



 **Office of Internal Oversight**

Independent Evaluation of Results-Based Management in the OSCE, 2015-2020

Final Report



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Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	I
1. Introduction and Purpose	1
2. Evaluation Approach and Methodology	2
3. RBM: An Overview	4
3.1 General experiences.....	4
3.2 RBM for service and support functions	5
4. RBM in the OSCE	7
5. Benchmarking Findings	11
5.1 Summary	11
5.2 Strategic management – RBM	13
5.3 Operational management - planning, programming and budgeting.....	14
5.4 Accountability and Learning Management	19
5.5 Change management	22
6. Evaluation Question Findings	24
6.1 Relevance and added value	24
6.2 Efficiency	26
6.3 Effectiveness.....	26
6.4 Coherence	27
6.5 Gender mainstreaming	28
7. Conclusions and Recommendations	29
8. Management Response and Recommendation Implementation Plan	33
Annex I: Glossary.....	39
Annex II: Evaluation Terms of Reference	40
Annex III: OECD-DAC Evaluation Matrix: Questions, Indicators and Data.....	49
Annex IV: Reference Group Terms of Reference	51
Annex V: List of Interviewed Individuals.....	52
Annex VI: On-Line Survey Information.....	56
Annex VII: Bibliography	63
Annex VIII: RBM Benchmarking of the OSCE	66

Executive Summary

Introduction

- I. At the programme level, the OSCE implements an RBM system called *Performance Based Programme Budgeting* (PBPB). Introduced in 2006, it primarily covers the organization's Unified Budget (UB) funded activities, and includes three main elements: planning for results, monitoring and reporting on results, as well as evaluation of results achieved. Its stated purpose is to strengthen the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability/transparency of the OSCE's executive structures (ES).
- II. **This evaluation assesses how well the OSCE has implemented RBM through its PBPB system over the period 2015-2020**, and proposes a number of measures to make the system better serve the organization in the future. To that end, the evaluation benchmarked the implementation of RBM in the OSCE with implementation in the United Nations system. The analysis focused on four overall RBM management areas - *strategic, operational, accountability and learning, and change management*, each with a large set of sub-areas. It was based on data collected through desk research, interviews with OSCE staff across the organization, a large survey of OSCE staff, and insights from previous OIO evaluations.

Key findings and conclusions

- III. Overall, this evaluation established that the OSCE's PBPB system, while being *conceptually* aligned with international RBM principles has been *implemented* unevenly in the OSCE. While implementation of several management areas was found to be on par with those of the other organizations, others showed a lower maturity level. Some of the OSCE's lowest rated performing management (sub-)areas are the ones that matter most for results based management.
- IV. Positive results were confirmed regarding several *strategic management* areas. For instance, there is a clear commitment in the OSCE to implement RBM, as demonstrated by the fact that the PBPB system has become an established practice across the organization, and there have been many initiatives to support the growth of an RBM culture in ES. Another important finding related to this management area was that the OSCE has created a well-functioning accountability system in terms of its annual PBPB process that provides participating States (pS) with information on activities, outputs, UB budget planning and expenditures, but not on outcomes. An overarching strategy for the continuous improvement of the implementation of RBM was, however, also lacking.
- V. With regards to *operational management* the lack of a corporate strategic results framework with multi-year organization-level funding priorities was noted, as well as the fact that to the extent that specific multi-year thematic priorities are formulated, this is done at the level of ES, and not in a

consistent manner across the organization. On the positive side, the organization-wide use of a results-framework for programmes and projects that foresees risk assessments of project proposals and the integration of cross-cutting issues such as human rights and gender equality, stands out. It was also noted, however, that the framework has not reached a level where credible data on outcomes is collected and regularly used to inform decision-making. The use of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) was also found to be inconsistent across the organization, in that a proportion of ES has developed a KPI setting practice that is not aligned with the intentions of the PBPB system, which calls for KPIs to be set at the programme outcome level and with a multi-year perspective.

- VI. Related to the above is the fact that the OSCE does not practice results-based budgeting, i.e. a process that allocates resources according to expected and actual performance against expected outcomes. Rather, resource allocation at the organizational level is motivated by political priorities and the need to find consensus among pS. Repeated zero nominal growth budgets for UB in recent years have further aggravated the situation, since resource allocation decisions have not been based on results information, but have been influenced by other considerations.
- VII. The area where the OSCE's RBM system shows most weaknesses is *accountability and learning management*, which concerns performance monitoring, results reporting and evaluation. As indicated above, programme level KPIs are not consistently applied across the organization, neither for monitoring, nor for results reporting, let alone internal decision-making and programme management. They are also not consistently used to keep pS informed on longer-term results through the PBPR (Programme Budget Performance Report), which covers activities and outputs to a much larger extent than it covers outcomes. At the project level, while being subject to self-evaluations, decentralized (commissioned) evaluations of UB projects conducted by external experts are few and of mixed quality. Several ES have, however, commissioned external evaluations of a set of consecutive / interrelated UB projects to assess outcome level results achieved after a number of years. These so-called cluster or pooled evaluations informed further work in these specific thematic areas, and were generally found to be useful by the concerned ES.
- VIII. In terms of *change management*, there are managers and other champions in the OSCE who promote results-based management, and try to create an enabling environment for it, including by making results-based management a part of training programmes. Nevertheless, this evaluation established that a considerable proportion of OSCE staff has an insufficient understanding of what RBM and RBB entail in practice. Related to this and other factors described above, the use of results-based information for decision-making and learning in the OSCE remains weak. It comes as no surprise then that many officials working in programmatic units question whether the annual effort invested in creating the PO, UB and PBPR constitutes an efficient use of their time.

Overall conclusions and the way forward

- IX. This evaluation concluded that in the OSCE, the system has primarily served an external purpose of *accountability* and *transparency* towards its pS, with a focus on managing activities and outputs. Longer-term outcomes have not been consistently measured, reported on or used for planning, decision-making and learning to ensure that resources are spent in the most value-adding way.
- X. The evaluation also acknowledges that the space for a stronger results orientation in the OSCE is constrained by a number of factors outside of the control of the OSCE's senior management, including the organization's broad mandate, political sensitivities, decision-making by consensus, comparatively small core (UB) resources combined with repeated ZNG budgets, and the annual Unified Budget (UB) cycle. Coupled with the high proportion of UB projects with small budgets dedicated to operational expenditures, these strategic level factors limit the organization's ability to achieve tangible results, especially on an annual basis. Overall, this means that under these circumstances results frameworks for programmes and projects, results reporting, and external evaluation of UB projects are challenging to implement.
- XI. While the above strategic level factors are beyond the control of the ES and thus also not covered by the recommendations of this evaluation, the pS may want to consider how they can be addressed. There are a series of operational level barriers that can be dealt with internally to implement RBM more effectively, in order to strengthen the results orientation of the OSCE's activities, and for enhanced accountability and transparency.
- XII. This evaluation offers a set of 11 **key recommendations** that aim to help the OSCE take RBM forward in the future. They focus on addressing the key issues identified by this evaluation. The full list of recommendations is available on page [29](#) of this report:
- a. **Lack of clarity among OSCE staff, including senior management, regarding the meaning of key RBM concepts and what functions the PBPB system shall play in the OSCE.** Addressing this will require updating guidance material on RBM, harmonizing RBM related language across documents and templates, building capacities, as well as developing complementary guidance for the implementation of PBPB by units that provide *core services and support functions* for the organization at large.
 - b. **Patchy multi-year planning, use of results-level indicators and reporting on results.** This should, inter alia, be tackled by developing multiyear plans for ES and Secretariat departments that include programme outcome-level indicators and appropriate M&E mechanisms to follow up on the achievement of results. Efforts should be continued to discuss with pS the move to a biennial budget cycle in order to strengthen the results-based reporting they receive.

- c. **Absence of a dedicated organizational RBM strategy, which complicates the implementation of PBPB in the OSCE.** Addressing this will require assigning an organizational steering committee that develops a long-term RBM strategy and implementation plan, and related monitoring and evaluation system in consultation with relevant stakeholders.

1. Introduction and Purpose

1. Results-based management (RBM) is commonly understood to include three elements: *planning* for results, *monitoring* and *reporting* to assess whether progress is made towards planned results, and finally *evaluation* to assess what results were achieved, and to identify lessons and best practices of relevance for future projects.¹ Information about results can in turn serve three distinct purposes: i) strengthen accountability for results which, in turn, ensures that the organization continues to be entrusted with the responsibilities and resources it requires to fulfil its mandate; ii) inform planning and decision-making so that resources are spent in the most value-adding way; and iii) inform learning on how results can best be achieved.²
2. At the corporate level, the OSCE implements an RBM system called *Performance Based Programme Budgeting* (PBPB) with its component parts being the *Programme Outline* (PO), *Unified Budget* (UB), and *Programme Budget Performance Report* (PBPR). Introduced in 2006³, the PBPB system covers only the organization's Unified Budget (UB) funded activities and incorporates the three standard RBM process steps of [1] *planning*, [2] *monitoring and reporting*, and [3] *evaluation*.
3. This is a corporate level evaluation that assesses how well the OSCE has implemented RBM through its PBPB system. The report's primary target audience is OSCE management, its *scope* is cross-organizational, and it covers the time period 2015-2020. In line with the focus of the PBPB system, the evaluation covers UB funded activities only.⁴ In that connection it identifies barriers against – and facilitators of – UB-related RBM in the OSCE. It also assesses to what extent the current system is an optimal fit for all types of OSCE entities, and seeks to identify necessary and feasible changes for the system to more effectively support accountability, planning and decision-making, and learning within the OSCE.
4. The choice of the OSCE's PBPB system and practice as object of an independent evaluation is timely, not least considering the frequent requests by OSCE participating States (pS) for the OSCE to better demonstrate the results of its activities. The system was partly reviewed in 2016 by an external expert

¹ E.g., SIDA (2014), OECD (2019a), and UNODC (2018).

² Vähämäki, Schmidt and Molander (2011: 7). See also OECD (2018a). Data show that many development assistance provider agencies in OECD DAC member countries have not defined the purpose of RBM, and that agency staff give various weight to accountability and learning, in many cases regarding accountability rather than learning as the main purpose of RBM (OECD: 2018).

³ See OSCE (2007), which is the OSCE's original RBM guidance note for OSCE staff. The introduction of the OSCE's system was preceded by a series of OSCE decisions, including MC.DEC/17/05 (2005) and MC.DEC/18/06 (2006). See also Heynitz (2016).

⁴ Whereas the PBPB process does not formally cover extra-budgetary (ExB) financed activities, these activities must be compatible with the main programs outlined in the PO and the UBP. This means that ExB financed activities also contribute to the achievement of the annual objectives of the organization.

who focused on the use of key performance indicators (KPIs) in the Secretariat.⁵ The findings and recommendations of this review have been considered in the present evaluation.

5. Section 2 outlines the evaluation approach and methodology, including the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) benchmarking approach. The theoretical and conceptual basis for RBM is presented in section 3, which also presents common challenges in implementing the concepts, and illustrates how they have been applied in other international organizations. Section 4 describes the OSCE's RBM system, whereas section 5 provides a summary of the detailed benchmarking findings on the degree to which RBM has been implemented in the OSCE. Relying on several standard OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, section 6 combines elements of the information presented in the previous section with other information sources to provide qualitative assessments of the PBPB system's relevance, added value, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence, and the degree to which the system has lent itself to the promotion of gender equality. Finally, section 7 provides overall conclusions and recommendations for follow-up by concerned OSCE management.

2. Evaluation Approach and Methodology

6. The evaluation applied the 2017 United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) benchmarking framework to assess the *implementation* of RBM in the OSCE and to compare its maturity with that of organizations of the United Nations system. This also allowed to identify areas in particular need of improvement and provides the first-ever baseline against which the OSCE's progress in implementing RBM can be reassessed in the medium-term future.
7. The JIU framework covers 166 performance indicators across the following five management areas – strategic, operational, accountability and learning, change, and responsibility. This evaluation applies the first four management areas together with their 143 performance indicators across the 15 area components presented below:⁶
 - *Strategic management* is based on a *results-based management* conceptual foundation involving a [1] results-based management strategy, [2] change management framework (development of a results-culture), and [3] accountability framework for implementing results-based management.
 - *Operational management* is based on *planning, programming and budgeting*. This involves [1] a corporate strategic results framework (which includes visions and goals), [2] a results framework

⁵ Heynitz (2016).

⁶ See JIU (2017a, 2017b).

at the programme and project levels (which includes results chains and theory of change), [3] a results measurement system, [4] results-based budgeting and [5] human resource management.

- *Accountability and learning management covers monitoring, evaluation and reporting.* This involves [1] performance monitoring (i.e., results-based monitoring), [2] results reporting, [3] evaluation and [4] management information systems.
- *Change management involves fostering a culture of results.* This covers [1] internalization and capacity development, [2] leadership and [3] the use of results as learning for future activities.

8. In line with the JIU benchmarking framework, and based on the performance indicators, each of the 15 components is rated on a scale from 1- 4, ranging from “not started” (1), “exploration for mainstreaming” (2), “In the process of mainstreaming” (3), to “fully mainstreamed and continuous learning for refinement/adjustment” (4). Details on the framework, including rating principles and sources for each indicator, are included in a stand-alone annex to this report.
9. Based on the information collected, the evaluation derives findings along five OECD DAC evaluation criteria: the **relevance** of the PBPB system for OSCE, the degree to which it reflects RBM good practice in other organizations as well as consistency in implementation across the OSCE (**coherence**), and its **effectiveness** and **efficiency** in supporting the OSCE. In addition, findings regarding the **added value** of the system for the OSCE, and the degree to which **gender** has been mainstreamed in it, are synthesized. The evaluation questions and indicators are further detailed in annex II to this report.
10. For the purpose of data collection, and building on in-house knowledge based on evaluations of several hundred UB and ExB projects over the period 2015-2019, the evaluation complements a desk review of OSCE documents with OIO in-house knowledge and data, third-party data, and structured interviews of 85 OSCE programme managers and unit heads (and other colleagues), as well as with a number of ACMF delegates. It also relies on data collected through an electronic survey that was distributed in September 2020 to all project and programmatic staff.⁷ Detailed information on the interviews and the survey are part of the annex to this report, where methodological caveats and limitations are presented as well.

⁷ The survey covered 1495 OSCE officials. For more information, including the selection criteria for survey respondents, survey questions, response rates, margin of error, confidence intervals and gender distribution, see the annex of this report.

3. RBM: An Overview

3.1 General experiences

11. RBM applies across three levels: the corporate level, country/programme level and project level.⁸ In its ideal corporate form it entails strategic level goals and action plans with result targets and timelines that are implemented by programmes, which in turn are implemented by projects, and linked to monitoring and evaluation plans.⁹ The role of projects is to generate the targets set at the strategic and programmatic level.¹⁰ The three standard RBM process steps of [1] *planning*, [2] *monitoring* and *reporting*, and [3] *evaluation* are applicable across all organizational levels.
12. Examples of this corporate-level top-down RBM approach include the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) that has a strategic plan for 2018-2021 with result targets and a related detailed results framework with key performance indicators (KPIs).¹¹ Another example is the Global Vaccine Alliance (GAVI). It has five-year plans with targets and timelines, seeks to achieve these targets through programmes and projects, implements a dashboard-based monitoring system, issues annual progress reports and systematically carries out evaluations.¹²
13. Other organizations have corporate-level targets but decentralized implementation mechanisms at the lower levels. For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) has been described as one of the most decentralized UN organizations.¹³ Its governance and structure include a broad mandate and geographically distributed regional bureaux that enjoy a significant degree of autonomy to decide on and plan activities.¹⁴ The WHO has formulated long-term cross-organizational goals, but their implementation is conditioned by its decentralized organizational structure in that regional bureaux can choose which corporate goals to pursue¹⁵.
14. Reviews of RBM systems of UN organizations and development aid agencies, have reported that RBM implementation is commonly uneven and beset by challenges, including but not limited to the¹⁶:

⁸ OECD (2018a: 9).

⁹ For a historical overview of RBM up until 2010, see Vähämäki, Schmidt, and Molander (2011), and ECOSOC (2012). See also OECD (2000, 2017, 2019a) and the Joint Inspection Unit (2017b, 2017c).

¹⁰ Joint Inspection Unit (2017a). See also Joint Inspection Unit (2017b).

¹¹ Strategic plan and results framework are available at https://www.unicef.org/media/48126/file/UNICEF_Strategic_Plan_2018-2021-ENG.pdf and <https://digitalibrary.un.org/record/1301145?ln=en>, respectively.

¹² See <https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/strategy/phase-4-2016-2020/vaccine-goal>, <https://www.gavi.org/programmes-impact/country-hub>, <https://www.gavi.org/programmes-impact/our-impact/evaluation-studies> and <https://www.gavi.org/programmes-impact/our-impact/progress-reports>.

¹³ Vijayan (2007).

¹⁴ Yadav (2017: 20). OECD (2016: 24) notes that “Under Article 50 of the Constitution, regional committees are mandated, inter alia, to formulate policies on matters of an exclusively regional character and supervise the activities of the regional office.” See also MOPAN (2019).

¹⁵ MOPAN (2019).

¹⁶ See OECD (2014, 2017, 2019a), which are reviews and meta-reviews of a large number of evaluations and review of RBM systems. See also JIU (2017c) and MOPAN (various years).

- Absence of a universally agreed definition of RBM. Some organizations do not have any clear statement of the significance of RBM, and provide an insufficient amount of guidance to staff on the meaning, purpose and implementation of RBM;
- Lack of shared agreement or understanding of the purpose of RBM systems. Mostly, the systems are serving accountability purposes instead of learning purposes;
- Absence of an organizational results culture and insufficient RBM skills among staff;
- Limited use of results information to inform budget decisions;
- Insufficient availability of data for reporting on outcomes and impact, and little collection of monitoring data;
- Confusion among staff over the concepts of outputs and outcomes, and little motivation to implement RBM;
- Prioritization of short-term targets over long-term goals, and inclinations to report on easily measurable and available output data instead of on outcome data that is more difficult to measure.

15. One key conceptual issue is whether “results” should cover only “outcomes” (short-term, mid-term, and long-term [i.e., “impact”]), i.e. the change made, as suggested by the World Bank¹⁷ among others, or also “outputs” as suggested for instance by the OECD and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).¹⁸ Of 29 UN organizations, seven organizations include “output” in the definition of “result” for RBM, another four organizations exclude outputs, whereas the remaining organizations do not define this key concept¹⁹. Meanwhile, JIU defines RBM as “managing for the achievement of intended organizational results by integrating a results philosophy and principles in all aspects of management and, most significantly, by integrating lessons learned from past performance into management decision-making.”²⁰ It describes results more narrowly, only including “outcomes” with regard to “intended changes” but not “outputs”, and describes activities and outputs as means thereto.²¹

3.2 RBM for service and support functions

16. An important distinction in the OSCE context concerns whether organizational entities foremost deliver activities with the aim of generating outcomes for the benefit of pS, or provide administrative, financial or legal support services for the organization itself. The key distinction here is between

¹⁷ World Bank (2012).

¹⁸ UNDG (2011). See also Belcher & Palenberg (2018) for an inventory and analysis of the various manners in which the terms “outcome” and “impact” have been used by the development assistance community.

¹⁹ JIU (2017b: 34-37).

²⁰ JIU (2017a: 2-3).

²¹ Ibid. Similarly, OECD (2019a: 10-11) finds that RBM and its purpose are inconsistently defined – and sometimes not defined at all – in international organizations and aid agencies.

entities that *directly* deliver or contribute to results for pS, and those that support these entities and are thus removed from the direct delivery of the intended outcomes. Units that do not implement projects but instead provide internal services and support to other OSCE entities, experience some challenges related to the implementation of RBM, but also some opportunities.

17. The latter category includes “secretariat” / “headquarters” entities and similar entities in ES, including recruitment departments, payroll units, finance departments, and conference service departments. Many of these entities aim to implement various standards and regulations, and/or revise such standards, and/or oversee that standards are implemented across the organization. Some of these entities may also carry out projects aiming to achieve change. For instance, an Office of Legal Affairs may engage in a revision of the organization’s legal provisions (e.g., duty of care), a recruitment department may implement capacity-building activities for staff, and a budget department may design and implement budget reforms. The category also comprises political affairs departments that primarily provide support (e.g., political contacts and mediation services) to management and field operations.²²
18. These functions have an inward focus in that they aim at strengthening the OSCE as an organization. The immediate “beneficiaries” of service and support functions are OSCE staff and OSCE entities rather than outside partners and stakeholders. This makes it more difficult for them (or even impossible for some of them) to plan for (and report on) outcomes, indicators, and objectives if understood to be directly affecting *OSCE-external stakeholders*. Indirectly, of course, these functions also contribute to the achievement of outcomes and objectives.
19. These types of units meanwhile have unique opportunities for implementing RBM. First, some of them exhibit a high degree of standardization which facilitates RBM. Most follow established “routine” patterns that do not differ much from year to year. Compared to project-implementing units that deliver assistance that is often not proposed and planned for by the unit, but rather demand-driven in that it depends on annual and partly difficult to foresee requests from stake-holders, the work of service and support units is more predictable. This offers several advantages for RBM, including allowing for the formulation of multi-year plans and more consistently reporting results over longer timespans.

²² The applicability of results-based accountability frameworks as management tools for essentially non-project-oriented entities has been a topic of discussion internationally. For instance, in a review from 2008 of RBM at the United Nations secretariat units, the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) remarked that “the exercise of accountability is not cast from a review of outcomes but from ascertaining that there is no negligence, misconduct or breach of rules and regulations”, and labelled RBM as applied to Secretariat units “a paper-making chore.” (United Nations 2008: 2, 20).

20. One element of RBM is results-based budgeting (RBB) or performance-based budgeting (PBB), which has been defined as the “use of performance information to inform budget decisions, either as a direct input to budget allocation decisions or as contextual information to inform budget planning, and to instil greater transparency and accountability throughout the budget process, by providing information to legislators and the public on the purposes of spending and the results achieved”.²³ In short, it involves an alignment of funding with goals as it “implies a shift in the focus of budgeting, away from management of inputs and towards a focus on the results of spending and the achievement of policy objectives.”²⁴ In its ideal form this means that only the expected most efficient and effective projects should receive initial funding, and that only the most efficient and effective projects should receive continued funding.
21. Similar to the applicability of RBM, the applicability of RBB in “secretariat” or “headquarters” level entities that are not project-oriented has occasionally been viewed as challenging. For instance, the OECD’s best practices for PBB recommends that any PBB methodology has “the flexibility to deal with the very varied nature of government funded activities, and the different relationships that exist between financial resources and performance. Rather than a ‘one size fits all’ approach, governments should differentiate between programme types, reflecting the relationship between budgetary inputs and outcomes.”²⁵

4. RBM in the OSCE

22. In the OSCE, given its broad area of responsibility (“comprehensive security”) and decentralized organizational structure, with the various OSCE entities being formally autonomous of one another and directly answerable only to the pS, the implementation of RBM is sometimes found to be challenging. The organization’s broad mandate makes it more difficult for the OSCE than for some other international organizations with a narrower purpose and centralized leadership/management to formulate and agree on targets and milestones that cover all areas of responsibility. Due to the decentralized organizational structure there is no central secretariat or corresponding entity that formulates, issues and follows up on corporate strategic targets.
23. Rather than having corporate targets and milestones, the OSCE has a growing number of Summit, Ministerial Council (MC) and Permanent Council (PC) decisions that contain general organizational-level commitments as well as taskings addressed to specific structures across its three dimensions (but no specific targets and milestones), coupled with annual Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) priorities. To the

²³ OECD (2018: 6).

²⁴ Ibid, p.7.

²⁵ Ibid, pp. 22-23.

extent that target setting and milestones are applied in the OSCE, this takes place at lower levels, i.e. for programmes and at the project level.

24. The OSCE's RBM system is called *Performance Based Programme Budgeting* (PBPB). Introduced in 2006²⁶ as called for in MC.DEC/18/06, its purpose was originally outlined in MC.DEC/17/05 (2005) "Strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE", which declares that pS are "determined to strengthen the effectiveness" of the OSCE, and to make "effective gender mainstreaming an integral part of all policies, activities and programmes in the OSCE." It tasks the PC to, inter alia, engage in "strengthening the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of the Organization's activities, including their budgetary and extra-budgetary financing, and their evaluation and assessment", "strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE institutions and field operations", and "improving the programme planning, so that it may better reflect the Organization's priorities."
25. The PBPB budget process is outlined in PC.DEC/553 (2003) "OSCE's Unified Budget Process", while the overall process and responsibilities are detailed in Financial Administrative Instruction 02/2005 (FAI/02/2005).²⁷ It involves a decentralized approach to target setting in that objectives and corresponding budgets, activities and outputs, are formulated by fund managers (i.e., heads of executive structures) "when appropriate in consultation with the countries of implementation" and consistent with the funds' (i.e., ES') mandates.
26. Further implementation-related details and guidance are provided by the PBPB guidance document from 2007 and subsequent guidance notes and templates.²⁸ They outline that ES programme objectives should cover "several years" and "be stated in a longer-term perspective", that the programme's "medium term impact" should be demonstrated, and that the goal of the planning process is to enhance efficiency and in extension also effectiveness of programmes. It also states that "if the OSCE wants to remain competitive, it must be able to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of its structures."
27. All OSCE entities – field operations, institutions and the Secretariat – are required to formulate programme level intended outcomes, outputs and KPIs that must be linked to the OSCE's three Dimensions and related commitments, and to specific taskings that these structures may have received in relevant OSCE decisions, including their mandates. Projects are in turn intended to contribute towards these outcomes. In practice, this means that the OSCE is not managing for

²⁶ See OSCE (2007), which is the OSCE's RBM guidance note for OSCE staff.

²⁷ Ibid. for practical guidance on implementing RBB.

²⁸ See <https://jarvis.osce.org/sites/portal/apps/Project%20Management.aspx> for the OSCE's guides and templates on programme and project management.

corporate level targets and results, but for corporate general level commitments that, together with the ES specific mandates, are translated into ES level targets and results.


28. It is worth noting that a considerable number of UB projects contribute to these outcomes only indirectly as they are not intended to provide assistance to external stakeholders, but are “quasi projects” that cover OSCE-internal regular costs of some ES, such as those of a field operation’s finance and administration unit. Data for 2020 show that of the 348 planned UB projects, 259²⁹ were intended for external stakeholders. It is the latter number and list of projects that the OSCE reports to the Chair ACMF and thus to the pS. The OSCE has not issued any specific guidance for this type of projects.
29. The PBPB process starts with the ES formulating individual annual “programme outlines” (POs) that ideally also have a multi-year element. OIO notes that whereas the PO guidance states that objectives and outcomes should be included, the PO is de facto currently just a brief thematic narrative. POs are reviewed in May by pS through the Preparatory Committee or “PrepComm.” The PrepComm is a subsidiary body of the OSCE Permanent Council, which generally meets at the level of Deputy Permanent Representatives to the OSCE, and the review of the PO at that level is intended to reflect that this is a programmatic document, indicating how the executive structure proposes to implement its mandate and carry out taskings received from the pS, rather than a specific request for resources. In practice, however, the Prepcomm discussions of the PO are often handled for many delegations by members of the OSCE Advisory Committee on Management and Finance (ACMF) that is responsible for issues relating to plans, budgets and resource management.
30. Following presentation of the PO by Fund and Programme Managers and discussion in the PrepComm, the incoming OSCE Chair presents a “perception paper” reflecting the (often divergent) views of various pS. The ES then formulate individual budgets which are expected to take this “perception paper” into account. These are combined by the OSCE Secretariat into a unified budget proposal (UBP), which in turn is presented by the Secretary General to the PC and then reviewed by the ACMF starting October with the goal of approving the budget before the end of the year. After a series of revision rounds, the UBP is submitted to the PC for formal approval.³⁰ The annual PBPB cycle is completed the following year in March with a Programme Budget Performance Report (PBPR) that contains ES specific chapters that report on activities, outcomes and lessons learned, which together with the PO is reviewed by the pS in May. To varying extents, results related to the implementation of activities budgeted through extrabudgetary funds are included by ES in the PBPR.

²⁹ Source: data as of October 2020 collected by PESU.

³⁰ It should be noted that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) is not part of the Unified Budget Proposal and UBP process as it has its own budgetary cycle. Nevertheless, the SMM still adheres to the OSCE’s RBM methodology.

31. The PBPR is delivered in two versions that are not publicly available: a full version of around 250 pages, and a shorter version of around 150 pages that excludes the narrative under the Output sections of the full report version. The PBPR is meanwhile not the only annual reporting product submitted to pS as it is complemented by the OSCE’s annual report, which provides summaries for each field operation, Institution, and the Secretariat. Moreover, ODIHR and the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings issue detailed annual reports, while the Secretariat publishes detailed annual reports of police related activities. What sets the PBPR apart are its details and that the structure and contents follow the PO and UBP structures.

Graph I. The 2021 PBPB Cycle³¹




³¹ Source: OSCE (2021). The months are indicative as deviations may occur in practice.

5. Benchmarking Findings

5.1 Summary

32. The benchmarking findings on implementation of RBM in the OSCE are summarized by the radar graph below that presents the area component ratings for the OSCE (in blue), together with the ones for the UN-12³² covered by the JIU evaluation (in red), and for the “ideal organization” (in green) that receives maximum ratings on all items. It shows a mixed picture in that there is a large variation in the ratings of the OSCE’s 15 components. In comparison to the *average* situation in other international organizations, RBM has been implemented in a more uneven manner in the OSCE across the various RBM areas.
33. As a caveat it deserves to be noted that whereas the JIU ratings are based on *self*-ratings by senior managers in the concerned UN organizations with selective rating validation checks by JIU staff who relied on in-house knowledge. Below ratings for the OSCE reflect *independent* ratings by OIO based on careful data collection, including through a large scale cross-organizational survey, interviews with OSCE staff and OIO in-house knowledge from a large number of independent evaluations conducted by OIO in recent years. This means that the UN-12 ratings are likely more generous than the ratings for the OSCE. Hence, the differences between the degree of implementation of RBM in the UN-12 and in the OSCE, may be smaller than indicated by the radar graph below.

Graph II. RBM in the OSCE and the United Nations



³² The term “UN-12” refers to the 12 UN organizations that were covered by JIU (2017b).

34. As the graph shows, the OSCE's ratings are on par with or close to (rating difference less than 0.5) the UN-12 in seven areas, higher in two areas, and significantly lower in six areas. The average rating for the UN-12 is 3.45, while the OSCE average is 2.87. In the language of the JIU's framework, the OSCE's overall average rating means its RBM is close to being "In the process of mainstreaming" (i.e., an average rating of "3") RBM, whereas the UN-12 are on average in-between that category and "fully mainstreamed and continuous learning for refinement/adjustment" (i.e., an average rating of "4").
35. The areas where the OSCE is on – or close to on – par with the UN-12 are "1.1 RBM strategy", "1.2 Change management framework", "1.3 Accountability framework", "2.3 Results measurement systems", "2.4 Results-based budgeting", "4.2 Leadership", and "4.3 Use of results." The overarching management area where the OSCE is closest to the UN-12 is "1. Strategic management." In contrast, OSCE ratings are as high as or tangibly higher than the UN-12 in the areas "2.5 Human resource management" and "4.2 Leadership", where it receives a "4."
36. The graph shows that the OSCE is behind the UN-12 when it comes to the results part of the RBM concept, and this applies in particular to the areas "2.1 Corporate strategic results framework", "2.2 Results frameworks for programmes and projects", "3.1 Performance reporting", "3.2 Results reporting", "3.3 Evaluation", "3.4 Management information systems", and "4.1 Internalisation." In effect, the OSCE's lowest performing management areas are the ones that matter most for results management. Meanwhile, the ratings are roughly on par with the other organizations in areas relating to accountability and transparency. Whereas results-frameworks with KPIs exist in the OSCE, they are for reasons related to the OSCE's organizational features located at the ES programme level instead of the corporate level.
37. As outlined in the area specific sections below, the OSCE ratings in several of the areas are contingent on a series of inter-related factors that have cross-cutting and barrier-like effects. In turn, these factors *constrain the space for a stronger results orientation* in the implementation of the PBPB system, but do not restrict the system's ability to provide accountability.
38. These factors include [1] the OSCE's broad area of responsibilities, which coupled with [2] its comparatively small core (UB) budget means that the budget is stretched over [3] many programmes the UB projects of which consequently have relatively modest budgets. In addition, its [4] annual budget cycle, and the lack of longer-term planning by a proportion of ES, undermine the organization's ability to achieve tangible results. Hence, few tangible and evaluable UB project results may reasonably be expected, on an annual basis. Finally, [5] the limited attention paid to results – combined with an emphasis on budgets, activities and outputs and thus accountability and transparency – in the annual PBPR, means that "results frameworks for programs and projects",

“performance reporting”, “results reporting”, “evaluation” are not prioritized, whereas the four previous issues mean that they are challenging to implement.³³

39. The following sections cover the four benchmarking management areas introduced in chapter 2 of this report and summarized in the above graph. These are “strategic management”, “operational management”, “accountability and learning management”, and “change management.” Under each section, the findings connected to the 15 related benchmarking component areas – included in the above graph – are briefly summarized. The figure and the figure in parenthesis after each component area headline refer to the OSCE’s average rating and the UN-12 average rating ranging from “1” (lowest) to “4” (highest), respectively, across the below four management area’s respective benchmarking component areas. A detailed narrative that covers each benchmarking component area is provided in an annex that accompanies, but is separate, to this report.

5.2 Strategic management – RBM: 3 (UN 3.1)

40. The rating of “3” is the average across the management area’s three subcomponents: **RBM strategy** (rating 3), **change management framework** (rating 3), and **accountability framework** (rating 3). Ratings for each of these subcomponents are in turn contingent on a number of detailed indicators. Below follows the main rationale for the individual ratings.

41. The current aggregate rating for the **RBM strategy** sub-component reflects that whereas the OSCE seeks to implement RBM, and while RBM is endorsed by senior managers and governing bodies and has been integrated into staff training, and the PBPB system has become an established practice across the organization, the OSCE lacks an overarching strategy for the continuous improvement of the implementation of RBM. Furthermore, the OSCE’s guidelines and templates on programme management and project management are not perceived to be providing clear and consistent definitions of the key concepts “activity”, “output”, “outcome” and “impact”.³⁴ Views along these lines were expressed by many of the programme managers (and other staff) interviewed for this evaluation.

42. The sub-component rating for **change management framework** reflects that the OSCE has implemented initiatives aimed at supporting the growth of an RBM culture and practice, but that it lacks a coherent change framework. Whereas OSCE staff training is delivered on project management and RBM, there is no framework or plan for how to mainstream a results culture, and how to track

³³ For instance, in OIO’s survey respondents regarded the absence of a multi-annual budget/UB cycle as a key barrier (40%) and somewhat of a barrier (27%), and the commonly small budget size of projects as a key barrier (25%) and somewhat of a barrier (34%), against RBM.

³⁴ See <https://jarvis.osce.org/sites/portal/apps/Project%20Management.aspx> for the OSCE’s guides and templates on programme and project management.

progress of mainstreaming. The organization has not developed any plan for how to sustainably change staff behaviour in combination with a monitoring plan that tracks implementation progress.

43. Turning to the third sub-component of **accountability framework**, its rating reflects that the OSCE has focused less on driving for results, and more on ensuring compliance with various regulations, guidance notes and templates related to project and programme management, including the annual PO, UB and PBPR processes. This has served to create a well-functioning accountability or transparency system in terms of the annual PBPB process that provides pS with information on activities, outputs, budgets and expenditures. In and by itself this is an important effect of the PBPB system. The tendency to focus on accountability is a feature that the OSCE shares with many other international organizations.

5.3 Operational management - planning, programming and budgeting: 3 (UN 3.5)

44. The rating of 3 is the average across the area's five sub-components: **corporate strategic results framework** (rating 2), **results-framework for programmes and projects** (rating 3), **results measurement system** (rating 3), **results based budgeting** (rating 3) and **human resources management** (rating 4).
45. The comparatively low rating for the first sub-component - **corporate strategic results framework** – reflects the fact that the OSCE lacks a corporate-level strategic results framework with broad organization-level funding priorities. To the extent that “strategic” or “multi-year” thematic priorities are formulated, this is done at the level of ES.³⁵ Furthermore, the OSCE has not formulated organisational broad thematic priorities with related budget allocations to provide direction to ES in formulating POs and budgets.
46. Interviews with ES programme managers (and other staff) show that some ES programmes have formulated multiyear programme strategies, which is in line with the 2007 PBPB guidance note, the 2009 guide to using performance indicators in the OSCE, and the most recent technical guidelines for the PO and PBPR process.³⁶ However, it also became clear that some interviewees were unaware of this PBPB requirement or possibility of multiyear programme level planning, even though this requirement is stated explicitly in the various OSCE guidelines for programme managers. OIO's survey shows that the lack of multiyear planning is regarded as a “key barrier” and “somewhat of a barrier” against RBM among 35% and 33% of the survey respondents, respectively.³⁷

³⁵ See OSCE (2007) for practical guidance on implementing RBB.

³⁶ See <https://jarvis.osce.org/sites/portal/apps/Project%20Management.aspx>.

³⁷ Survey data shows that with only one exception, average response scores were fairly similar across all ES. This suggests that the prevalence of the absence of long-term planning is pretty similar across all ES.

47. The rating for the second subcomponent **results-frameworks for programmes and projects** reflects that a results-measurement framework for programs and projects, which builds on pre-defined standards and templates, exists, and that it has been internalized across the organisation and all levels. The Framework has, however, not reached a level where credible data on outcomes is collected and regularly used to inform decision-making.
48. On the positive side, the OSCE does have a results framework and includes risk assessments in UB as well as ExB project proposals.³⁸ In addition to the themes related to its three Dimensions, the organization addresses cross-cutting issues such as human rights and gender quality, and its results framework as manifested by the Unified Budget proposal and related KPIs, is developed in a participatory fashion in terms of intra-ES discussions, but not in discussions with pS/ACMF, the role of which is confined to reviewing POs and UB budgets. The part of the results framework that includes detailed KPIs is also not routinely shared with the pS³⁹.
49. Relevant to the rating of this subcomponent is also, as demonstrated by interview information, that not only mandates but also expectations of pS and stakeholders as well as political sensitivities, condition the type of projects that can be initiated or given up, as well as how KPIs are formulated. This restricts the ability of programmes and projects to apply RBM, let alone RBB. Interview information also shows that ES for various reasons tend to formulate KPIs that are reachable given available funds and the annual reporting cycle vis-a-vis the ACMF. Overall, these factors commonly translate into a tendency for UB projects to focus on annual indicators of activities and outputs, and to manage for outputs rather than for longer-term results.⁴⁰
50. Interview information also shows that the dominating KPI practice involves setting KPIs for “results” that are under the control of the ES. OIO meanwhile notes that according to standard project management concepts, any project or programme has two parts: one that involves inputs, activities, and outputs over which a programme/project has control; and another that includes short-, mid-, and long-term outcomes over which a programme/project has limited or no control at all. Whereas any programme/project does not *control* the outcomes, the intention and the rationale of any programme/project is to *influence* them. A failure to influence the outcomes of a project also means that the programme/project has failed. This implies that despite there being less control of the achievement of outcomes, KPIs are required at that level, too.

³⁸ This applies to all ExB projects. For UB projects, this does in practice not apply to projects that reside with the Secretariat.

³⁹ The full list of KPIs has only been shared with the pS once, which was in 2017. See OSCE (2017).

⁴⁰ See also von Heynitz (2016).

51. Also relevant for the rating is the interview finding that KPIs are not always consistently used by ES. Some interviewees regarded KPIs as a useful tool. Others were of the view that KPIs were of little or no added value, and of no relevance for some units, in terms of enhancing results or being useful for decision-making.⁴¹ Interviews also showed that while sometimes a considerable amount of work goes into formulating KPIs, they are not consistently followed up on by ES. It was also mentioned that an easy-to-use dashboard system for entering and retrieving KPI data was missing in the OSCE, which further complicates the use of KPIs.
52. The evaluation notes in this regard that a proportion of ES has developed a KPI setting practice that is not aligned with the intentions of the PBPB system. As outlined in the 2007 guidance note and subsequent guidance notes issued by PESU⁴², KPIs should be set at the main programme (Secretariat) and programme (field operations) outcome level and with a multi-year perspective. In contrast, an understanding and practice among some of the interviewed programme managers is that KPIs are expected to refer to a one-year period. It was in this context also noted that some of the interviewed programme managers stated that they were not aware of the 2007 PBPB guidance document and its provisions. OIO meanwhile understands that all programme managers are provided with guidelines and technical instructions that refer to the 2007 PBPB guidance document and highlight that planning should cover 2-3 years.
53. The rating for the third subcomponent **results measurement system** reflects that the OSCE does not prioritize resource allocations for measuring priority strategic results (in this case, achievement of commitment compliance), it does not measure (though it has implemented) project quality assurance and risk management, and it has overall not employed measurement specialists and statisticians to support RBM. On one hand, the results measurement system addresses the PBPR reporting requirements vis-a-vis the pS. It also entails standardized procedures that involve KPIs at the programme level, and performance indicators with baselines and targets also at the project level. For instance, project proposal templates include logframes that outline monitoring indicators, and there are templates for reporting on project progress. Meanwhile, the OSCE's annual budgets, and its commonly small and short-term UB projects of 12 months maximum, combined with the lack of long-term planning by some ES, restrict the degree to which project and programme monitoring is taking place.
54. Because of the generally limited UB project size and duration, it is also of questionable value to design and implement detailed monitoring frameworks for the large majority of *individual* UB projects for

⁴¹ It is the impression of OIO that to an unknown extent the interviewees held back on their critical views of the KPI system. This means that this paragraph to an unknown extent overestimates the extent to which KPIs are used or followed up on.

⁴² See <https://jarvis.osce.org/sites/portal/apps/Project%20Management.aspx>.

the sole purpose of assisting project officers staying informed about progress in implementation. Through its thematic evaluations in recent years, OIO observed that UB projects are commonly monitored at the activity and output level in that project officers are directly involved in delivering project activities. Moreover, mid-way progress reports are to some extent created for larger projects. Hence, monitoring is de facto taking place, though commonly not in a formal and systematic manner that involves entering and retrieval of monitoring data through some type of online data management and dashboard system.

55. OIO evaluations over the period 2015-2019 also show that ES have commonly not implemented monitoring frameworks that cover project implementation and project *results* of UB projects in the short-, medium- and long-term.⁴³ Interviewed OSCE staff generally expressed that for reasons of limited staff and financial resources, they seldom follow up on short-term assistance results beyond obtaining information through contacts with – and feedbacks from – beneficiaries, and through project officers' observations. OIO meanwhile notes that mid-term results – in terms of changed policies and practices among stakeholders – by definition only materialize sometime after projects have ended, which means that mid-term result monitoring is not possible for *individual* UB projects. It is, however, possible for a series of interlinked projects over a longer period of time. The same sources show, however, that RBB is to some extent implemented at the ES programme level as there are instances of underperforming, marginal or obsolete projects being phased out.
56. The rating for the sub-component **results-based budgeting** reflects the fact that the OSCE misses a process that allocates resources according to performance against expected outcomes. The items on which the OSCE scores low include the overall annual budget process that is not formulated with long-term strategic / institutional level results in view, that there is no structured financial discussion at the organisational level on funding priorities, and that resource allocations for projects and programmes are overall not conditioned on only the expected importance of outcomes and actual outcomes, but also preferences among stakeholders and pS.
57. More specifically, a review of UB budgets and UB project documents, and interviews with programme managers and unit heads, show that KPIs are commonly formulated in terms of activities or outputs rather than at the outcome level. Decisions on programmes and projects at the ES level are furthermore not solely based on their expected or actual net contributions to the OSCE's commitments. Moreover, the degree to which plans and procedures include monitoring and

⁴³ Good examples within the OSCE of monitoring of activities as well as short and mid-term results include, inter alia, the Border Management Staff College project (2009 and onwards) delivered by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, the War Crimes Capacity-Building Project (2014-2017) delivered by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a series of community policing projects delivered by the OSCE missions in Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. However, a common feature of these cases is that they are multi-year ExB projects, not UB projects.

evaluation of programmes and projects varies across ES. Hence, whereas a results-measurement framework for programmes and projects building on pre-defined standards and templates exists, its actual implementation is uneven across the organization.

58. Another interview finding related to this sub-component is that the OSCE's repeated zero nominal growth (ZNG) approach for UB restricts change since new initiatives need to be compensated by savings elsewhere. It also makes budget allotments predictable and thereby undermines ES' and pS' motivation to implement RBM and RBB, as it means that regardless of the results achieved, annual budgets will not change to any tangible degree in any direction. In the words of one interviewed pS representative to the ACMF, the OSCE's consensus decision principle resulting in repeated ZNG budgets means that any individual pS has only a marginal ability to influence changes to budgets and ES plans.
59. This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that since staff standard costs increase every year, ZNG budgets mean that operational costs and thus UB projects must be reduced in either size or number. Similarly, another pS's delegate to the ACMF stated that because of the consensus on ZNG, budget decisions were not influenced by results information, and regarded this as "very unfortunate" since it meant that "we [pS] have no prospect in changing the future", and that this "harms the dynamism of the OSCE." This means that ZNG budgets have the unintended consequence of undermining RBM. Similar views were expressed by a number of interviewed OSCE staff. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that ZNG budgeting to some extent facilitates multiyear planning by ES, since it makes budget allocations relatively predictable.
60. Another observation is that the PBPR process does not include ExB funds in addition to UB funds even though ExB funds are in practice often essential – rather than just supplementary – for delivering programme outcomes, since all ExB projects must be incorporated in – and thus also be consistent with – the programmes that are formulated on the basis of the UB. In turn this means that pS do not have an accurate understanding of what is achieved by the UB budgets alone. Another observation is that since the UB discussion for the coming year is normally carried out before the end of the current year, the overall results stemming from the annual cycle are not known at that moment. This means in effect that corporate budget allocation discussions are not informed by UB-related results of the most recent year, and RBB implementation at the corporate level is consequently undermined. Whereas the absence of results information for the current year may be inherent to budget processes in many international organizations, it would be less of a challenge if the OSCE were to have a multiyear budget together with a PBPR that cover several years of activities.

61. Finally, the high rating for the sub-component **human resources management** reflects that overall “competency frameworks, job categories and profiles are established and aligned with accountability frameworks”, that “capacity development initiatives [...] support the internalization of competencies”, and that “staff is recruited/mobilized based on competencies identified as key to the delivery of strategic results.”⁴⁴ In addition, “individual performance expectations are aligned with organizational goals; performance is assessed based on respective unit/department results frameworks; and “performance management systems identify and address both staff developmental needs, as well as chronic underperformance.”

5.4 Accountability and Learning Management: 2.2 (UN 3.7)

62. This management area consists of four sub-components: **performance monitoring** (rating 3), **results reporting** (rating 2), **evaluation** (rating 2), and **management information systems** (rating 2). The rating for the first subcomponent **performance monitoring** reflects in the words of the JIU benchmarking model that the OSCE is overall striving to develop “measureable targets and implementing mechanisms to provide credible evidence of the progress of indicators related to each level of results in order to track performance against expectations.” At the program level, the JIU criteria involve that monitoring is based on a “clearly defined framework [i.e., KPIs and templates] [...] for data collection and the assessment indicators”, while qualitative and quantitative indicators (e.g., KPIs) are supposed to be used across ES. However, and as mentioned above, programme level KPIs are to an unknown extent neither followed up by ES, nor reported on to pS through the PBPR, let alone used for internal decision-making.
63. The low **results reporting** sub-component rating (2) reflects in JIU language that “results reporting (both internal and external) is usually requested by partners or donors; it is rarely used for internal decision-making and programme management.” For instance, at the corporate level, results reporting and subsequent learning through the PBPR are insufficient. The ES-specific introductory section “Overall Constraints and Lessons Learnt” in the PBPR for 2019 only occasionally contains lessons, or mentions overall constraints in implementing programmes, and mostly provides a summary of activities and outputs. The PBPR covers activities and outputs to a much larger extent than it covers outcomes. Interview information shows that one - but not the only – stated reason for providing limited information in the PBPRs are the report sections’ characters limits, which restrict the ES’ ability to provide many details. OIO nevertheless notes that ES have chosen to allocate the limited number of characters to outputs rather than to outcomes. As a consequence, the pS may be under-informed of the achievements of the organization. Another reason is the difficulty of demonstrating tangible

⁴⁴ The score reflects a self-rating with complementary details provided by the OSCE talent management unit.

programme outcomes when they are implemented through commonly small UB projects on an annual basis. Overall, this state of affairs has repercussions for the accountability and transparency of the organization.

64. With regard to the expectations of pS, interviews with selected pS delegates to the ACMF showed that some of them regard the format and length of the PBPR as just right, whereas all interviewees found that it constituted a comprehensive and useful reference, and the best source of overview information of the OSCE's activities, and that it contributed to transparency. Some delegates suggested that the PBPR format was too long and therefore overwhelming and not user-friendly. An additional shorter format of 15-20 pages that contains the main highlights and a stronger focus on OSCE "flagship" activities that delegates can use to advocate for OSCE funding vis-à-vis respective foreign ministries, was said to be preferable. The full PBPR report would then serve as a stand-alone reference document for readers who need details.
65. Meanwhile, most of the pS interviewees voiced the opinion that the PBPR contained too little information on results. Some expressed a preference for multi-year, rather than only single-year, backward coverage when it comes to results reporting, the stated reason being that tangible results are unlikely to materialize on an annual basis. One delegate in particular suggested that the PBPR should better outline the links between ES activities, outcomes and mandates as a way of further enhancing the transparency of the organization. The delegate also asked for the presentation of more quantitative outcome indicators, and that the currently large amount of details be reduced as it undermined an overall understanding of the OSCE's activities and results. Rather than focusing on what the OSCE spent its funds on, the PBPR should put more emphasis on the benefits created by these funds. At the same time, the delegate was of the view that the comparative advantage of the OSCE did not come through in the PBPR. Similarly, another delegate expressed a desire for more information that serves as proof of results, together with information on baselines, indicators, and risks encountered by the OSCE that impact its ability to deliver on planned results. Several – but not all – interviewed pS delegates voiced an interest in receiving more information on the OSCE's KPIs.
66. The main users of the PBPR report varied across delegations. In some cases, the information was confined to the delegation staff as they had no reporting requirements to the respective foreign ministries, some of which leave details of OSCE issues in the hands of the OSCE delegations. In the words of one pS delegate, their Ministry of Foreign Affairs largely viewed the financial contribution to the OSCE as a "subscription fee" to an international security organization and had little interest in the exact details of the report. For some other delegates, the situation was different, in that the details of the report were essential in assisting the delegations in their efforts to request funding for the OSCE. For those delegates, results information presented in the PBPR was of high importance.

67. The third sub-component **evaluation** also receives a rating of “2” based on the JIU benchmarking model. It reflects that evaluation of programmatic UB projects appears to be among the weakest elements of the OSCE RBM system and practice. ES foremost carry out UB project self-evaluations that mostly have the character of summaries of project inputs, activities and outputs. Decentralized (commissioned) evaluations⁴⁵ conducted by external experts are few compared to the number of UB projects. However, since UB projects are typically of small financial volume and of short duration, it is by definition not reasonable to expect tangible mid-term results during the course of a single year, nor feasible to commission an external evaluation for each UB project given the costs involved.
68. Furthermore, since long-term project results cannot be expected in such a short time-frame, the usefulness of external outcome evaluations of *individual* UB projects is constrained, unless these projects have a significant size.⁴⁶ As a consequence, several ES have occasionally commissioned decentralized evaluations of a set of consecutive / interrelated UB projects to assess outcome level results achieved after a number of years. These so-called cluster or pooled evaluations informed further work in these specific thematic areas, and were generally found to be useful.
69. Finally, also the sub-component **management information systems** received a rating of “2.” It reflects that whereas the OSCE has online financial, asset, and human resources information management systems, and online systems for entering and retrieving information for the PO, UBP and PBPR processes, no similar easy to access and dashboard-based *programme performance* information management system exists at either the corporate level, or the project and programme levels.⁴⁷ This means that there is no simple way for ES to enter and retrieve results data that can be used for corporate level learning and decision-making, let alone for corporate level accountability and transparency. A number of interviewees stated that because the OSCE did not have a user-friendly performance monitoring system for easy recording of KPI monitoring data, results data needed to be “compiled manually and at great effort” by the end of the year.

⁴⁵ In the OSCE, decentralized evaluations are also known as ‘commissioned evaluations’. In this report, the term ‘decentralized evaluation’, instead of ‘commissioned evaluation’, is used to align language with international practice.

⁴⁶ An inventory undertaken by OIO shows that over the period 2017-2019, 26 decentralized evaluations were carried out by the OSCE’ ES. OIO data also show that 1808 UB projects were initiated over the period 2015-2019, of which 38% had expenditures of at most EUR25.000, 58% were below EUR50.000, and 75% below EUR100.000. Only 64 UB projects (3.5%), or on average 13 projects per year, had expenditures in excess of EUR400.000. Given the evaluation cost rule-of-thumb of 2-3% of project costs to be set aside for evaluation, this provides little financial space for decentralized evaluations of individual UB projects. It is meanwhile noted that these projects involved 40% of all UB project expenditures. However, an OIO review of six recent UB projects with expenditures of at least EUR400.000 showed that only one referred to a project that delivered assistance to stakeholder in pS, whereas the other four covered OSCE-internal regular common operational costs and costs for administrative units. This indicates that the actual number of UB projects that have a budget of EUR400.000 or higher, and that delivered assistance to external stakeholders, is very low.

⁴⁷ OIO notes that PESU has carried out a feasibility study for an online project design and management tool with a dashboard. Intended for ExB projects, it may be possible to also use it for UB projects.

5.5 Change management: 3.3 (UN 3.5)

70. The change management area score reflects the sub-component ratings of 3 for **internalization** and **use of results** and the rating of “4” for **leadership**. The rating for **internalization** shows that the OSCE has “champions and leaders” that promote results-based management and that it includes results-based management into its training programmes. There are also “visible efforts and investments” in developing staff understanding of RBM and their role in applying it. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of RBM capacity-building efforts has not been assessed, and no real capacity-building incentive systems exist. No corporate-wide efforts have been undertaken to identify obstacles and disincentives against RBM that may be used to inform RBM capacity-building.
71. OIO’s survey reveals that a considerable proportion of OSCE staff has an insufficient understanding of what RBM and RBB entail in practice. 45% of the respondents were unable – or able to only a limited extent – to identify the guiding principles of RBM, whereas the corresponding figure for RBB is 52%. Similarly, 77% of the respondents profess that they do not understand – or have only a limited understanding of – their role in applying RBB in their daily work, whereas the corresponding figure for RBM is 32%. Possibly, the considerable amount of staff turn-over in the OSCE contributes to this knowledge deficit and is an impediment to RBM capacity-building. This in turn raises concerns about the extent to which RBM and RBB are implemented in the day-to-day work of the organization.
72. Furthermore, OIO survey data provides information on staff perceptions of knowledge-related obstacles against RBM. One perceived barrier is indeed the lack of knowledge, as also illustrated in the previous paragraph: OSCE staff are of the view that they have received no (34%) or an insufficient amount (43%) of training on the meaning and application of RBM in their daily work. The survey also found that the RBM skills/knowledge gaps of team colleagues of the respondents were perceived as a key barrier (29%) or somewhat of a barrier (52%) against the implementation of RBM.
73. The survey also identified other obstacles. First, there is a perceived lack of RBM culture as staff regard team members’ resistance against RBM as “a key barrier/challenge” (10%) or “somewhat of a barrier/challenge” (38%). Other prevalent key barriers/challenges include lack of staff time (key barrier - 26%; somewhat of a barrier - 43%), and low staff expectations of the value of RBM, which is considered a key barrier (22%) and somewhat of a barrier (47%) by the majority of the respondents.
74. The **leadership** sub-component was rated higher, as a “4.” On a positive note, OIO’s survey shows that managers commonly lead and demonstrate the benefits of RBM, clarify to staff how results are part of their daily work, and consistently ask for results information from staff. In addition, OIO’s survey data shows that managers are often perceived to be establishing realistic performance expectations,

and an environment that facilitates reporting and learning from poor and good performance. In addition, the OSCE provides annual performance awards.

75. In particular, the survey shows that for 83% of staff their personal performance assessment is “fully” or “to a large extent” based on results achievement and the identification of lessons learned, and 56% find that their managers to “a considerable extent” lead by demonstrating the benefits of using results data for decision-making. A slightly larger proportion (61%) finds that managers to a “considerable extent” ask for results information and use it to take decisions on programme/project adjustments and to hold managers accountable, and that managers to a “large extent” set realistic yet challenging personal performance expectations (64%). Similarly, 63% consider that their managers “to a considerable extent” create an enabling environment to report and learn from poor and good performance.
76. Nevertheless, these figures also show that a considerable proportion of managers do not create an enabling environment, ask for results information and use such information to take decisions on programme/project adjustments, and lead by demonstrating the benefits of using results data for decision-making. This may in turn be related to the previously discussed limited space for RBM in the OSCE, which may have resulted in some managers not pursuing RBM more vigorously.
77. The final sub-component **use of results** rating of “3” reflects that in the JIU benchmarking language the OSCE “is making efforts to mainstream results-based management [...] mainly by advocating for the use of results information in management and the strengthening of systems generating results information (outcomes).” Moreover, while “mechanisms to ensure the systematic availability of results information at the various decision-making levels of the organization are being established”, the importance “of results information is only recognized by some/few groups within the organization.”
78. In concrete terms, through decisions, guidance notes, project proposal templates and the annual PO/UB/PBPR process the OSCE may appear to have shared a clear vision of the role of RBM. However, only 42% of the survey respondents agreed “to a considerable extent” that the OSCE had such a clear vision. Another survey finding is that only 60% (for UB projects) and 52% (for programmes) responded that “to a large extent” “information on results and the capacity to continue delivering them” is “routinely analysed and used [...] in decision-making on modifying operations, reallocating resources, deciding on new activities/projects, and revising strategies and policies.” OIO’s survey also shows that 85% of staff regard RBM as “valuable and essential for good management and delivery of programme and project results.” Thus, while the large majority of staff believe that decisions should be driven by RBM considerations, half or less perceive this to actually be the case. This finding is aligned with

interview information that highlights the role of pS and stakeholder expectations, as well as of political sensitivities, for decisions on what projects to pursue.

79. The survey also shows that the majority of respondents find that decentralized evaluations launched by ES are useful for learning and decision making. A question on whether results from self-evaluations (UB projects) and decentralized evaluations (programmes) are used for future project and programme planning, received “to a considerable extent” responses from 60% and 58% of the respondents, respectively. A related survey finding is that 61% of the respondents (for UB projects) and 62% (for programmes) agreed to a “considerable extent” that analysis and decentralized evaluations provided information on what works, why, and in what contexts, “thereby providing a good basis to guide decisions and actions for improvement or change.”

6. Evaluation Question Findings

80. The previous report section provided quantitative ratings of the degree to which elements of RBM have been implemented in the OSCE. This section combines select information in that section with other information sources to provide an assessment of the PBPB system’s relevance, added value, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence, and the degree to which the system has lent itself to the promotion of gender equality.

6.1 Relevance and added value

81. OECD-DAC defines *relevance* as “doing the right things” in terms of alignment with “needs, policies, and priorities.”⁴⁸ The stated goal of the OSCE’s PBPB system is to strengthen the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability/transparency of the OSCE. Rather than corporate targets and milestones, the OSCE has organizational level general commitments with targets and milestones set at lower ES levels, which reflects the organization’s structure and system of governance. The PBPB system’s decentralized design is therefore of **relevance** for the OSCE. Meanwhile, the system’s **added value** is in practice constrained with regard to its effect on monitoring and evaluation.
82. A central challenge is related to the roles RBM should – and can – play for the OSCE. In theory, the OSCE’s PBPB process should use information about results for three distinct purposes: to i) strengthen accountability for results which, in turn, ensures that the organization continues to be entrusted with the responsibilities and resources it requires to fulfil its mandate, ii) inform planning and decision-making so that resources are spent in the most value-adding way, and iii) inform learning on how

⁴⁸ OECD (2019b).

results can best be achieved. In practice, the PBPB process only serves the first two purposes, and only the first purpose is served well.

83. The ACMF tends to focus on the UB and related budget considerations, rather than on substance and results, as evidenced by lengthy budget discussions that tend to span over several months, as compared to the comparatively little time devoted to the PO and the PBPR, the latter of which provides some results-related information. Possibly, this difference is due to the fact that only the UBP requires a consensus decision, which often results in a lengthy process until such a decision is reached. Nevertheless, results considerations do not figure prominently in the UBP discussions among pS. The large majority of interviewees who are programme heads (and similar) also regard the system as primarily serving an accountability, transparency and compliance purpose vis-à-vis pS.
84. The accountability-focused function of the PBPB system is of significant value for the organization as a whole, including for the pS, as it addresses the organizational real need for accountability, and it enhances the institutional memory of a decentralized organization with high staff turnover.
85. The PBPB system is also relevant – and commonly also highly appreciated by interviewees – for serving an important ES *internal planning* purpose in terms of providing a planning tool that is helpful to the extent that it provides a framework for translating ES plans and strategies into work plans. Many interviewees expressed the view that it brings structure, logic, direction, focus and keeps ES “on track”, and that it creates a shared understanding among programme staff on goals, and on how their work fits into the larger organizational picture. In the words of one interviewee, the PO and UBP process “gets programme managers to think beyond activities.” It is also viewed as a necessary tool for standardising and increasing coherence of the planning and budgeting process across a decentralized organization. However, some interviewees found that the system did not improve planning, which was said to be carried out independently of the PBPB, with the planning information subsequently being fitted into the PO and UB templates, instead of using the templates for planning.
86. For reasons detailed in section 5 above, the majority of interviewees also did not see the added value of the system with regards to monitoring, decentralized evaluation and assessments. The reasons include the annual planning process coupled with small budgets, which in practice provide little space for planning, assessment, external evaluation and reporting. Nevertheless, and even though the current system was seldom regarded as perfect and constrained by a number of factors, only a minority of interviewees stated that they would like to stop using the system for planning purposes. The stated reason was that most of them perceived the need for some type of planning mechanism.

6.2 Efficiency

87. The annual process is generally regarded positively and as less burdensome – and thus more efficient – by units delivering support functions. Since these units typically have fixed tasks and standardized outcomes, these can be carried forward from one year to another. Moreover, most of their KPIs are output-related and considered to be easier to formulate than outcome-related indicators. This means nevertheless that for such units the system is strictly speaking not a system that overall *directly* promotes outcomes and thus results, but rather a system that emphasizes outputs and thus efficiency. In effect, such units are commonly managing for outputs instead of for outcomes. However, since outputs of support function units that are achieved cost efficiently increase the likelihood that planned outcomes will be realized, outputs indirectly contribute to outcomes of programmatic units.
88. Interviewees from programmatic units commonly professed more mixed views, in that the annual effort invested in creating the PO, UB and PBPR was by some found to be too time consuming and not an efficient use of their time. Some also highlighted the futility of formulating KPIs given that ES commonly did not follow up on them because only little results information was included in the PBPR, and since the KPIs were not used internally either. In addition, tangible results from project and programmes do not materialize during a one year period only, whereas KPIs were typically formulated for a one year period.

6.3 Effectiveness

89. While the PBPB system was regarded as effective for accountability and for ES internal planning purposes, OSCE interviewees pointed out barriers that undermined its effectiveness with regard to generating more results-oriented practices/activities. First, the annual budget cycle, commonly coupled with delayed budget approvals and small project sizes caused by the limited ES budgets stretched over many thematic areas, was commonly seen to be undermining ES' ability to achieve concrete outcomes, and thus to manage for results. For these reasons the focus of the overall annual planning process and formulation of KPIs has become geared towards activities and outputs that are reachable on an annual basis, rather than on outcomes. Second, KPIs were considered useful *in principle* but their effectiveness was seen to be diminished by the way they were adapted to the annual UB budget cycle and small UB budgets. In addition, for the reasons outlined in section 5 above, not all ES use and follow up on them.
90. Another common interview remark was that the system was not synchronized with the planning process and consequently was not effective in promoting *learning*. Development of the PO for the forthcoming year has in recent years commenced before the current year's budget was approved, and before the results of the current year were known. This means that the annual RBM circle that involves

planning – implementation – learning – and then planning again, is not closed before the next annual budget is prepared.

91. In addition, since the budget of the forthcoming year is discussed in the current year, it means that the current year's (i.e., 2019) performance information has only a limited influence on the directly subsequent (i.e., 2020) annual budget decision, but may instead influence budget decisions two years later (i.e., 2021). Thus, RBB is undermined. Finally, because budgets have for many years been limited by consensus on ZNG rather than being influenced by RBB principles, budget allotments are predictable. Some interviewees mentioned that as a consequence incentives to achieve results are reduced, as neither failure nor success have budget implications for the ES given that with ZNG budgets, next year's budget can with a high degree of certainty be expected to be similar to the current year's budget. Meanwhile, RBB principles can be applied within ES in that the internal distribution of project funds can be revised.
92. The evaluation notes in this regard that the PBPB system appears more suitable for managing results in organizations with sizeable and multi-year budgets and planning cycles than for an organization with a rather small annual budget influenced by repeated ZNG budgets.⁴⁹ In the view of one interviewee, "we are not given an opportunity to achieve" results. It may in that regard be noted that as the annual UBs decrease in real terms due to the ZNG budgets, this logically means that the results-promoting effectiveness of the system likewise decreases on an annual basis. The reason is that the fixed costs in terms of labour for setting up projects are likely similar for small and large UB projects alike. Hence, as projects decrease in size due to the ZNG budget, project efficiency is reduced by the proportionally larger fixed costs for setting them up.

6.4 Coherence

93. Coherence is defined as "the compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution." Implementation of the PBPB system is not coherent *across* the OSCE. In particular, some ES are more prone than others to carrying out multi-year planning at the programme level, and some ES are more inclined than others to using the PBPB templates for planning. There are also differences across ES with regard to the extent to which data is collected and monitoring and evaluation of programmes and major projects are carried out. In addition, there is a variation among ES and programmes regarding how they formulate and follow up on KPIs. To some extent these differences appear to rely on whether the entity in question is programme and project-oriented, or whether its main role is to either provide administrative, financial or legal support services for the

⁴⁹ However, the annual UB process does not preclude an underlying multiyear planning that is exercised by some ES; and multiyear planning is advised in the PBPB guidance documents.

larger organization; or to primarily deliver on the OSCE's political mandate and to support field operations in that respect.

94. These differences also relate to the fact that some OSCE activities are more politically sensitive than others. In this context, while properly formulated KPIs should focus mainly on the results achieved by the ES themselves, assessment of the extent to which an ES has achieved results in certain politically sensitive areas may be interpreted by some interlocutors as an assessment of the extent to which pS themselves have implemented their commitments. The fact that the OSCE has a consensus-based decision-making process, not least on management and financial matters, ensures that caution is exercised in all PBPB documents to avoid misunderstandings or critical reactions from one or more pS. In addition, a significant proportion of all OSCE projects are demand-driven (i.e., requested by the stake-holder through annual negotiations with the OSCE,), rather than supply-driven (i.e., planned and offered by the OSCE to the stake-holder). In effect, the space for multi-year plans is inherently conditioned by the degree to which the OSCE's assistance is supply-driven and the extent to which the assistance requests from stake-holders are linked to their own multi-year strategies or plans.

6.5 Gender mainstreaming

95. The *2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality* promotes equal rights and treatment of men and women and sets out that the OSCE should mainstream gender in its activities in order to promote these goals. Aligned thereto, MC.DEC/17/05 (2005) on "Strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE" declares that pS are "determined to strengthen the effectiveness" of the OSCE, and to make "effective gender mainstreaming an integral part of all policies, activities and programmes in the OSCE." It is noted that "gender equality" is included in the 2007 PBPB guidance and in recent guidelines for the PO and PBPR that state that "all executive structures should ensure that a gender perspective is integrated into OSCE activities, programmes and projects."
96. Structures were created to help fulfil the above commitments, including a dedicated Gender Issues Programme and thus strategically oriented "gender champion" in the Secretariat, and dedicated structures, experts and focal points in ES, together with additional reporting requirements on gender equality related to the Secretary-General's *Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the OSCE 2004 Action Plan on the Promotion of Gender Equality*, which is submitted to the PC on a yearly basis.
97. OIO's survey provides indicative data on the extent to which gender is an integral part of policies, activities, results and programmes in the OSCE. 72% of the respondents answered that their managers "to a considerable extent" highlighted the need to promote results with regard to gender equality in the planning and implementation of programmes and projects, whereas only 7% responded "no." Second, 56% responded that "considerations of the impact of previous projects on gender equality

were “to a considerable extent” used for project or programme planning. Third, 78% of the respondents regarded the promotion of gender equality “to a large extent” or “fully” as a key element of programme and project planning. Finally, 67% responded that results related to the promotion of gender equality were “to a large extent” or “fully” key elements of project self-evaluations and decentralized evaluations.

98. While these findings show inclusion of gender considerations for [1] *planning*, [2] *monitoring and reporting*, and [3] *evaluation*, the survey data should be combined with data collected by the Secretariat’s Gender Issues Programme from ES, which show for 2018 that whereas 14% of all OSCE ExB projects are gender-specific, and another 30% of all ExB projects are considered to be fully gender mainstreamed, 53% are characterised by “limited gender mainstreaming”, and a further 3% of ExB projects have not been gender mainstreamed at all.⁵⁰ Comparable information for UB projects does not exist.
99. Data collected during this and other OIO evaluations also confirm that despite the prominent place that gender equality has taken in the OSCE’s PBPB system, challenges observed with regard to RBM overall are faced in this area as well. More specifically, management of activities and outputs rather than of longer-term results is often given priority. Strengthening results reporting on gender equality has been a concern of the Secretariat’s Gender Issues Programme and many ES, and needs to be further pursued in the future, including by updating the templates used for planning and reporting on the implementation of the *Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality*. Reporting on the implementation of the *Action Plan* in the PBPR also needs to be strengthened, and aligned with the former gender reporting mechanism. These efforts need to go hand in hand with other activities to reinforce RBM overall in the organization.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

100. The evaluation concluded that in comparison to the *average* situation in other international organizations, RBM has been implemented unevenly in the OSCE across the various RBM areas. More specifically, the areas - results frameworks for programmes and projects, performance reporting, results reporting, evaluation and management information systems - in which RBM has been least implemented in the OSCE are also the ones that matter most for results management. Meanwhile, the ratings are roughly on par with the other organizations in areas relating to accountability and transparency. The OSCE’s PBPB system’s most substantial function has been external in terms of *accountability* towards its pS by putting the focus on reporting on budgets, and on outputs, rather

⁵⁰ OSCE (2018).

than on medium to longer-term results or outcomes, although this is required by the PBPB methodology. The overall focus on accountability and transparency is a feature that the OSCE shares with the RBM practices of other international organizations.

101. These findings for the most part also apply to reporting on gender results. Gender equality has taken a prominent place in the OSCE's PBPB system in terms of the inclusion of gender considerations in *planning, monitoring and reporting, and evaluation* within the OSCE. However, management of activities and outputs was often prioritized over longer-term results.
102. The PBPB system's decentralized design is of **relevance** for the OSCE. Meanwhile, the system is of **added value** as it addresses an organizational real need for accountability, and provides a planning tool that translates into work plans. The system's **efficiency** however, is mixed. OSCE units delivering support functions commonly found the system to be efficient, whereas staff from programmatic units professed more mixed views in that in the application the system was often not to be viewed as an efficient use of their time. The evaluation found that the system was **effective** for accountability and for ES internal planning purposes, whereas its effectiveness for generating more results-oriented practices/activities was undermined by a series of factors, including the annual budget cycle, commonly coupled with delayed budget approvals and small project sizes.
103. This evaluation observed that the space for a stronger results orientation in the OSCE is restricted by a series of factors including its broad area of responsibilities, political sensitivities, the OSCE's consensus decision-making process, its comparatively small core (UB) budget, repeated ZNG budgets, and the annual UB budget cycle, coupled with a large number of UB projects with small budgets. All these factors limit the organization's ability to achieve tangible results, especially on an annual basis. Overall this means that under these circumstances results frameworks for programmes and projects, results reporting, and external evaluation of UB projects are challenging to implement.
104. Most of these factors are at a strategic level and while they are thus beyond the control of the ES and thus also outside the recommendations of this evaluation, the pS may want to consider how they can be addressed in order to help strengthen RBM in the OSCE.
105. The evaluation identified a series of operational level barriers that are within the purview of the organization. If addressed, they can assist the OSCE to more effectively occupy the space available for RBM, not only for a stronger results orientation of its activities, but also for enhanced accountability and transparency. Efforts should also be continued to discuss the move to a biennial budget cycle with pS in order to strengthen the results-based reporting they receive. The evaluation identified the following recommendations to be addressed in the short, medium and long term:

Recommendations for action in the short-term

Lack of clarity among OSCE staff, including senior management, regarding the meaning of key RBM concepts, how KPIs should be formulated, and what functions the PBPB system shall play in the OSCE.

- **Recommendation 1.** Update guidance for OSCE staff, including senior management, that clarifies the key RBM concepts of activity, output, outcome, and objective, and that explains the importance of outcome level KPIs, and the functions of the PBPB system; raise awareness of and provide training on these issues; and harmonize RBM related language in all relevant documents including PBPB guidance, the OSCE Project Management Manual, project templates, and training materials *(CPC/PESU in consultation with OIO and ES)*
- **Recommendation 2.** Develop complementary guidance on how the PBPB system is to be implemented by units that are not project-oriented but foremost provide core *services and support* for the organization at large *(CPC/PESU in cooperation with DMF and DHR)*
- **Recommendation 3.** Assign an organizational steering committee that in consultation with relevant stakeholders develops a long-term RBM strategy and implementation plan and related monitoring and evaluation system *(SG)*
- **Recommendation 4.** Plan for an independent evaluation after five years of implementation of the revised RBM strategy in the OSCE *(SG)*

Recommendations for action in the medium-term

Insufficient multi-year planning, use of outcome-level indicators and reporting on outcomes

- **Recommendation 5.** Promote multiyear plans for ES and Secretariat departments in line with the PBPB guidance, including programme outcome-level indicators and appropriate M&E mechanisms to follow up on the achievement of results *(SG)*
- **Recommendation 6.** Encourage a shift from having many small UB projects towards fewer but larger projects that include complementary and inter-connected activities and are aligned with multiyear strategic plans and objectives *(SG)*
- **Recommendation 7.** Encourage ES to strengthen their decentralized evaluation practices, and to plan for and commission external evaluations of multi-year clusters of UB projects *(CPC/PESU and OIO)*
- **Recommendation 8.** Collect and share good practices from ES that already exercise long-term planning and good UB related monitoring and evaluation practices *(CPC/PESU)*

- **Recommendation 9.** Improve outcome-level reporting on the implementation of the *Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality* in the PBPR (SG)
- **Recommendation 10.** Develop an online dashboard performance monitoring system to facilitate easy recording and retrieval of monitoring data by all ES (*CPC/PESU in co-ordination with DMF*)
- **Recommendation 11.** Include the full list of KPIs in the UBP document and ensure their integration into future reporting (SG)

8. Management Response and Recommendation Implementation Plan

OVERALL MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

As I noted in the PBPR and PO presentation to pS on 7 May 2021 I am committed to improving the OSCE's **Performance Based Budget Process** including planning, monitoring and evaluation to ensure our activities deliver and demonstrate real results when implementing OSCE mandate. OSCE management thus appreciates this evaluation report and its recommendations to improve the use of RBM in the OSCE.

Solid results-based management lays a strong foundation for effectiveness and efficiency, but also for continuous learning, which is critical for improvement and value for money delivery. Hence I am committed to further enhance the current institutional framework in place with the introduction of an RBM Strategy including through implementation of recommendations in the report, to the extent possible given the structural and political constraints identified in the report.

To best benefit from the RBM system, it will be important to benchmark with peer organizations (particularly those working in conflict), as well as with participating States. This benchmarking should seek to capture best practices for RBM in conflict affected and diplomatic contexts, as well as to optimize comparability. It should also seek to identify any emerging trends or potential shifts which might have implications in the medium term.

Given the OSCE's particular constraints, developing an RBM strategy will involve extensive coordination among executive structures with distinct mandates and close consultation with participating States.

Proposals to change the way that outcomes are reported to participating States (including through the publication of Key Performance Indicators) have been under discussion since the OSCE introduced RBM almost two decades ago and have proven to be highly sensitive.

Area	Issue	Recommendation	Evaluation Client	Accept Yes/No/Partially	Recommendation Implementation Plan (if not accepted, add management comments)	Implementation date (estimate)
Actions for the short-term	1. Lack of clarity among OSCE staff, including senior management, regarding the meaning of key RBM concepts, how KPIs should be formulated, and what functions the PBPB system shall play in the OSCE	1. Update guidance for OSCE staff, including senior management, that clarifies the key RBM concepts of activity, output, outcome, and objective, and that explains the importance of outcome level KPIs, and the functions of the PBPB system; raise awareness of and provide training on these issues; and harmonize RBM related language in all relevant documents including PBPB guidance, the OSCE Project Management Manual, project templates, and training materials	CPC/PESU in consultation with OIO and ES	YES	CPC PESU, in consultation with DMF and OSG, updated its input into the consolidated budget preparation guidelines as part of the UBP 2022 process, taking into account the lessons learnt of UBP 2021 review and RBM issues. CPC PESU and DMF will carry out a more comprehensive review and update of all documents and templates for harmonization by end of 2022. OIO and ES will be consulted. Annual awareness raising and training to senior management and relevant OSCE staff will also be organized.	2022
		2. Develop complementary guidance on how the PBPB system is to be implemented by units that are not project-oriented but foremost provide core services and support for the organization at large	CPC/PESU in cooperation with DMF and DHR	YES	DMF and DHR will update the sample text on Fund Administration Units (FAU) in the UBP 2022 guidelines to better align to the methodology. CPC PESU, in consultation with DMF and DHR, will develop further guidance for UBP 2023 preparations.	2022

		3. Assign an organizational steering committee that in consultation with relevant stakeholders develops a long-term RBM strategy and implementation plan and related monitoring and evaluation system	SG	YES	The SG will establish an time-limited internal consultation process to develop the future approach, with key roles to be played by OSG,DMF, and CPC . OIO, other Secretariat departments, Institutions and other ES shall be part of the consultation process as required. DMF, in cooperation with CPC and OSG, will draft a proposal for the way forward on the internal consultation mechanism for SG's approval by end of 2021. Relevant Executive structures as well as OIO will be consulted.	End of 2021
		4. Plan for an independent evaluation after five years of implementation of the revised RBM strategy in the OSCE	SG	YES	RBM strategy/action plan is foreseen to be developed and for SG's approval by end of 2022. While further actions and timelines will be foreseen in the strategy/action plan, a review in 2026 would be timely.	Q3 2022
Actions for the mid-term	2. Insufficient multi-year planning, use of outcome-level indicators and reporting on outcomes	5. Promote multiyear plans for ES and Secretariat departments in line with the PBPB guidance, including programme outcome-level indicators and appropriate M&E mechanisms to follow up on the achievement of results	SG	YES	Internal multi-year planning is performed in a number of FOs and is specifically encouraged in Ministerial Council decision 18/06. While this will be further encouraged, in some cases the ES need to have the flexibility of not having this in place, for political reasons. In the context of budget cycle reform, CPC PESU and DMF will seek to update the Programme Outline structure to make clearer reference to objectives and outcomes for multiyear period, in consultation with programmatic capacities (including Institutions) and OSG. Internal tracking of monitoring outcome level indicators could be developed.	Q4 2021

		6. Encourage a shift from having many small UB projects towards fewer but larger projects that include complementary and inter-connected activities and are aligned with multiyear strategic plans and objectives	SG	YES	<p>Management agrees that larger and better-integrated projects aligned with longer-term plans and objectives should be encouraged wherever possible. In some cases, relatively small projects will undoubtedly continue to be appropriate to serve specific needs based on operational and political requirements.</p> <p>In support of these efforts by programmatic capacities, CPC PESU and DMF, in collaboration with OSG, will continue to develop recommended guidance and management tools, including the new budgeting system, to support the resulting evolution of the OSCE's approach to project management.</p>	
		7. Encourage ES to strengthen their decentralized evaluation practices, and to plan for and commission external evaluations of multi-year clusters of UB projects	CPC/PESU and OIO	YES	<p>The recommendation encourage the planning and conducting of decentralized evaluation has been reflected in the UB 2022 guidelines and will also be reflected in future UBP guidelines as advice to Fund Managers. However, a constrained UB and late budget approval imposes operational limitations.</p> <p>Furthermore, CPC PESU will support and will continue to make clear recommendations on decentralized evaluation during project review and project management trainings, templates and support.</p>	

		8. Collect and share good practices from ES that already exercise long-term planning and good UB related monitoring and evaluation practices	CPC/PESU	Yes	CPC PESU will collect and make centrally available a repository of good examples and will promote through the ES and the Network of Project Practitioners.	Q4 2021- Q1 2022
		9. Improve outcome-level reporting on the implementation of the Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality in the PBPR	SG	YES	The SG will continue to provide an annual report and presentation on the implementation of the Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality to the pS, further developing its outcome-level reporting in line with objectives outlined in the Action Plan. (i.e., promotion of gender equality and gender mainstreaming). Efforts to incorporate such outcome-level results in the PBPR will also be continued and enhanced, on the understanding that this will not involve adding any separate sections to the PBPR.	From July 2021
		10. Develop an online dashboard performance monitoring system to facilitate easy recording and retrieval of monitoring data by all ES	CPC/PESU in co- ordination with DMF	Partially yes	If this recommendation would involve creation of a large-scale new system for use throughout the OSCE, it would entail a significant effort and cost, which is currently unfunded. CPC PESU in coordination with DMF can develop an options paper in Q4 2021 – Q2 2022 on what existing off-the-shelf online tools could be used, subject to availability of resources, and make recommendations in this regard.	Q4 2021 – Q2 2022

		11. Include the full list of KPIs in the UBP document and ensure their integration into future reporting	SG	No	<p>Inclusion of KPIs in the UBP document has not been agreed by all participating States.</p> <p>As part of an RBM Strategy, this can be considered further, in consultation with pS.</p> <p>Options on this will be developed for consideration.</p>	
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Annexes

Annex I: Glossary

ACMF	Advisory Committee on Management and Finance
CiO	OSCE Chairperson-in-Office
CPC	OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DHR	OSCE Department of Human Resources
DMF	OSCE Department of Management and Finance
ES	OSCE Executive Structure
ExB	Extra-budgetary
GAVI	Global Vaccine Alliance
JIU	United Nations Joint Inspection Unit
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MC	Ministerial Council
MOPAN	Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network
OIO	Office of Internal Oversight
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSG	OSCE Office of the Secretary General
PBB	Performance-Based Budgeting
PBPB	Performance Based Programme Budgeting
PBPR	Programme Budget Performance Report
PC	Permanent Council
PESU	OSCE Programming and Evaluation Support Unit
PO	Program Outline
pS	Participating States
RBB	Results-based Budgeting
RBM	Results-Based Management
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UB	Unified Budget
UBP	Unified Budget Proposal
WHO	World Health Organization
ZNG	Zero Nominal Growth

Annex II: Evaluation Terms of Reference

I. Background

Topical overview

1. Results-based management (RBM) has been defined in various ways, including its key concept “result.” The OECD defines RBM as a “management strategy focusing on [...] achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts.”⁵¹ Similarly, the UN Development Group defines RBM as “a management strategy by which all actors, contributing directly or indirectly to achieving a set of results, ensure that their processes, products and services contribute to the achievement of desired results (outputs, outcomes and higher level goals or impact).”⁵² Perhaps more broadly, the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) defines RBM as “managing for the achievement of intended organizational results by integrating a results philosophy and principles in all aspects of management and, most significantly, by integrating lessons learned from past performance into management decision-making.”⁵³ It describes results as “outcomes” with regard to “intended changes” in conditions, and describes activities and outputs as means thereto.⁵⁴ JIU finds that “the confusion over the concepts of outputs and outcomes” undermines the implementation of RBM.⁵⁵
2. RBM typically entails the existence of strategic level goals and action plans with result targets and timelines that are implemented by programmes, which in turn are implemented by projects, and linked to monitoring and evaluation plans.⁵⁶ The role of programmes and projects is to generate the result target set at the strategic and programmatic level.⁵⁷ Examples of this corporate-level top-down RBM approach include UNICEF that has a strategic plan for 2018-2021 with result targets and a related detailed results framework with key performance indicators (KPIs).⁵⁸
3. Other organizations have a decentralized but still a top-down RBM mechanism. For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) has been described as one of the most decentralized UN organizations.⁵⁹ Its governance and structure include a broad mandate and geographically distributed field offices that enjoy a significant degree of autonomy to decide on and plan activities.⁶⁰ Whereas the WHO has formulated long-term cross-organizational impact goals, their implementation is challenged by its decentralized organizational structure⁶¹.

⁵¹ OECD (2012).

⁵² United Nations Development Group (2011).

⁵³ Joint Inspection Unit (2017a: 2-3). A conceptual issue is whether “results” should cover only outcomes (short-term, mid-term, and long-term), i.e. the change made, as suggested by among others the World Bank, or also “outputs”, as suggested by for instance the OECD and the UNDP. Data show that of 29 UN organizations, seven organizations explicitly include “output” in the definition of “result” for RBM, another four organizations explicitly exclude outputs, whereas the remaining organization do not define “result” (JIU 2017b: 34-37). It may be noted that if outputs are considered to constitute results, then RBM moves beyond a focus on effectiveness to also incorporate the concept of efficiency (i.e., cost per output unit).

⁵⁴ Joint Inspection Unit (2017a: 2).

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 30.

⁵⁶ For a historical overview of RBM up until 2010, see Vähämäki, Schmidt, and Molander (2011), and ECOSOC (2012). See also OECD (2000, 2017, 2019) and the Joint Inspection Unit (2017b, 2017c).

⁵⁷ Joint Inspection Unit (2017a). See also Joint Inspection Unit (2017b).

⁵⁸ Strategic plan and results framework are available at https://www.unicef.org/media/48126/file/UNICEF_Strategic_Plan_2018-2021-ENG.pdf and <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1301145?ln=en>, respectively.

⁵⁹ Vijayan (2007).

⁶⁰ Yadav (2017: 20). OECD (2016: 24) notes that “Under Article 50 of the Constitution, regional committees are mandated, inter alia, to formulate policies on matters of an exclusively regional character and supervise the activities of the regional office.” See also MOPAN (2019a).

⁶¹ MOPAN (2019a).

4. Implicit as well as key in the above narrative and JIU evaluations is a focus on organisational entities that foremost deliver pre-determined activities with the aim of generating short-term, mid-term and long-term outcomes. As such the entities formulate and plan for results (i.e., intended changes) and to that end implement *pre-planned* activities. Any organisation has also “secretariat” or “headquarters” entities, many of which provide to various degree predictable on-demand and core *services and support* for the organisation at large. These include various types of policy support, political affairs departments and offices of internal oversight, as well as support services such as recruitment departments, legal affairs departments, payroll departments, finance departments, procurement units, and conference service departments.
5. To some extent, several of these entities may also carry out pre-planned activities or projects in addition to the on-demand services. For instance, an Office of Legal Affairs may plan for a revision of the organisation’s legal provisions (e.g., duty of care); a recruitment department may implement capacity-building sessions for staff; a secretariat-level police matters unit may plan to implement a capacity-building project in a certain country; while an IT department may plan for a large-scale update of an organisation’s computer hardware and software.
6. This evaluation will cover all types of the OSCE’s organisational units – field operations, institutions and the Secretariat. In this context it deserves to be noted that in the international community, the applicability of results-based accountability frameworks as management tools for headquarters or secretariat level units has been a general topic of discussion for more than 10 years. In a review of RBM at the United Nations secretariat units, the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) remarked that “the exercise of accountability is not cast from review of outcomes but from ascertaining that there is no negligence, misconduct or breach of rules and regulations” and labelled RBM as applied to Secretariat units “a paper-making chore.”⁶² The report concluded that “[...] results-based management has been an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making [...]” and that “[...] there are conceptual and operational caveats to the applicability of results-based management in the Secretariat.” Stating that the United Nations need “a comprehensive “new deal” on results-based management” in the secretariat, as a first among six recommendations it recommends that the “Secretary-General propose to the General Assembly an overarching policy and terminological framework to circumscribe the extent and limitations of results-based management in the Secretariat.” By 2020, the ninth annual progress report on the work to “strengthening accountability in the United Nations Secretariat” had been issued.⁶³
7. An element of RBM is Performance-based budgeting (PBB), which has been defined as the “use of performance information to inform budget decisions, either as a direct input to budget allocation decisions or as contextual information to inform budget planning, and to instil greater transparency and accountability throughout the budget process, by providing information to legislators and the public on the purposes of spending and the results achieved”⁶⁴. It “implies a shift in the focus of budgeting, away from management of inputs and towards a focus on the results of spending and the achievement of policy objectives.”⁶⁵

⁶² United Nations (2008a: 2, 20).

⁶³ For the third to the ninth progress reports, see United Nations (2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2020).

⁶⁴ OECD (2018: 6)

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.7.

8. Similar to the applicability of RBM, the applicability of PBB in “secretariat” or “headquarters” level entities has for a number of reasons often been viewed as less than straightforward. For instance, the OECD’s best practices for PBB recommends that any PBB methodology has “the flexibility to deal with the very varied nature of government funded activities, and the different relationships that exist between financial resources and performance. Rather than a “one size fits all” approach, governments should differentiate between programme types, reflecting the relationship between budgetary inputs and outcomes.”⁶⁶

The OSCE’s practice

9. In contrast to organisations such as WHO or UNICEF, the OSCE lacks organizational level top-down targets/impact goals and milestones. It instead has a series of organizational level general commitments (but no targets and milestones) across its three Dimensions coupled with annual Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) priorities and a continuously growing number of Ministerial Council (MC) commitments and Permanent Council (PC) decisions. The OSCE’s commitments and activities, while related in particular to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (i.e., peace, justice and strong institutions), are also relevant for the other 16 SDGs.⁶⁷
10. Partly similar to the practice of the WHO, concrete goals and KPIs are formulated independently by the OSCE’s executive structures, which in turn are divided into “programmes.” Hence, in practice the OSCE is not managing for organizational level results but for lower executive level results through their various entities.
11. In the absence of organisation-wide and pre-determined results targets, the OSCE implements a single, highly detailed and itemized results-based budgeting (RBB) system called *Performance Based Programme Budgeting* (PBPB) with the related *Programme Budget Performance Report* (PBPR). Introduced in 2006⁶⁸, the PBPB system is applied in the same way across all organisation entities regardless of roles/mandates.⁶⁹ As such, all OSCE entities – field operations, institutions and the Secretariat – are required to formulate intended outcomes, outputs and KPIs. This includes entities that to various degrees provide on demand core services and support for the organisation at large across the OSCE area of operations. It may in this context be noted that OSCE entities commonly formulate objectives, outcomes, outputs and KPIs in terms of activities and outputs instead of short-term, mid-term and long-term results (change), in the OSCE’s annual Unified Budget proposal.⁷⁰
12. The OSCE’s bottom-up approach to target setting is formally outlined in PC.DEC/553 (2003) and further detailed in Financial Administrative Instruction 02/2005 (FAI/02/2005).⁷¹ It outlines that objectives and corresponding budgets, activities and outputs, are formulated by fund managers (i.e., heads of executive structures) “when appropriate in consultation with the countries of implementation” and consistent with the funds’ (i.e., executive structures) mandates. These executive structure specific budgets are then combined into a unified budget proposal that is submitted to the

⁶⁶ Ibid, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁷ <https://www.osce.org/sustainable-development-goals>.

⁶⁸ See OSCE (2007), which is the OSCE’s RBM guidance note for OSCE staff. The introduction of the OSCE’s RBB system was preceded by a series of OSCE decisions, including MC.DEC/17/05 (2005) on “strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE” and MC.DEC/18/06 (2006).

⁶⁹ On best practices for performance budgeting, see OECD (2018).

⁷⁰ See OSCE (2019). See also Heynitz (2016).

⁷¹ See OSCE (2007) for practical guidance on implementing RBB.

Permanent Council (PC) and further considered in detail by the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance (ACMF). Hence, and in contrast to other international organisations, the role of the central level of the OSCE is not to proactively set corporate level targets and budgets, but to reactively review the fund specific budgets and activities and approve the resulting unified budget. In addition, and in contrast to for instance the United Nations, the OSCE does not formulate organisational broad thematic priorities with related budget allocations as a means of providing guidance to executive structures in their formulations of annual plans and budgets.

2. Purpose and Use of the Evaluation

13. The choice of the OSCE's RBM (including PBB) practice as object of an independent evaluation is timely, not least considering the frequent requests by OSCE pS that the OSCE demonstrates the results of its activities. The OSCE's RBM/PBB system was created in 2006 and partly reviewed for the first time in 2016 by an external expert who focused on only the Office of the Secretary General (OSG) at the Secretariat and formulated a series of key recommendations. Neither other Secretariat units, nor the OSCE's field missions that are the OSCE's core executive tools for delivering results, were covered.⁷² Moreover, the review did not address the common and key question of how the application of RBM may be adapted to add more value to some organisational units: some Secretariat units may lend themselves more to the OSCE's current RBM system, while for others it might be of less added value. Finally, compared to the RBM benchmarking assessments approaches of the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit and MOPAN, the 2016 review was smaller in scope and detail, and did not rely on a clear and pre-set analytic framework.
14. This evaluation will adhere to the conceptualisation of RBM as excluding outputs in the definition of "result." In contrast to the 2016 OSCE-internal review of its RBM mechanism, the *scope* will be cross-organizational and cover the time period 2015-2020.
15. This shall be a strategic level evaluation where the report's primary target group is OSCE management. It has several inter-linked *purposes*. Apart from constituting routine oversight, the evaluation will assess the nature and degree of implementation of the OSCE's current RBM system. It will in that connection identify good RBM practices within the OSCE and identify barriers against – and facilitators of – a more effective RBM system. The evaluation will furthermore assess whether and to what extent the current PBB system is an optimal fit-for-OSCE-purpose for all types of OSCE entities, and identify the changes that are necessary and feasible for the system to be of optimal relevance, added value, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability to all of them. The evaluation will also assess to what extent the system lends itself to and is used for the promotion of gender equality, one of the OSCE's commitments.
16. Based thereon the evaluation will formulate recommendations that are tailored to the OSCE's governance and structure, and serve to further harmonize, simplify and strengthen the organization's RBM mechanism, enhancing its fit for purpose.

⁷² Heynitz (2016).

3. Criteria, Scope and Methodology

17. An assessment framework developed by the JIU has been used to evaluate the prevalence and character of RBM in United Nations system organizations.⁷³ Similar to the JIU evaluation, and related to one of the purposes of this evaluation (i.e., assess the nature and degree of implementation of the OSCE's current RBM system), it will have the character of a benchmarking study. To enable comparison with the state of RBM in other international organisations, it will grade the OSCE for 65 indicators across the below four elements that originate from JIU's assessment framework and assess whether an organization's:⁷⁴
- *Strategic management* is based on a results-based management conceptual foundation involving a [1] results-based management strategy, [2] change management framework (development of a results-culture), and [3] accountability framework for implementing results-based management.
 - *Operational management* is based on planning, programming and budgeting. This involves [1] a corporate strategic results framework (which includes visions and goals), [2] a results framework at the programme and project levels (which includes results chains and theory of change), [3] a results measurement system, [4] results-based budgeting and [5] human resource management.
 - *Accountability and learning management* covers monitoring, evaluation and reporting. This involves [1] performance monitoring (i.e., results-based monitoring), [2] results reporting, [3] evaluation and [4] management information systems.
 - *Change management* involves fostering a culture of results. This covers [1] internalization and capacity development, [2] leadership and [3] the use of results as learning for future activities.
18. Further adhering to the JIU's assessment framework, the sub-elements will be assessed for the degree to which they have been implemented, ranging from "not started", "exploration for mainstreaming", "transition to mainstreaming", to "fully mainstreamed." The complete matrix of benchmarking questions and indicators, including how gender will be considered, can be found in the annex to this ToR.
19. Related to another purpose of the evaluation (i.e., assess whether the current PBPB system is an optimal fit-for-OSCE-purpose for all types of OSCE entities and identify the changes that are necessary and feasible for the system to become of optimal relevance), it will apply the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standard evaluation criteria. More specifically, and on the basis of the benchmarking scores, it will assess the *relevance, added value, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and coherence* of the OSCE's current RBM system, taking into account the governance and structure of the OSCE. The matrix of benchmarking questions and indicators, including how gender equality will be considered, can be found in the annex to this ToR.

⁷³ Joint Inspection Unit (2017b, 2017c).). See also Joint Inspection Unit (2017b. The Multilateral Organization performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) is an initiative to harmonize assessments of organizational effectiveness (i.e., results) and performance (whether organizations have a results-management system that promotes organizational effectiveness). Since 2002 MOPAN has carried out more than 50 assessments of international organizations, see <http://www.mopanonline.org>. See Lindoso and Hall (2016) for an overview of assessment frameworks

⁷⁴ See JIU (2017a, 2017b). The evaluation is narrowed down to around half of the benchmarking items in the JIU's framework that address core RBM issues.

20. For the purpose of data collection, the evaluation will complement a desk review of OSCE documents and OIO in-house knowledge and data, with structured interviews of OSCE officials (some via video link) from all executive structures and Institutions. It will rely on data collected in electronic surveys distributed by OIO/PESU in 2015 and 2018 to assess the evaluation culture, prevalence of monitoring and evaluation in the OSCE, including related barriers and facilitators. A complementary electronic survey will be distributed to OSCE staff.

4. Timeline

21. The evaluation – including the initial consultation process to finalize the evaluation ToR and issuance of the final report – is planned to be carried out over the period March 2019 to September 2020.

5. Tasks and Qualifications of the Expert Consultant

22. One subject matter (RBM) expert consultant will be hired to support the evaluation, which will be managed by OIO's Senior Evaluator. The consultant will provide expert advice throughout the evaluation process; author individual reports of interviews with all field missions, institutions and Secretariat units; author an analysis of how RBM may be implemented in OSCE entities that are foremost not implementing projects; provide written input to the evaluation ToR and to electronic survey questions, assist with the interpretation of survey findings, and contribute to the development of interview questions; provide written comments on draft evaluation reports, and potentially also participate in a debriefing meeting in Vienna. The consultant will furthermore provide expertise and recommendations in the area of efficiency related measurement and KPIs. He/she is required to meet the following competency profile:

- At least a first-level university degree in social sciences, economics, public policy, law, evaluation, business, management or related field(s) from an accredited university;
- A minimum of 5 years documented professional experience in RBM issues. Documented knowledge RBM in international organizations is highly desirable;
- A minimum of 5 years documented evaluation experience, which could include managing and/or conducting evaluations of development projects or programmes with an international organization, an NGO, with a government department, research experience with a university or academic institution;
- Documented experience in qualitative and/or quantitative analysis;
- Documented experience in conducting gender-responsive evaluations;
- Documented experience in constructing surveys and analysing survey data;
- Fully proficient computer skills and ability to use relevant software and other applications, ideally including, but not limited to survey software, statistical software (e.g., STATA, SPSS, SAS, and R), and advanced MS. Excel skills;
- Excellent report-writing skills and the ability to convey complex information in a logical, clear and concise manner as demonstrated by previous evaluation reports;
- Professional fluency in English.

23. In addition, the evaluation will consider soliciting the services of an external peer reviewer who will contribute to ensuring the quality of the evaluation and relevance of the evaluation findings. He / she

will be asked to review the ToR and draft evaluation report, and to provide advice and suggestions during the evaluation process as required.

6. Liaison Arrangements

24. The expert consultant is required to support the evaluation in close and regular communication and agreement with the evaluation manager, who shall support the consultant by providing:
- OSCE and third-party data, and other sources as required and possible;
 - Logistical support, including arranging meetings with OSCE officials;
 - An evaluation reference group that contains relevant stakeholders or experts;
 - Other support as appropriate.

7. Reporting

25. The report will be organized as outlined in the annex to this ToR and not exceed 30 pages (excluding annexes). The OIO standard report template, including title page, opening page, acknowledgements and Executive Summary shall be applied and adapted to the particular requirements of this evaluation.
26. Apart from OSCE management, the report findings will be communicated through-out the organization. A summary of evaluation findings will be shared through OIO's evaluation newsletter *OSCEval News* and at relevant meetings with OSCE pS, and potentially also through presentations at larger OSCE events and conferences that are open to OSCE staff and OSCE pS. A separate communication strategy will be created towards the end of the evaluation process.

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Annex III: OECD-DAC Evaluation Matrix: Questions, Indicators and Data

Issue	Primary evaluation question	Sub-question(-s)	Primary evaluation question indicator	Baseline	Target	Data source/ instrument
Relevance and added value	EQ1: Is the OSCE's RBM system relevant, given the OSCE's structure and governance?	If not, why? For what OSCE units is it not relevant? What were the key barriers/facilitators? For what OSCE units is RBM of particular relevance? For which OSCE units has the potential of RBM not been fully exploited? <i>Additional questions/ specifications to be determined</i>	No – Partly – Yes	N.a.	Yes	OSCE Documents, interview data, survey data, benchmarking matrix data.
	EQ2: Is the OSCE's RBM system of added value to the OSCE, given the OSCE's structure and governance?	If not, why? For what OSCE units is it not of added value? What were the key barriers/facilitators? <i>Additional questions/ specifications to be determined</i>	Ibid.	N.a.	Yes	
Efficiency	EQ3: Is the OSCE's RBM system efficient in terms the extra <i>outputs</i> required from OSCE staff?	If not, why? For what OSCE units is it not efficient? What were the key barriers/facilitators? <i>Additional questions/ specifications to be determined</i>	No – Partly – Yes	N.a.	Yes	Ibid.
Coherence	EQ4: Is the OSCE's RBM system aligned with international norms and standards for RBM in international organisations? EQ5: Is the OSCE's RBM system implemented in a consistent manner across executive structures?	If not, why? What amendments are required for the OSCE's RBM system to become aligned with international norms and standards for RBM in international organisations? What actions are required for the OSCE's RBM system to become consistently applied across the organisation? <i>Additional questions/ specifications to be determined</i>	No – Partly – Yes	N.a.	Yes	Ibid.
Effectiveness	EQ6: Is the OSCE's RBM system effective in terms of [1] generating results-oriented practices/activities and [2] improving the <i>results</i> of OSCE activities, including in the area of gender equality?	If not, why? For what OSCE units is it not effective? What were the key barriers/facilitators? If "yes", what were the key elements/practices/methods that made RBM effective? <i>Additional questions/ specifications to be determined</i>	No – Partly – Yes.	N.a.	Yes	Ibid.
Sustainability	EQ7: Is the OSCE's RBM practice sustainable in the absence of continued RBM mainstreaming activities?	Strategic level sustainability: existence of an RBM implementation strategy? Operative level sustainability: existence of an RMB strategy implementation plan?	No – Partly – Yes.	N.a.	Yes	Ibid.

Personal capacity level: existence of an RBM capacity-development plan of sufficient magnitude?
Resource level. Sufficient amount of human and financial resources dedicated to implementing RBM?
If not, why? For what OSCE units is it not sustainable?
What were the key barriers/facilitators? *Additional questions/ specifications to be determined*

Annex IV: Reference Group Terms of Reference

Role

An evaluation reference group consists of key evaluation stakeholders who review and provide feedback on specific evaluation outputs. It is established at the start of the evaluation for the entirety of its duration.

The reference group forms an integral part of the quality assurance system of the evaluation. The group members act in an advisory capacity and do not have management responsibilities for the evaluation, or responsibility for the evaluation report contents. Responsibility for approval of evaluation outputs rests with the evaluation manager (OIO).

Tasks

1. Review and provide comments on the evaluation concept note and ToR;
2. Provide feedback through-out the evaluation process whenever solicited or on the group member's initiative;
3. Review and provide comments on draft evaluation reports

Composition

- Mr. John Aguirre, Principal Deputy Director, Head of Budget and Finance Services, Department of Management and Finance, OSCE Secretariat
- Ms. Vera Strobachova Budway, Senior Co-ordination Officer, Gender Section, OSCE Secretariat
- Ms. Edina Halapi-Stansfield, Head, Programming and Evaluation Support Unit, OSCE Secretariat
- Ms. Tatiana Turcan, Head, Office of Central Coordination, OSCE Mission in Kosovo
- Ms. Rasmiya Kazimova, Senior Planning Adviser, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Mr. Douglas Wake, Senior Expert, Strategic Policy Support Unit, OSCE Secretariat
- Ms. Gerrit Zach, Associate Project Officer, Operations Service, OSCE Secretariat
- Mr. David Mirzoyan, former Policy and Planning Officer, OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek

Annex V: List of Interviewed Individuals

OSCE Executive Structures

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Mr. Waldemar Figaj, Programme Coordinator

Mr. William Leaf, Political Officer

Mr. Vassil Nikolov, Human Dimension Officer

OSCE Centre in Bishkek

Mr. Alexander Eliseev, Head, Politico Military Department

Mr. Edoardo Da Ros, Regional Development Officer

Ms. Olga Jukova, Chief, Fund Administration Unit

Ms. Yulia Netesova, Head, Human Dimension Department

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

Mr. Christophe Kamp, Director

Ms. Ditta Ciganikova, Senior Administrative Officer

OSCE Mission in Kosovo

Mr. Apollon Hoxha, Analysis and Reporting Officer

Ms. Caroline Hoi Key Law, Deputy Head, Office of Central Co-ordination

Mr. Childerik Schaapveld, Director, Democratization

Mr. Edward Anderson, Director, Department of Security and Public Safety

Ms. Gabriella Danza, Deputy Director, Department of Human Rights and Communities

Mr. Paul Fraser, Head, Administration and Finance

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ms. Amra Basic, Chief, Budget and Finance

Mr. Bojan Jankovic, Programme Coordinator

Mr. Juri Maas, Chief, Policy and Planning

Ms. Lillian Langford, Acting Deputy Head, Human Dimension Department

Mr. Milos Bogicevic, Head, Human Rights

Mr. Tamas Magda, Chief, Fund Administration Unit

OSCE Mission to Montenegro

Mr. Blerim Krasniqi, Chief, Fund Administration Unit

Mr. Daniel Blank, Programme Manager
Ms. Lia Magnaguagno, Programme Manager
Mr. Stephen Harmon, Organized Crime Police Adviser

OSCE Mission to Serbia

Mr. Arthur Graham, Head, Rule of Law and Human Rights
Ms. Gordana Jankovic, Head, Media
Ms. Irina Krapivina, Chief, Fund Administration Unit
Mr. John Clayton, Head, Democratization@osce.org
Mr. Umberto Severini, Head, Security Cooperation

OSCE Mission to Skopje

Mr. Alessio Zuccarini, Head, Human Dimension Department
Ms. Cornelia Hamrin, Senior Policy and Planning Officer
Ms. Igbalje Ferati Preshova, National Finance Officer
Mr. Juraj Smolek, Head, Public Safety and Community Outreach Department

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Mr. Alexander Shlyk, Head, Election Department
Ms. Christie Edwards, Deputy Head, Programme on Tolerance and non-discrimination
Mr. Dan Doghi, Senior Adviser, Roma and Sinti Issues
Ms. Emma Corneliussen, Project Officer
Ms. Jennifer Croft, Deputy Head, Human Rights Department
Ms. Kateryna Ryabiko, Project Co-ordinator
Ms. Meaghan Fitzgerald, Head, Democratisation Department
Mr. Tome Shekerdijev, Project Officer

OSCE Presence in Albania

Mr. Alexandru Murzac, Chief, Fund Administration Unit
Mr. Galentin Georgiev, Head, Security Cooperation Department
Mr. Claudio Pala, Head, Rule of Law and Human Rights
Ms. Arianna Briganti, Head, Governance, Economy and Environmental Department
Ms. Jelena McCoy, Head, Programme Coordination

OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Mr. Filippo Crivellaro, Head, Economic and Environmental Department

Mr. Johan Dahl, Countering Security Threats Officer

Mr. Robert Heuer, Head, Human Dimension Department

Mr. Samadkul Goibov, Monitoring Officer

Ms. Victoria Buchok, Head, Fund Administration Unit

OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

Mr. Adilet Mukushev, National Legal Officer

Mr. Colin McCullough, Political Officer

Mr. Rati Japaridze, Economic and Environmental Officer

Mr. Yavor Dinev, Chief, Fund Administration Unit

OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine

Ms. Emina Sibic-Marjanovic, Chief, Fund Administration Unit

Mr. Hlib Yasnytsky, National Programme Coordinator

Ms. Liliya Grudko, National Programme Manager

Ms. Nataliia Stupnytska, National Programme Manager

Mr. Vitalii Gatseliuk, National Programme Manager

Mr. Yaroslav Yurtsaba, National Programme Manager

Mr. Yevgen Poberezhny, National Elections and Governance Officer

OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

Mr. Hans-Ullrich Ihm, Senior Project Officer

Ms. Lola Maksudova, National Project Officer

Mr. Richard Wheeler, Senior Project Officer

Ms. Viktoria Vakulova, Chief, Fund Administration Unit

OSCE Secretariat

Mr. Thomas Greminger, Secretary-General

Mr. Arne Bell, Head, Conferences Services

Ms. Amarsanaa Darisuren, Senior Adviser on Gender Issues

Mr. Andrii Khomenko, Deputy Director, Department of Management and Finance; Head, Mission Support Section

Mr. Dennis Cosgrove, Head, Border and Security Management Unit

Mr. Douglas Wake, Senior Expert

Ms. Edina Halapi-Stansfield, Chief, Programming and Evaluation Support Unit

Mr. Fejzo Numanaj, Deputy Head, Action Against Terrorism Unit

Mr. Guy Vinet, Head, Strategic Police Matters Unit

Mr. John Aguirre, Principal Deputy Director, Department of Management and Finance; Head, Budget and Financial Services

Ms. Kristin Olson, Principal Adviser

Mr. Lorenzo Rilasciati, Senior Economic Affairs Officer

Ms. Malgorzata Twardowska, Deputy Director for Operations Service

Ms. Margaret Osdoby Katz, Strategic Planning and Resource Mobilization Officer

Mr. Michael McNulty, Head, Security Management

Mr. Micheal Conneely, Deputy Director, Human Resources

Mr. Philippe Tremblay, Head, External Cooperation Section

Mr. Renaud Cuny, Chief, Online Communications Unit

Mr. Robin Mossinkoff, Senior FSC Support Officer

Ms. Tetiana Rudenko, Senior Coordination Adviser

Ms. Tsvetelina Parvanova, Head, Communications and Media Relations Section

Mr. Valiant Richey, Special Representative, Office of Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

Ms. Vera Strobachova Budway, Senior Co-ordination Adviser

Delegations of Participating States to the OSCE

Permanent Delegation of Norway to the OSCE

Mr. Magnar Aaberg, Adviser

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE

Mr. Sergey Khalizov, Senior Counsellor

Permanent Mission of Turkey to the OSCE

Mr. Cemil Tahrali, Counsellor

United Kingdom Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna

Ms. Susan Vierny, Second Secretary

United States Mission to the OSCE

Mr. Christopher Wurzel, Director, Office of Resource Management

Annex VI: On-Line Survey Information

Population size, sample size, and data integrity issues

The survey focuses on staff who directly support the implementation of programmes and projects. As of 2020-09-16, the OSCE's staff list contained 3,585 names. In order to reduce the number of non-relevant OSCE staff, relevant individuals among G-level staff were identified by scanning the staff list. This led to the inclusion of all project/programme assistants, project/programme co-ordination assistants and rule of law monitoring assistants among G4 and G5. In addition, all staff in categories G6, G7, NP (national professional), P (international contracted), S (international seconded) and HoMs/HoIs/Directors are included. To further assure that the survey questions are relevant to respondents and thus responses were valid, the response alternative "This question is not applicable to my line of work" is added to some questions.

The survey was active over the period 2020-09-15 – 2020-09-25 and distributed to the 1,495 relevant respondents, of which 37 email addresses bounced, thus reducing the population to 1,458, of which in turn 922 initiated the survey. 102 respondents ended the survey after question "4" ("In what entity do you work?"), reducing the effective sample size to 820.⁷⁵

Integrity of the survey data from the 820 respondents was checked by searching for (1) logically contradictory responses, (2) whether the respondent had "flat-lined", that is, provided a series of (sometimes) non-contradictory but implausibly invariant responses in a very short period of time, and (3) whether the survey had been completed in an unreasonably short period of time, potentially indicating that the respondent may have clicked through the survey. 54 respondents completed the survey in 5 minutes or less, of which seven were removed since they had provided long strings of invariant answers, such as providing the same answer for 17 questions in a row. No logically contradictory responses were found.

⁷⁵ Of the initial 1,495 individuals, 53% were women and 47% men. Among the 922 who initiated the survey, question 1 on gender showed a distribution of 457 women (49.6%), 428 men (46.4%), 2 "other" (0.2%) and 35 "prefer not to say" (3.8%). Among the 820 individuals who proceeded with the survey after question 4, 405 were woman (49.4%), 386 men (47.1%), 2 "other" (0.2%) and 27 "prefer not to say" (3.3%). Finally, among the 762 who completed the entire survey, 371 were women (48.6%), 367 men (48.2%), 2 "other" (0.3%) and 22 "prefer not to say" (2.9%). The gender distribution in the final sample of 762 is slightly skewed in comparison to the population of 1,495: women are slightly undersampled (by 9%), whereas men are slightly oversampled (2.5%). However, since the survey had four gender response options, while the OSCE staff list had, it is difficult to determine to what extent the final sample is unbalanced – and thus not representative to the underlying population that it purports to represent – when it comes to gender distribution. For instance, if it assumed that all "prefer not to say" responses in the survey's gender question were recorded as female in the OSCE's staff list, then the undersampling of women is reduced from 9% to 1%. Likely, the undersampling of women is somewhere in the middle of the range 1% – 9%. Because of this uncertainty, it is not possible to determine corrective weights of the survey responses. In addition, the small undersampling is not decisive for conclusions in the report: the effect – if any – on sample estimates are likely to be at most a single % unit or a fraction thereof. For this reason, the evaluation report is based on unweighted survey responses.

The integrity screening reduced the effective sample size to 813, of which 762 completed all survey questions, providing for a sample margin of error of $\pm 2.3\%$ (from question 5 and onwards) and $\pm 2.5\%$ (by the last survey question), respectively, for a 95% confidence level. Given the sample size, the analysis in the report is based on aggregate response data since disaggregation would have resulted in sample margin of errors that may have been too large to draw any firm more concrete conclusions.

On-line survey questionnaire (Number of responses in parenthesis).

Section 1: Background information

1. What is your gender? (922)

- Female (457)
- Male (428)
- Other (2)
- Prefer not to say (35)

2. For how many years have you worked in the OSCE? (922)

- Less than 1 year (73)
- More than 1 year but less than 2 years (76)
- More than 2 year but less than 4 years (137)
- More than 4 year but less than 6 years (117)
- More than 6 year but less than 8 years (90)
- More than 8 years (429)

3. In which of the following staff categories do you work? (922)

- HoMs/Hols/Directors (17)
- G4 or G5: project/programme assistants, project/programme co-ordination assistants and rule of law monitoring assistants (122)
- G6 or G7 (188)
- NP (National Professionals): staff at all levels (282)
- P (International contracted): staff at all levels (131)
- S (Seconded): staff at all levels (182)

4. In what entity do you work? (922)

- Secretariat (162)
- ODIHR (51)
- High Commissioner on National Minorities (20)
- Representative of the Freedom of the Media (6)
- Mission in Kosovo (171)
- Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (157)
- Mission to Serbia (46)
- Mission in Albania (29)
- Mission to Skopje (65)
- Mission to Montenegro (14)
- Mission to Moldova (27)
- Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (36)
- Programme Office in Nur-Sultan (8)
- Centre in Ashgabat (7)

- Programme Office in Bishkek (36)
- Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (8)
- Programme Office in Dushanbe (48)
- Prefer not to say (31)

Section 2: Internalisation of Results-based Management

5. Without consulting the above description of RBM, would you have been able to describe the guiding principles of RBM? (806)

- No (115)
- To a limited extent (250)
- To a considerable extent (339)
- Fully (102)

6. Without consulting the above description of RBB, would you have been able to describe the guiding principles of RBB? (806)

- No (137)
- To a limited extent (280)
- To a considerable extent (313)
- Fully (76)

7. Do you understand your role in applying RBM in your day-to-day work? (806)

- No (43)
- To a limited extent (215)
- To a large extent (327)
- Fully (221)

8. In your assessment, have you received a sufficient amount of training/guidance on the meaning and application of RBM in your day-to-day work? (806)

- No (272)
- To a limited extent (346)
- To a large extent (152)
- Fully (36)

9. In your team, have RBM learning groups and networks been established with a high level of staff participation? (806)

- No (374)
- To a limited extent (229)
- To a large extent (121)
- Do not know (82)

10. In your team, is the promotion of gender equality a key element of programme and project planning? (806)

- No (39)
- To a limited extent (128)
- To a large extent (327)
- Fully (279)
- Do not know (33)

11. In your team, are results related to the promotion of gender equality a key element of project self-evaluations and commissioned evaluations? (806)

- No (55)
- To a limited extent (190)
- To a large extent (312)
- Fully (178)
- Do not know (71)

12. Is your annual personal performance assessment based on results achievement and the identification of lessons learned? (806)

- No (38)
- To a limited extent (93)
- To a large extent (329)
- Fully (315)
- Do not know (31)

13. In your assessment, what are some of key barriers or challenges you have experienced in applying RBM in your team? (806)

	Not really a barrier/challenge	Somewhat of a barrier/challenge	A key barrier/challenge	Do not know
Staff resistance/ disinterest in RBM	349	259	66	132
Lack of staff RBM skills/knowledge	138	373	208	87
Lack of staff time	226	310	186	84
Low staff expectations of the added value of RBM	193	318	143	152
Absence of long-term programme/project strategic plan against which results can be assessed	230	236	256	84
Absence of a multi-annual budget/ (UB)project cycle	152	215	326	113
Small project budget size	206	276	205	119
Other barriers or challenges	141	138	72	455

Section 3: Leadership in the Area of Results-based Management

14. Does your manager lead by demonstrating the benefits of using data on results for decision-making? (793)

- No (107)
- To a limited extent (191)
- To a considerable extent (384)
- Do not know (75)
- Prefer not to say (36)

15. Does your manager consistently ask for results information and use it to take decisions on adjustments to programmes/projects and to hold managers accountable? (793)

- No (94)
- To a limited extent (180)
- To a considerable extent (420)
- Do not know (67)
- Prefer not to say (32)

16. Does your manager set realistic yet challenging personal performance expectations? (793)

- No (92)
- To a limited extent (166)
- To a considerable extent (460)
- Do not know (34)
- Prefer not to say (41)

17. Does your manager create an enabling environment for you to report on and learn from both poor and good performance? (793)

- No (98)
- To a limited extent (171)
- To a considerable extent (459)
- Do not know (31)
- Prefer not to say (34)

18. Does your manager highlight the need to promote gender equality when planning for and implementing programmes and projects? (793)

- No (52)
- To a limited extent (155)
- To a considerable extent (521)
- Do not know (43)
- Prefer not to say (22)

Section 4: Use of Results Information

19. In your view, what primary role is served by the annual reporting of results through the PBPR? (762)

- Accountability/compliance vis-à-vis the participating States (pS) (350)
- Learning for the OSCE (28)
- Planning: OSCE decision-making and steering of future activities (285)
- Other role(-s) (10)
- Do not know (89)

20. In your experience, does the OSCE have a clear and shared vision of the value of results information and the role it should play in managing the organization? (762)

- No (106)
- To a limited extent (270)
- To a considerable extent (270)
- Do not know (96)
- Prefer not to say (20)

21. Do you regard results information as valuable and essential for good management and delivery of programme and project results? (762)

- No (19)
- To a limited extent (87)
- To a considerable extent (621)
- Do not know (23)
- Prefer not to say (12)

22. Is information on results and the capacity to continue delivering them (as well as the means to achieve them) routinely analysed and used by your team in decision-making on modifying operations, reallocating resources, deciding on new activities/projects, and revising strategies and policies? (762)

	No	To a limited extent	To a considerable extent	Do not know	This question is not applicable to my line of work	Prefer not to say
For UB projects	40	145	392	70	102	13
For ExB projects	26	113	287	145	175	16
For programmes	27	141	324	128	125	17

23. Do analyses and evaluations carried out / commissioned by your team provide information on what works, why, how and in what contexts, thereby providing a good basis to guide decisions and actions for improvement or change? (762)

	No	To a limited extent	To a considerable extent	Do not know	This question is not applicable to my line of work	Prefer not to say
For UB projects	42	186	342	72	101	19
For ExB projects	28	137	249	155	174	19
For programmes	30	153	293	139	127	20

24. Please rate how you agree or disagree with the following statements. (762)

	No	To a limited extent	To a considerable extent	Do not know	This question is not applicable to my line of work	Prefer not to say
In my team, findings from self-evaluations are used for future project or programme planning	54	210	392	40	54	12

In my team, findings from commissioned evaluations are used for future project or programme planning	53	181	319	103	94	12
In my team, considerations of the impact of previous projects on gender equality are used for project or programme planning	55	211	344	77	63	12

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Annex VIII: RBM Benchmarking of the OSCE

Because of its size, this annex is available as a standalone document on request from OIO.