki Final Act posed a serious challenge to the European rules-based order.

2.   There was widespread support for the focus selected for the first thematic meetings on threat perceptions, military doctrines and military force postures, which were acknowledged to be connected and intertwined. The meetings on those important but controversial topics had revealed divergences and convergences among participating States. Future discussion on the concept of enhanced multilateral strategic stability and its building blocks was considered useful for future discussions.

3.   The evolving security environment necessitated enhanced transparency, trust and predictability. In that regard, many participating States saw a need to minimize the risks from unintended military incidents through enhanced risk reduction and de-escalation measures, including fact-finding and clarification.

4.   A high priority was attached to the full implementation of existing politico-military commitments. Selective implementation contributed to ambiguity and unpredictability. Many participating States stressed that the modernization of the Vienna Document was crucial to increasing transparency and trust and dispelling concerns about intentions.

5.   There was wide support for a proposal on engaging in a common systematic analysis of trends in military force postures and exercises. Such "mapping" would provide more clarity on facts and figures and serve as a basis for future discussions.

6.   Discussion on force postures revealed that the current tools for increasing transparency were not sufficient, and a number of participating States saw the need to adapt the existing conventional arms control and CSBM architecture to current security requirements. Some participating States were of the view that the Structured Dialogue could assist the OSCE in producing a conceptual framework for a future conventional arms control regime.

WORKING SESSION I:
EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION: LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY AHEAD

Keynote speakers: Mr. E. Fouéré, Associate Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Ms. T. Talvitie, Executive Director, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)

Moderator: Ms. G. Kramer, Director, Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution

Rapporteur: Ms. A. Holzinger, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE

In her opening remarks, the moderator Ms. Gudrun Kramer underlined the important role both of civil society and of women across all elements of the conflict cycle and outlined some of the key findings of a high-level retreat on successful peace processes and inclusion of women organized by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and the 2017 Austrian OSCE Chairmanship earlier in the year. Pre-assessment interviews and discussions at the retreat revealed certain shortcomings in peace processes in the OSCE area, such as the absence of women from formal peace processes, and missing links between formal and informal peace efforts. Against this background Ms. Kramer underlined the timely nature and relevance of the present working session devoted to the enhancement of peace efforts in the OSCE area through the inclusion of civil society and women.

Mr. Erwan Fouéré, Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), highlighted three key aspects of successful peace processes, namely: 1) respecting diversity; 2) learning and drawing conclusions from past peace processes, while keeping in mind the particularities of each conflict; and 3) broadening traditional approaches to peace processes and mediation by recognizing the positive input of civil society, including local communities, business actors and parliamentary groups. He pointed to empirical evidence showing that the early inclusion of civil society at all stages of conflict increases the chances for the success and sustainability of final peace agreements. Civil society organizations are well equipped to build bridges across the political divide and foster trust at the local level. Formal peace efforts should be accompanied by inclusive and participatory processes promoting a broad dialogue with a wide range of actors, as these processes build local ownership and ensure that root causes of conflicts are addressed. As a positive example of civil society's inclusion in peace processes, the speaker quoted the Northern Ireland peace process, in which the early inclusion of civil society, in particular at grass-roots and community levels had led to greater public acceptance of the settlement. Civil society consultation processes such as the ones established in the Transdniestrian settlement process were useful tools in fostering broad dialogues. Mr. Fouéré encouraged the OSCE to collect examples from its area, identify lessons learned, and conduct impact assessments in order to gain a better understanding of the positive impact of civil society's inclusion in all stages of conflicts.

Ms. Tuija Talvitie, Executive Director, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), focused on women's inclusion in peace processes and stressed that promoting women's meaningful participation at all stages of peace efforts is not just the right but also the smart thing to do. Empirical evidence showed that women bring in new viewpoints and narratives that are critical to the broader population and contribute to greater legitimacy of peace processes. Moreover, as peace processes are decisive moments when the rules of the political game can be rewritten, women's inclusion at such critical junctures can pave the way for more just and equitable societies. While there is a broad normative framework on women's inclusion in peace and security efforts at the regional and international level, Ms. Talvitie argued that this had not changed the state of play in conflict-affected countries and norms had only been translated into action to a limited extent. Despite several UN Security Council resolutions on the women, peace and security agenda and the adoption of National Action Plans in almost 30 countries in the OSCE area mandating women's inclusion in peace and security efforts, women continue to be excluded from peace processes. The OSCE has a key role to play in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in the region, and is therefore in a good position to change practice on the ground. According to Ms. Talvitie, three major factors are hampering progress, namely: 1) women's broader exclusion from politics and society, which translates into women's exclusion from peace and security efforts; 2) a limited understanding of peace processes, focusing too heavily on track 1 activities/formal peace negotiations and overlooking opportunities for informal peace efforts at the local level; and 3) a lack of financial and human resources devoted to the women, peace and security agenda, currently accounting for only two per cent of all peace- and security-related funding. In order to strengthen the role of women in conflict resolution at the OSCE, Ms. Talvitie suggested focusing on action and translating political commitments into practical measures on the ground, looking beyond the negotiation table and understanding peace processes in the OSCE area in broader terms, and, given the key importance of complementarity between actions and actors, connecting informal and formal processes.

Delegations agreed that the meaningful inclusion of women and civil society at all stages of a conflict is essential for long-lasting, sustainable and inclusive peace, and that action towards mainstreaming gender throughout the whole conflict cycle needs to be stepped up. One delegation underlined the importance of full implementation of the OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality in this regard, and welcomed the organization by the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship in June 2017 of the Second Gender Equality Review Conference, which also discussed ways to mainstream gender in the security sector as an essential element of the conflict cycle.

Discussion

Delegations agreed that early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution, and post-conflict rehabilitation lie at the heart of the OSCE's activities, with strong emphasis being laid on the relevance and full implementation of all aspects of Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on elements of the conflict cycle. One delegation noted that in particular conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation should receive the same attention as the other phases of the conflict cycle. While some delegations perceived the OSCE toolbox as sufficient to account for the realities of today's security environment, other delegations stressed the need to strengthen the OSCE's capabilities in early warning, early action and crisis management. One delegation pointed out that while the OSCE conflict cycle

toolbox has many useful instruments, they appear to be inadequate for situations involving direct military aggression. Delegations suggested the updating of Vienna Document confidence- and security-building measures, the strengthening of human rights protection mechanisms, and the establishment of a standing OSCE mechanism for immediate reaction to emerging conflicts. Another delegation called for the strengthening of the OSCE's crisis management capabilities in the light of recent developments, in particular its peacekeeping tools such as the High-Level Planning Group. Increased attention to mediation as an important element of all phases of the conflict cycle was also mentioned. One delegation pointed out that as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE should ensure that its mediation activities are undertaken in conformity with the principles and standards developed by the United Nations. One delegation commended the work done by the 2016 German OSCE Chairmanship to strengthen the OSCE's capabilities across the conflict cycle, and voiced regret that it had not been possible to achieve consensus on a decision on this subject at the Hamburg Ministerial Council. Several delegations argued that the OSCE conflict cycle toolbox should be constantly reviewed in order to allow the Organization to respond effectively to new and current challenges.

There was recognition for the important work across the conflict cycle done by the Conflict Prevention Centre, the autonomous institutions, the OSCE field missions and other executive structures of the OSCE; in this connection, a number of delegations stressed the need to make sufficient resources available to them to allow them to implement their mandates fully. One delegation underlined the key role of the autonomous institutions in early warning and called for the preservation of their strong and flexible mandates. Another delegation stressed that OSCE field missions should play a greater role in monitoring, in early warning, and in addressing conflict situations.

Conclusions and suggestions

1.   Assessing and learning from past peace processes should be encouraged, as useful conclusions can be drawn for current peace efforts.

2.   The meaningful participation of women and civil society in all stages of the conflict cycle should be ensured, as it is a prerequisite for long-lasting, sustainable and inclusive peace.

3.   Traditional approaches to mediation and peace processes should be broadened. Inclusive and participatory processes that involve different segments of society at an early stage, including women, civil society, local communities, business actors, parliamentary groups, and the media, increase the legitimacy, stability and success chances of peace processes.

4.   Consultation processes with civil society and women's groups are an important element in building space for inclusive dialogue; they can build bridges across political divides, create constituencies for political agreements, and pave the way for more democratic and more equitable societies.

5.   Informal peace processes at local level deserve greater attention. Concentrating solely on official peace negotiations/track 1 activities leads to other opportunities being overlooked; complementarity between formal and informal peace processes is of key importance.

6.   The OSCE should develop a collection of examples of civil society's inclusion in conflicts in its area, identify lessons learned, and conduct an assessment of the impact of civil society's inclusion.

7.   Women's participation in peace processes in the OSCE area remains marginal. To ensure that women make meaningful contributions to peace and security, the political commitments enshrined in the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11, and UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions need to be put into concrete action on the ground.

8.   Adequate human and financial resources should be dedicated to the women, peace and security agenda.

9.   Increased attention should be given to mediation as an important element in all phases of the conflict cycle.

10.   The OSCE conflict cycle toolbox should be constantly reviewed in order to enable the Organization to respond effectively to new and current challenges.

11.   OSCE field missions could play a greater role in monitoring, early warning, and addressing conflict situations.

WORKING SESSION II:
CONFLICT AND CRISIS SITUATIONS IN THE OSCE AREA: BUILDING SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE

Keynote speakers: H.E. W.-D. Heim, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process

        H.E. G. Bächler, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus

Moderator: Ms. R. Cristescu, Head of Eurasia Department, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)

Rapporteur: Ms. S. Michael, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the OSCE

The first keynote speaker, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, outlined the situation of that mediation process. From the very beginning, the establishment of the principle of the equality of the sides in mediation had enhanced the quality, level and structure of the dialogue. Current efforts were focused on building on the achievements of 2016; under the OSCE German Chairmanship, dynamism had been restored to the "5+2" process after a long period, with a formal meeting in Berlin and the conclusion of the June Protocol, in which some important principles had been reaffirmed. The other significant milestone had been the statement adopted at the Hamburg Ministerial Council meeting underlining the need to advance work, reaffirming the "5+2" format as the only mechanism through which to achieve resolution and calling on the sides to engage constructively in outcome-based meetings of the format, in order to achieve tangible progress. After the recent elections in Moldova, the discussions had received input from new participants in the meetings, including an updated agenda for the settlement process. On the political level, the chief negotiators continued to meet regularly in Tiraspol and Chisinau, and recently in Bender, to address the substance of the eight issues under discussion.

Positive aspects included the continuity of the process, the expansion of the substance of talks, the presence of new stakeholders in Chisinau and Tiraspol, the reconfirmation of the agenda and the addition of new items which were agreed on by both sides and seen as relevant to the settlement process. Finally, he said that the positive foundation for further dialogue included the benefits of geography and common languages of communication. Overall, the OSCE's close relationships with all sides facilitated the discussions.

The second keynote speaker, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, said that the Geneva International Discussions covered stability and security on the ground, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and any additional issue agreed on by the participants. Participants attended in a personal capacity as experts and met four times a year in two working groups. At the recent 40th round of the Discussions, some frustration about the lack of progress was visible on all sides. The entire package of aspects of the Discussions needed to be implemented, not only

selected parts thereof. The format was well established and valued by all participants; all sides agreed that the Discussions should continue. All sides agreed on the need to achieve progress on a non-use of force agreement; much had been achieved in that regard in four years and agreement on a consent paper should be reached soon. More progress was also needed in Working Group II, which dealt with best practice on crossings, freedom of movement, documentation, missing persons, multilingual education, environmental concerns and cultural heritage. During the next round, efforts would be made to find ways to enhance (although not change) the format of the working groups, which was currently rather rigid.

The Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) had been added in late 2008, separately covering the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They included Russian border guards, as well as the UN, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and the OSCE, represented by the Special Representative, as moderators. The IPRM was not a process, but a mechanism for prevention and de-escalation, which covered the security situation and related issues, detentions of people crossing the administrative boundary line, humanitarian issues, missing persons and farmers' access to land. It also focused on the issue of "borderization", regularly pointing to the different perspectives and narratives around this question.

Responding to the moderator´s question concerning his role in the Nagorno-Karabakh context, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus explained his involvement was limited. . He worked very closely with the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference, with whom he exchanged views regularly. He regretted very much the lack of progress in the conflict´s resolution, and noted that unlike in the case of the Geneva International Discussions, there was no clearly established format on how to deal with principles and resolution.

Meetings were held between the Presidents, Co-Chairs, the Personal Representative, and also the High-Level Planning Group operated within the limits of its mandate, but there was no ongoing process. The German and Austrian Chairpersons-in-Office had initiated discussions to support the Co-Chairs in their efforts; both Mr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Mr. Sebastian Kurz had expressed their commitment to finding a solution and the Chairmanship urged all sides to work on a peaceful solution and avoid further escalation.

Both speakers stressed that while the process of ensuring the co-ordination of co-chairs or other international actors in those formats could be somewhat time-consuming, it was less difficult than might be imagined, and good working relationships were beneficial. In response to the question about what the OSCE's strengths in mediation were, both speakers highlighted the range of support they were able to draw on from the OSCE Secretariat, particularly from the Conflict Prevention Centre, other OSCE field operations, former members of OSCE field operations and Chairmanship colleagues. The Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process highlighted the OSCE's unique range of experience and access in the region, and the co-mediators' knowledge of the sides and which steps they would find most difficult. In the current situation, only political will was required to proceed on many aspects; the technical work had been done. The Special Representative for the South Caucasus said that the platform provided the opportunity to find creative ways forward, for example through the publication of expert non-papers on certain issues, through

the organization of a conference at Wilton Park on status neutral security measures, as well as through discussing measures proposed in other conflict settings, such as the measures on border crossings proposed in Cyprus.

Discussion

Delegations agreed that the protracted conflicts posed a risk to the security of the entire OSCE area and a major challenge to the OSCE. The severe impact of the conflicts on civilian populations was also widely noted. Many delegations highlighted the importance of restoring respect for international principles and commitments, including the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter, and some delegations said that what the OSCE had witnessed in those conflicts was the violation by a State of a neighbouring State's sovereignty and right to choose its own foreign policy. Some delegations said that the OSCE was uniquely placed to help resolve those protracted conflicts and expressed support for confidence-building measures in that regard. Several delegations mentioned that the OSCE provided a useful and important platform for dialogue, rebuilding trust and restoring security based on OSCE principles and commitments. Some delegations also called for the OSCE to take more action, and not to accept the status quo but to assign a high priority to the conflicts in its work. One delegation called on the OSCE to use its resources to provide more information to the international community about the situation in the conflict zones, also calling for the protracted conflicts to be discussed in the Structured Dialogue and hoping for a Ministerial Council decision on concrete steps. The majority of delegations welcomed the opportunity to discuss the protracted conflicts in the Annual Security Review Conference format, but one delegation said that that encouraged unhelpful rhetoric and did not achieve anything. One delegation expressed regret that the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference were not present to share their assessment of the challenges faced in the conflict settlement process.

Many delegations expressed their support for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Moldova, in line with Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity with a special status for Transdniestria. Several delegations expressed support for the Special Representative's approach and the results-focused process; however, one delegation disagreed with the Chairmanship's approach that meetings should not be held without tangible outcomes and questioned whether it would be possible to agree on another Ministerial decision on that basis. Furthermore, regular meetings without any preconditions were needed for building trust and without such meetings, new problems might arise. The delegation in question further commended recent actions taken by the leadership in Tiraspol, such as dropping charges against some Republic of Moldova government officials, but expressed disappointment at a lack of progress by the Government of the Republic of Moldova. The same delegation was concerned that the party from Tiraspol was not accorded the status of a fully-fledged participant in the negotiating process. All parties needed to compromise and relinquish maximalist positions.

Many other delegations called for work across all three baskets to continue and for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region. Two delegations suggested transforming the peacekeeping operation into a civilian police mission under the auspices of the OSCE, while two delegations also called for greater exchange of information on military exercises. One delegation called for the barriers to OSCE access to Transdniestria to be removed, also noting the commitment by the Government of the Republic of Moldova to developing a concept

document on Transdniestria and hoping that this would be finalized soon. One delegation confirmed its commitment to the Berlin Protocol of June 2016, but felt that the resolution of issues or confidence-building measures should be in alignment with the ultimate goal of integrating the whole region into the Republic of Moldova, with a special status for Transdniestria. Previously, it had been possible to work with the business community in Transdniestria to ensure that they could engage in trade, and that same principle would continue to be applied to the border crossing between Moldova and Ukraine at Kurchurgan. The delegation expressed confidence that it would be possible to find practical solutions to many issues; the key to progress was commitment and the international co-ordinators should continue their work.

With regard to the situation in Georgia, many delegations called for greater OSCE access to the breakaway regions and some called for an enhanced OSCE role in Georgia. Many delegations confirmed their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Georgia, in accordance with Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Many expressed their support for the Geneva International Discussions and the IPRMs and two delegations noted the importance of the EU, UN and OSCE Co-Chair roles. Many delegations also expressed their concern at increased "borderization" along the administrative boundary line and its negative impact on civilians. Several delegations also negatively highlighted the dropping of the investigation into the death of a Georgian civilian on the administrative boundary line and the closure of crossing points. Several delegations were also concerned by an increase in the Russian military presence and called urgently for an agreement on non-use of force. Two delegations expressed their opposition to the integration of armed forces in the breakaway Georgian regions into the Russian armed forces and rejected the March 2017 and November 2016 agreements made by one participating State in that regard; those delegations would not recognize those agreements. One delegation expressed its frustration at the lack of progress and would like to see advances on a non-use of force agreement, internationally displaced persons and security measures. It would continue to seek to facilitate people-to-people links, but rejected unilateral measures such as the recent so-called parliamentary and presidential elections in the breakaway regions, the "referendum" on changing the name of the Tskhinvali region and reports that another "referendum" would be held. It also expressed concern over the lack of access to education in the chosen language of instruction and cases of arbitrary detention, as well as discrimination against ethnic Georgians in the breakaway regions. Finally, the delegation called on the international community to be more vocal on the issue.

Many delegations expressed their support for the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference and for the finding of a comprehensive and lasting settlement to that conflict based on agreed principles. Many delegations also expressed their concern over recent increases in violence. One delegation called for better use of the entire Minsk Group to be made and for expectations to be regulated. Although noting that it was unrelated to the conflict, one delegation expressed its regret at the closure of the OSCE Office in Yerevan. The same delegation called on the sides to make progress on the expansion of the Office of the Personal Representative and the creation of an investigative mechanism for ceasefire violations as agreed on at the Vienna and St. Petersburg Summits. One participating State, however, said that this would be conditional on simultaneous progress on other agreed actions, such as the exchange of data on missing persons and the continuation of substantive negotiations.

The same delegation highlighted the threat to security created by the international community's lack of adequate response to the violation by a participating State of its international law obligations through the use of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another State, and through ethnic cleansing and resettlement, as well as through illegal economic activities and the destruction of cultural heritage. That delegation had been particularly affected by the resulting influx of refugees and internally displaced persons. It called on all participating States to hold others to account under international law and return their attention to a lasting settlement of the conflict. Another delegation highlighted the threat caused to the security of the region by one participating State's use of force along the line of contact, including through incursions and targeting of civilian infrastructure, which damaged efforts towards a peaceful resolution. The confidence-building measures agreed on at the Vienna and St. Petersburg Summits could diffuse tensions, ensure stronger OSCE involvement on the ground and create conditions for an advancing peace process. Two delegations engaged in an exchange on economic relations between their countries and one repeated its call for clarification on the issue of the Armenian Church in the Sur District of Diyarbakir in Turkey.

In conclusion, the Special Representative for the South Caucasus said that the exchange had demonstrated the need for dialogue and a format in which to discuss issues at length. All sides needed to be ready to make progress pragmatically and step by step, and negotiators needed the support of all 57 participating States. His priority was to secure a Ministerial statement in support of the Geneva International Discussions and he opined that the OSCE should strengthen its presence in the region. The tandem use of the Geneva International Discussions and the IPRM could serve as a model for other processes. The Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process noted that co-mediators did not always agree in their assessments, but refrained from further commenting as the concerned Delegations had left the room. The moderator, Ms. Roxana Cristescu, concluded by noting that the Crisis Management Initiative had vast experience with constructive dialogue on conflict and said that participating States could be encouraged that that was possible in the OSCE area.

Conclusions and suggestions

1.   Protracted conflicts in the OSCE area pose a threat to the security of the entire area and are a major challenge for the Organization. They continue to adversely impact the lives of people in those regions and prevent them from achieving their full potential.

2.   There is general consensus that more needs to be done to resolve those regional conflicts.

3.   Most participating States called for the OSCE and other international organizations to have greater access to regions affected by the protracted conflicts.

4.   Most participating States expressed support for the "5+2" negotiating format and the emphasis on substantive results in the Transdniestrian Settlement Process. However, one participating State said that the outcome-based approach had jeopardized the regular conduct of talks and made it harder to reach a political settlement.

5.   There was widespread support for the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms.

6.   There was clear acknowledgement for the efforts of OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference.

WORKING SESSION III:
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Keynote Speakers: Mr. I. Anthony, Programme Director, European Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Mr. A. Grushko, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO

Mr. B. Turner, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, United States of America

Moderator: Mr. C. Istrate, Permanent Representative of Romania to the OSCE

Rapporteur: Ms. T. Jouffroy, Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE

The moderator introduced the session by quoting from the 2016 Ministerial Declaration "From Lisbon to Hamburg" on the twentieth anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control and by assessing the current security situation in Europe, which he described as unstable and unpredictable. Divergences among participating States seemed to be on the increase and the crisis of confidence in Europe could have serious consequences for European security.

The first keynote speaker, Mr. Ian Anthony from SIPRI, underlined the necessity to continue to strengthen predictability in the politico-military sphere. New challenges generated by new factors were making the pol-mil environment increasingly dynamic, complex and difficult to understand. Foremost among the challenges and factors he identified were asymmetries in defence investments, asymmetry in force posture, and advanced technology; furthermore, he pointed out certain patterns of behaviour characteristic of a traditional arms race. In his view, the Structured Dialogue was a realistic tool to sustain the process of dialogue, which needed to be intensified in the pol-mil sphere in the near future.

The second keynote speaker, Mr. Aleksandr Grushko, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, shared his views on the period when the conventional arms control instruments were negotiated, underlining the involvement of the military in the process, which created a systemic dialogue. After the negotiation of those instruments, new technologies and new weapons systems emerged, such as drones, that were not reflected in the instruments today. He pointed out the consequences of NATO's actions at the regional level and warned against a move backwards to the "Cold War trap".

The last keynote speaker, Mr. Bruce Turner, responded on the subject of the crisis regarding the existing instruments (Russian withdrawal from CFE Treaty, issues in the implementation of the Vienna Document and Treaty on Open Skies) and noted significant

changes in the international context (violation of international norms by one participating State). He recalled the importance of transparency and confidence in the full implementation of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures and emphasized the need to "go back to basics and talk in the OSCE tradition". The Structured Dialogue should be a true dialogue and participating States should commit themselves to listening to each other. There was no basic structure for the initiation of discussions in the context of blatant violations of international law. Mr. Turner argued in favour of using the existing tools to address the new challenges (hybrid warfare, cyber phenomena) and of focusing on ways to increase transparency (full implementation of existing instruments and modernization of the Vienna Document).

The Chairperson of the FSC presented the work carried out by the Forum since the last ASRC, focusing on the following: two declarations adopted in Hamburg, topics raised during the security dialogues (UNSCR 1325, UNSCR 1540, SALW, the crisis in and around Ukraine), the Vienna Document, and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

Discussion

Following the keynote speakers' presentations, 17 delegations took the floor.

Most participating States called for the full implementation of the existing instruments (CFE Treaty, Treaty on Open Skies, Vienna Document) and, especially in the case of the Vienna Document, their modernization, in order to promote a better response to the new realities.

Most participating States saw international law and a set of principles as the basis for discussions. Political will, restoring confidence and re-establishing co-operation was of key importance to the process. One delegation underlined the link between conventional arms control and CSBMs and the wider politico-military context, stressing the need for efficient measures in order to respond to aggression and military occupation. Instruments should also focus on the prevention of illicit military activities. The Vienna Document is seen by many participating States as the appropriate tool for reducing risks.

Regarding the Vienna Document, some participating States referred to proposals currently on the table, especially on Chapters III and V, and called upon others to join the consensus in favour of adapting the chapters to twenty-first-century realities. One participating State underlined the need to introduce a qualitative approach into the process of modernizing the existing instruments and, likewise, complementary approaches at a regional and subregional level. Some participating States stated that verifiable transparency was critical to the strengthening of the existing regimes. One participating State pointed out an imbalance in the proposals to modernize the Vienna Document, which would be to its own detriment because it would be the only one affected by greater transparency.

The discussions made it clear that most participating States regard the Open Skies Treaty as an important tool for European security, even though some implementation issues are still under discussion.

As for the CFE Treaty, many delegations regretted the withdrawal of one State Party but emphasized that it was still a relevant tool. Some participating States called for the CFE regime to be updated.

As for the Structured Dialogue, most participating States clearly see its initiation as a positive measure for the purpose of exchanging views on strategic instability, assessing the situation in Europe, and enhancing common understanding.

The Chairmanship presented the outcomes of the year's first two workshops on CSBMs and invited the participating States to a third workshop scheduled to take place in October.

In conclusion, the moderator stated that the current situation raised serious concerns and that the existing instruments were needed more than ever in the context of this deep crisis of confidence. He also encouraged the delegations to engage in more systematic interaction.

Conclusions and recommendations

1.   The politico-military environment is becoming increasingly challenging. Significant changes have occurred since the negotiation of the pol-mil instruments currently in force at the OSCE. Numerous phenomena are seen as challenges to European security, notably: asymmetries in defence investment, asymmetry in force posture, advanced technology, patterns of behaviour characteristic of a traditional arms race, violations of international law and OSCE principles, and ongoing conflicts.

2.   According to the general assessment, the current security situation in Europe is characterized by an erosion of the pol-mil instruments and a lack of confidence and transparency.

3.   Most participating States are in favour of the full implementation of the existing instruments (CFE Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, Vienna Document) and, especially in the case of the Vienna Document, their modernization, in order to promote a better response to the new realities. Some participating States referred to proposals currently on the table, especially on Chapters III and V. Some delegations see a need to introduce a qualitative approach into the conventional arms control and CSBM regimes. One participating State sees an imbalance in the proposals to modernize the Vienna document that would be to its own detriment.

4.   Most participating States hold that political will is of key importance to progress in the field of security. Confidence will not be restored without political will and respect for international law and OSCE principles.

5.   Most participating States hold that the way ahead lies in strengthening the existing instruments, minimizing risks, and restoring confidence, and that the main objective of the OSCE's security work is to ensure military transparency and predictability.

6.   Most participating States see the Structured Dialogue as a means of increasing dialogue on politico-military issues and of promoting the exchange of views on the challenges to European security.

WORKING SESSION IV:
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS – CURRENT AND FUTURE TRENDS

Keynote speakers: Ms. L. Shelley, Director, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, George Mason University

           Mr. A. Kortunov, Director General, Russian International Affairs Council

           Mr. B. W. McConnell, Global Vice-President, EastWest Institute

Moderator: Ms. R. Ostrauskaite, Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats, OSCE

Rapporteur: Mr. J. F. Reinertsen, Permanent Delegation of Norway to the OSCE

In her opening remarks, Ms. Ostrauskaite underlined that the global transnational threat (TNT) situation was becoming increasingly challenging, interlinked and complex. Accordingly, the session would focus on the linkages between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Ms. Louise Shelley of George Mason University presented two case studies exemplifying the nexus between crime, corruption and terrorism, one related to illicit drug-trading on the Darknet (Silk Road) and the other to natural resources depletion in Syria. The first case study showed how easily illicit activities can be carried out in cyberspace through the use of the Darknet and crypto-currency. The second case study showed how resource depletion and climate change contribute to displacement, neglected communities, high unemployment and crime rates, and unrest. Corrupt officials and terrorists alike were profiting from the rise in illicit trafficking, through "dirty entanglements" between corruption, organized crime and terrorism. Crime and threats to human beings, natural resources and survival strategies should be dealt with in a more integrated way, with account being taken of the fact that abuse of new technologies facilitates illicit activities by both State and non-State actors.

Mr. Andrey Kortunov considered that the OSCE's discussions and co-operation on TNTs were indications of progress, increased interaction, and a willingness to discuss topics not discussed during the Cold War period. Interference by "twentieth-century agenda" elements such as the arms race was an obstacle to the effective handling of twenty-first-century challenges. Five principles or goals were suggested in order to improve co-operation: 1) Precision: choosing well-defined topics of discussion in order to free agendas from political and "theological" disputes; 2) Involvement of new stakeholders from the private sector, the media, educational institutions, municipalities, and other fields; 3) New level of flexibility, to keep up with opponents. Legally binding agreements would be ideal, but overlapping voluntary commitments at the regional and subregional level were perhaps more realistic; 4) Going for low-hanging fruit, to ensure a certain level of success;
5) Improving expectation management to counter pessimism and populist solutions.

Mr. Kortunov highlighted the OSCE's comparative advantage: the Organization's moderate size, its flexibility and capacity for rapid response, and its comprehensive approach to security (notably the nexus between development and security) could all be used to its own advantage and to that of the participating States.

Mr. Bruce W. McConnell's presentation focused on cybersecurity. The most vexing TNTs all shared two characteristics: they were accentuated by modern technology, and existing international regimes were ill equipped to deal with them. The OSCE was a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy picture. Cybersecurity was no longer a separate issue, but was part of everything, from terrorism to the arms race, offensive capabilities (of both State and non-State actors), and espionage. State-to-State skirmishes increasingly undermined terrestrial security and stability, with the application of international law in cyberspace still being under debate. Still, the relevant UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) had agreed on certain non-binding norms for responsible State behaviour, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace was doing important advocacy work, and the private sector was also playing an important role. The rise of cloud computing and the "Internet of Everything" was significantly altering the security picture online. The international community should seek to turn this into an advantage, by taking greater control over networks and shifting responsibility from individuals to internet service providers. Mr. McConnell argued that there was a need for better institutions to help States in dealing with threats from within their territories, implementing network responses to network threats, and pursuing improved multi-stakeholder and public-private partnership approaches. The private sector's interest in securing future business opportunities could well be exploited to greater effect.

Discussion

In their responses, all participating States who took the floor underlined that TNTs, and especially terrorism, were collective threats and should be met with collective efforts. The direct threat from ISIS was decreasing, but other threats were evolving, such as the threat from returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and "home-grown" terrorists. To ensure effectiveness, it was important to promote a cross-dimensional, whole-of-society response, with strengthened co-operation between States, the private sector and civil society. All expressed strong commitment to contributing to this joint effort. There was broad support for the Chairmanship's focus on violent extremism and radicalism that lead to terrorism (VERLT) and youth, with the OSCE Counter-Terrorism Conference of May 2017 being highlighted in this regard. Several delegations underlined the need for increased attention to the nexus between transnational organized crime, trafficking in drugs, and terrorism.

Delegations agreed that it was crucial to uphold human rights when countering terrorism. The two were not contradictory, but complementary and mutually reinforcing. Likewise, all delegations underlined the important role of civil society. While the State played the primary role, the close involvement of civil society was necessary to ensure the credibility of outreach activities and effectiveness at the local level. The importance of grassroots organizations and of cities had been the topic of a Security Days event on 30 and 31 March. The important role of women and of integrating a gender perspective was underscored.

It was also argued that more research and analysis was needed to advance understanding of the complex threats faced by the international community. One delegation

suggested that the OSCE should consider establishing a regional research centre on security issues at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek.

In the course of the discussion, the OSCE's commitments in the field of TNTs were described as comprehensive and the valuable role of the OSCE's work in preventing and countering TNTs was highlighted. The Organization was encouraged to be guided by the UN and by relevant Security Council resolutions. Several delegations highlighted the need for strengthened practical implementation and argued in favour of strengthening the OSCE's capacities in this field. Important programmatic activities were commended, including the Border Management Staff College, the OSCE Mobile Training Teams on FTFs, capacity-building on advance passenger information (API), scenario-based table-top exercises on VERLT and FTFs, and work with civil society, youth and women through projects such as the Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (LIVE) campaign and the #UnitedCVE social media campaign (OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism). The report of Professor Peter Neumann, Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Fight against Radicalization, would provide important impetus for the future work of the Organization in the field of VERLT.

One delegation highlighted the need for a strengthened international legal framework.

Delegations expressed concern about the tense situation in cyberspace, which could have consequences for political relations between States. Threats from State and non-State actors were increasing, and trust and confidence were diminishing. The OSCE's efforts were increasingly relevant, especially through the confidence-building measures aimed at reducing the risk of tension and conflict stemming from the use of ICTs, not least in the light of recent developments with regard to the UNGGE. The OSCE's main focus should be on implementing and operationalizing key CBMs, including CBMs 3, 8 and 13. A multi-stakeholder approach was of key importance, with the close involvement of civil society, especially academia, and the private sector.

Conclusions and suggestions

1.   The participating States should redouble efforts to prevent and counter transnational threats at the national and international levels, and strengthen their implementation of relevant Ministerial Council decisions and declarations.

2.   The OSCE executive structures should continue to address TNTs in a comprehensive and cross-dimensional manner, with full respect for OSCE commitments and principles, in particular in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

3.   Meaningful co-operation with Partners for Co-operation should be sought wherever relevant.

4.   Countering terrorism should be at the top of the OSCE TNT agenda, with a focus on implementing the relevant Ministerial declarations of recent years. States have the primary responsibility to ensure an effective and inclusive whole-of-government, whole-of-society response, and should pursue the meaningful involvement of youth, women, civil society and the private sector. The nexus between terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, and organized crime deserves more attention. The spread of terrorist ideology must be curbed.

5.	Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism should remain a priority. Participating States and executive structures should strengthen their implementation of existing commitments. The Chairmanship's emphasis on youth enjoys broad support.

6.	Efforts in the area of information and communication technology should be enhanced. Participating States should prioritize the implementation and operationalization of existing confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies, with an emphasis on CBMs 3, 8 and 13.

7.	The OSCE executive structures should further strengthen programmatic activities to prevent and counter TNTs.

APPENDIX

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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council

PC.DEC/1253
22 June 2017

Original: ENGLISH

1150th Plenary Meeting
PC Journal No. 1150, Agenda item 2

DECISION No. 1253
AGENDA AND ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2017
ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE (ASRC)

The Permanent Council,

Recalling Porto Ministerial Council Decision No. 3 on the Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account its Decision No. 1242 on the dates of the 2017 Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides to organize the 2017 Annual Security Review Conference in accordance with the agenda and organizational modalities contained in the annexes to this decision.

2017 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 27–29 June 2017

Agenda

Tuesday, 27 June 2017

10–12 noon	Opening session: European security
2.15–4.15 p.m.	Special session: Ensuring security and stability in the OSCE region in light of developments with respect to Ukraine

Wednesday, 28 June 2017

10–12 noon	Special session: Special meeting of the Structured Dialogue
2–3.30 p.m.	Working session I: Early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation: Lessons learned and the way ahead
4–5.30 p.m.	Working session II: Conflict and crisis situations in the OSCE area: building security and confidence

Thursday, 29 June 2017

10–12 noon	Working session III: Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures: challenges and prospects
2–4 p.m.	Working session IV: Transnational threats – current and future trends
4–4.30 p.m.	Closing session

ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE
2017 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 27–29 June 2017

Background

The Tenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, at Porto, by adopting its Decision No.3, dated 7 December 2002, established the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) to provide a framework for enhancing security dialogue and for reviewing security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States, to provide an opportunity to exchange views on issues related to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, and to promote the exchange of information and co-operation with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

Organization

A representative of the Chairperson-in-Office will chair the opening and the closing session. The Secretariat will issue a journal of the Conference.

Each working session as well as the special sessions and the opening session will have one moderator and one rapporteur. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) will serve as co-ordinator for preparing the working sessions.

The contribution of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) will be made in accordance with its procedures, mandate and competences.

The Rules of Procedure of the OSCE will be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, at the Conference. Also, the guidelines for organizing OSCE meetings (Permanent Council Decision No. 762) will be taken into account.

Interpretation from and into all six working languages of the OSCE will be provided at the opening, special, working and closing sessions.

The Chairmanship will co-ordinate the preparation of the ASRC with the FSC Chairperson and the OSCE Secretariat.

The Chairperson-in-Office will distribute a comprehensive report on the Conference.

The Communication and Media Relations Section (COMMS) will inform the press, as appropriate, and in accordance with the modalities concerning co-ordination with the OSCE Chairmanship.

Participation

The participating States are encouraged to be represented at a high level, by senior officials from capitals, responsible for security-related policy in the OSCE area.

The OSCE institutions will participate in the Conference, as will the Secretary General and the CPC. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Partners for Co-operation are invited to participate.

The Chairmanship may also invite heads of OSCE field operations to participate in the Conference. Consideration could be given to the possibility of inviting heads of field operations or other high-ranking OSCE officials to be present as keynote speakers or moderators.

The international organizations that may be invited are the security-related organizations mentioned in Permanent Council Decision No. 951 of 29 July 2010.

Consideration will be given to the possibility of inviting security-related scientific institutes, think tanks of international standing, and NGOs to send keynote speakers, moderators or to be represented as members of national delegations.

General guidelines for participants

The work of the ASRC will be conducted in eight sessions. The opening session is intended to set the stage for substantive, focused and interactive discussions at the special and working sessions. The opening session will include the welcoming remarks by the Chairperson-in-Office or his representative. The Chairmanship will explore the possibility of inviting high-level special guests to address the Conference.

The working sessions as well as the special sessions will each concentrate on a different subject, introduced by one or more keynote speakers, whose addresses will be followed by a discussion of relevant topics that are mentioned in the agenda.

The aim is an interactive and free-flowing discussion.

In order to reinforce the effectiveness of security activities across all three dimensions of the OSCE, it is expected that each of the sessions will address the interfaces of security and the question of co-operation with other international and regional organizations.

To promote an interactive discussion, interventions by delegations at the opening, special and working sessions should be as concise as possible, not exceeding five minutes in length. Moderators will be asked to strictly enforce these time limits. Prior circulation of statements and interventions will enhance the possibility for engaging in a free-flowing discussion.

Participants should inform the OSCE Secretariat of the composition of their delegations to the ASRC, in response to the information circular regarding organizational aspects of the Conference which will be sent out by the OSCE Secretariat.

Participating States and other participants in the Conference are invited to submit any written contributions they may have.

Written contributions should be submitted to Conference Services, which will then distribute them. The information could also include contributions from OSCE institutions and other international organizations, if appropriate.

Guidelines for keynote speakers

Contributions of keynote speakers should be focused on the subject of the relevant session, setting the scene for the subsequent discussion and stimulating debate among delegations by raising appropriate questions and suggesting potential recommendations based on OSCE realities.

The maximum available speaking time is 15 minutes per keynote speaker, shorter and focussed presentations are encouraged.

Keynote speakers should be present during the entire session at which they are speaking, and should be ready to engage in the debate following their presentation.

To enable delegations to prepare themselves, keynote speakers should provide a written contribution and their biographical synopsis to the CPC. In their presentations, keynote speakers should touch on the highlights of their written contribution.

Guidelines for moderators and rapporteurs

Moderators chairing the special and working sessions should facilitate and focus the debate among delegations. Each moderator should stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the subject of sessions, as appropriate, in order to broaden or focus the scope of the discussion. When appropriate, moderators may call on speakers out of order to facilitate a genuine and free-flowing discussion.

The written reports provided by rapporteurs should address issues raised during the opening, special and working sessions, covering problem areas, improvements, suggestions made during the sessions, and other relevant information. Personal views shall not be advanced.

Moderators and rapporteurs should seek to identify and summarize specific recommendations made in each of the sessions.

Guidelines for the participation of other international organizations

International and regional organizations may participate in all sessions. They are invited to concentrate their contributions on aspects of co-operation with the OSCE within the scope of the relevant session.

International and regional organizations should provide factual information, useful for the participants of the ASRC, to Conference Services.