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Embassy of Finland

PERMANENT DELEGATION OF FINLAND
TO THE OSCE

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VERBAL NOTE

The Permanent Delegation of Finland to the OSCE presents its compliments to the Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE and to the Conflict Prevention Centre and has the honour to convey Finland's Annual Information Exchange on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in accordance with Decision 2/09 of the Forum for Security Co-operation.

The Permanent Delegation of Finland to the OSCE avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all the Permanent Missions and Delegations and to the Conflict Prevention Centre the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, 3 October 2023



Encl.

To all Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE
to the Conflict Prevention Centre

OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects on Security

FINLAND

Annual Information Exchange on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct

2022

INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

FINLAND's information, year 2021

Section I: Inter-State elements

1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism

1.1 To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, sub-regional and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party?

Conventions and protocols ratified or accepted by Finland:

Relevant United Nations Conventions

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York on 14 December 1973

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, done at New York on 17 December 1979

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, done at New York on 15 December 1997

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, done at New York on 9 December 1999

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963

Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done at Montréal on 4 April 2014

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970

Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010 and prevailing over the abovementioned Montreal Convention as between the States Parties to the Beijing Convention

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 26 October 1979 as amended 2005

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, done at Montreal on 1 March 1991

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, done at New York on 13 April 2005

Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October 2005

Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October 2005

Relevant Council of Europe Conventions

Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (ETS 196)

Government Bill for the acceptance of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (ETS 217) has been approved by the Parliament and the treaty has been ratified by the President. The ratification instrument will be deposited during spring 2023.

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS 90)

Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS 190)

Convention on Cybercrime (ETS 185)

Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (ETS 189)

European Convention on Extradition
(ETS 24)

Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition
(ETS 98)

European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(ETS 30)

Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(ETS 99)

European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes
(ETS 116)

Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS
141)

Other conventions and protocols signed by Finland

Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (ETS 198)

Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(ETS 182)

Third Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (ETS 209)

1.2 What national legislation has been adopted in your State to implement the above-mentioned agreements and arrangements?

The procedure for concluding international treaties is based on Chapter 8 of the Constitution of Finland. Due to the dualistic system, treaties and other international obligations must be both adopted in Finland and implemented domestically. The Finnish Constitution states that the provisions of international obligations, in so far as they are of a legislative nature, are otherwise significant, or otherwise require approval by the Parliament under the Constitution, are subject to acceptance of the Parliament (Section 94).

Once the parliamentary approval has been obtained in cases where it is needed, the President ratifies the treaty according to Section 93 of the Constitution. If there is no need for the parliamentary approval, the President will ratify the treaty after it has been signed. Provisions that are of legislative nature shall be brought into force by an Act of the Finnish Parliament (Section 95). Other provisions than those of a legislative nature are to be brought into force by a Decree (of the Government), which specifically also indicates the date of entry into force of the obligation in Finland (Section 95).

In Finnish Criminal Code a separate Chapter 34(a) on terrorist offences was incorporated into the Criminal Code on 1 February 2003. The Chapter originally covered offences made with terrorist intent and their preparation (Sections 1 and 2), directing of a terrorist group (Section 3), promotion of the activity of a terrorist group (Section 4) and financing of terrorism (Section 5). The Chapter also contains a provision defining terrorist intent (Section 6), a provision on the right of prosecution (Section 7) and a provision on corporate criminal liability (Section 8). The terrorist intent definition, such as the entire Chapter 34(a), are both originally based on the EU Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA).

When the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was implemented in Finland, necessary amendments were adopted in the Criminal Code. Thus, the EU Council Framework Decision (2008/919/JHA) of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA did not require any further changes in the legislation as the obligations had already been met in the context of the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

Receiving training for the commission of a terrorist offence and financing of a terrorist group were criminalized in the beginning of 2015 (Chapter 34(a), Sections 4(b) and 5(a) of the Criminal Code). At the same time, the provision regarding financing of terrorism was widened to cover the financing of other terrorist offences. These amendments were mainly based on national consideration. Travelling abroad for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence (Chapter 34(a), Section 5(b) of the Criminal Code) has been punishable in Finland since the beginning of December 2016. This provision with its original content was based on the Security Council Resolution 2178(2014).

Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism came into force on 15 November 2018. The Criminal Code was supplemented with provisions on an offence made with terrorist intent regarding a radiological weapon and facilitation of travelling abroad for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence (Chapter 34(a), Sections 1(a) and 5(c) of the Criminal Code). Some forms of serious cybercrime offences (aggravated damage to data, aggravated interference with communications and aggravated interference in an information system) were included in Chapter 34(a), Section 1(1) regarding offences made with terrorist intent. The provision on receiving training for the commission of a terrorist offence (Section 4(b)) was widened to cover self-study and the provision on travelling abroad for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence was amended to cover all travels for such purposes regardless of the nationality of the traveller and the destination.

Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime was transposed in Finland with the Act on the Use of Airline Passenger Record Information for the Purpose of Combating Terrorism and Serious Crime (657/2019). This Act in part also transposes the UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2395 (2017) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts – foreign terrorist fighters.

Based on the fourth mutual evaluation report of the FATF, published in 2019, and on the recommendations proposed by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, following the report of the CTED on its follow-up visit to Finland in 2019, as well as on the UN Security Council Resolutions 2462 (2019) and 2482 (2019), the Criminal Code provisions on financing of terrorism have been amended. These amendments came into force on 15 April 2021. Financing of an individual terrorist without a link to a specific terrorist offence is now punishable as a terrorist offence (Chapter 34(a), Section 5(a) of the Criminal Code). In addition, the penalty scale of financing of a terrorist group (Chapter 34(a), Section 5(b) of the Criminal Code) was amended (previously a fine or imprisonment of at most three years and now, according to the new scale, imprisonment of at least four months and at most six years). Some minor amendments were adopted.

Finally, the scope of participation in the activity of a terrorist group (Chapter 34(a), Section 4 of the Criminal Code) has been widened to cover taking care of an essential task related to the criminal terroristic activity of the group. At the same time, public incitement related to terrorist

offences was criminalised as a separate offence (Chapter 34(a), Section 5(e) of the Criminal Code). According to the new provision, it is punishable by a presentation made in public or available to the public, to exhort or entice someone to join or enlist in a terrorist group or to commit terrorist offences punishable under Chapter 34(a) of the Criminal Code. In addition to some other minor changes, these amendments entered into force in the beginning of 2022.

National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2022-2025:

Finland's priority in counterterrorism is to prevent terrorism, which means addressing the root causes of and motivations for terrorism as well as factors relating to the spread of terrorism, which can lead to violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. Finland has continued to implement measures to counter terrorism as well as prevent and counter violent extremism. Finland's National Counter-Terrorism Strategy was recently updated through a broad-based co-operation between public authorities. The updated strategy, approved by the Government, contains a number of policy definitions and strategic actions. The guiding principle of the Strategy, as in the previous ones, is that any measures taken to counter terrorism are in compliance with international law and with the respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law. The Ministry of the Interior coordinates the implementation work and chairs the national Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Group, which follows the implementation of the Strategy on a regular basis.

The National Action Plan for 2019-2023:

In Finland, violent radicalisation and extremism have been prevented systematically since 2012 when the first National Action Plan for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism was confirmed. The Government adopted the third Action Plan in December 2019. The Action Plan for 2019-2023 was drawn up through a broad co-operation between different authorities and civil society actors.

Finland targets all forms of violent extremism both through so-called soft measures and hard measures. The main objective of the third National Action Plan is to develop further local actions to prevent violent extremism, strengthen the involvement of young people to PVE activities, and prevent terrorist propaganda, illegal hate speech and recruitment to extremist groups, as well as to increase security and safety of religious communities. To promote the wellbeing of adolescents, the multi-agency Anchor makes interventions targeted to the individuals in risk of violent radicalisation.

In April 2021, the Finnish Government adopted a resolution on the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. A related Action Plan for 2021-2023 sets out the measures to react to and reduce the risks highlighted in the national risk assessment.

1.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State?

The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy lays down the key roles and missions of various governmental bodies in countering terrorism in Finland. According to the Strategy, Counterterrorism in Finland is based on cooperation and partnership among all authorities and societal actors. The effectiveness of counter-terrorism as a whole is enhanced by the parties' understanding of the various actors' resources and scope of action and the related cooperation, competences based on law and a clear division of responsibilities. Information required to combat

terrorism is generated not only by public authorities but also by parties responsible for society's vital functions and sites, by the municipalities and by civil society.

Primary responsibility for counter-terrorism rests with the police, whose counter-terrorism capabilities comprise the intelligence capabilities of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, the prevention and operational response capabilities of local police, the capabilities of the National Bureau of Investigation to gather information and investigate offences committed with terrorist intent, and cooperation among the authorities. The Finnish Border Guard contributes to counter-terrorism in the context of maintaining border security and by providing specialised personnel and materiel to support the Police as necessary. The Finnish Defence Forces and Customs also support counter-terrorism efforts in their respective fields.

The tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces under the Defence Forces Act (551/2007) are:

- Military defence of Finland;
- Providing support for other authorities, which involves responding to non-military threats including situations involving terrorism;
- Participating in providing assistance based on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union, participating in territorial surveillance cooperation, providing other international assistance or participating in other types of international activities.
- Participating in international military crisis management and military tasks in other international crisis management.

The substantial part of preventing and combating terrorism per se falls to the mandate of the police, legal and other authorities. Nationally, the Defence Forces are prepared to support the police in protecting against and responding to terrorist crimes. The full range of the Defence Forces capabilities can be utilised to support the police, including use of necessary military force. However, the operations are always led by the police. The decisions on use of force are also always the responsibility of the police. Internationally, the Defence Forces participate in international military co-operation and in crisis management. The Defence Forces also take part in international and national exercises as well as in possible acts concerning Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict trafficking of WMD and related material.

The Act on Executive Assistance, adopted in 2022, lays down provisions on the right of the police to obtain executive assistance from the Defence Forces that requires the use of force in situations where the prevention or interruption of certain terrorist offences is not possible with police equipment or personnel.

1.4 Provide any additional relevant information on national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, e.g., those pertaining inter alia to:

- Financing of terrorism;
- Border controls;
- Travel document security;
- Container and supply chain security;
- Security of radioactive sources;
- Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes;
- Legal co-operation including extradition;

- Safe havens and shelter to terrorists and terrorist organisations.

Finland's approach to counter-terrorism is laid down by the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which is adopted as a governmental resolution. The current Strategy for years 2022 - 2025 is the fourth Government-level document of its kind. It guides Finland's counter-terrorism activities both nationally and internationally such as within the EU as well as within the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the NATO, the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh, the Europol, the Interpol, the Eurojust and the counter-terrorism cooperation among the security and intelligence services.

The first national CBRNE Strategy was published in 2017. The Strategy highlights e.g. maintaining common situational awareness, further development of risk-based approach to supervision, detecting and preventing intentional actions and enhancing the capacity for cooperation. The Finnish CBRNE Coordination Group has been set up to enhance coordination, cooperation and shared situational awareness among national authorities.

Financing of terrorism

Financing of terrorism is criminalised in the Finnish Criminal Code, in Chapter 34a, Section 5. The criminalisation of terrorist financing is consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, ratified by Finland in June 2002, and the EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism. The obligation to freeze terrorist assets imposed by the UN Security Council has been implemented in the EU by decisions and regulations adopted by the Council.

The Sanctions Act (Act on the Enforcement of Certain Obligations of Finland as a Member of the United Nations and of the European Union, Act No 659/1967), together with the Criminal Code, provides for penalties and forfeitures to be imposed for violations of EU Council regulations, including those adopted to implement UN Security Council Resolutions.

The legislation applied to the prevention of terrorist financing has been replaced with the Act on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (444/2017) and the Act on the Financial Intelligence Unit (445/2017). The Acts entered into force in July 2017. The legislation implemented Directive (EU) 2015/849 and the revised FATF recommendations of 2012.

Based on the fourth mutual evaluation report of the FATF, published in 2019, and on the recommendations proposed by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee following the report of the CTED on its follow-up visit to Finland in 2019 as well as on the UN Security Council Resolutions 2462 (2019) and 2482 (2019), a Government proposal for amendments to the terrorism financing provisions was submitted to the Parliament and approved on 9 April 2021. The adopted acts included a provision to criminalize financing of an individual terrorist. The provision does not require a link to a specific terrorist offence or the commission of a terrorist offence. In accordance with the definitions of the General Glossary of the FATF, it is punishable to finance a person who commits terrorist offences or participates in the commission of those offences.

The Act on the Freezing of Funds with a view to Combating Terrorism entered into force on 1 June 2013. The Act complements existing EU level freezing mechanisms and enables Finland to freeze funds of persons and entities suspected, prosecuted or convicted of involvement in terrorist crimes in Finland; of persons and entities designated by the Council of the European Union as being involved in terrorism within the EU; on the basis of a well-founded request by another State,

persons and entities identified in that request as being involved in terrorism; and entities owned or controlled by any of the above. The Act also prohibits the making available, directly or indirectly, of funds and economic resources to designated persons or entities.

The Financial Supervisory Authority is the authority for supervision of Finland's financial and insurance sectors. The Financial Supervisory Authority supervises the enforcement of the new Act on Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing by the credit and financial institutions and provides training on the provisions of the new Act. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which functions in the National Bureau of Investigation, is responsible for detecting and preventing both money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

FIU has explicit powers to disclose information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for the purposes of applying the Sanctions Act and the Freezing Act. This is of relevance for the purposes of implementing targeted financial sanctions to prevent terrorist financing.

When money transfer services are provided by banks, full license is required and the services are supervised by the Financial Supervision Authority. Any alternative money transmitting business provided other than by banks requires registration, and AML/CFT laws are applied to it. Particularly with regard to the non-profit sector, a special license issued by the National Police Board or a local police department is needed, as a rule, for money collection and the running of a non-money prize lottery in Finland. Organizing a small-scale money collection requires a written notification to a local police department. Money collection and the running of a lottery are supervised by the National Police Board and the police departments.

The Action Plan for the National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2021-23 sets out the measures to react to and reduce the risks highlighted in the 2021 national risk assessment for money laundering and terrorist financing.

Renewed legislation on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System came to effect on 15 September 2022. At the same time, the scope of use of the legal act was extended. With the renewal, the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System can be used by even more authorities, and more efficiently than before making the combat against money laundering and financing of terrorism more efficient. The amendments to legislation implement the EU Financial Information Directive, and complement the implementation and regulation of the fifth EU Money Laundering Directive.

Border controls

The Finnish Border Guard is responsible for border control (checks and surveillance) at external land, sea and air borders in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code and national legislation. The Customs and police carry out border checks at certain border crossing points, namely at ports (cargo traffic) and at some small airports.

The Border Guard can prevent and combat terrorism mainly at border checks and by exchanging information with third country authorities. This is done in close co-operation with other law enforcement authorities (the police, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service and Customs). Co-operation is based on the Law on Police, Customs and Border Guard co-operation. Co-operation is conducted by common use of databases, common operations, and common intelligence, risk analysis and investigations. The Border Guard is using a national Entry-Exit System (EES) into which third country nationals' border crossings are recorded. Other law enforcement authorities

have an access into the EES. Furthermore, the Border Guard is using SIS (Schengen Information System), VIS (Visa Information System) and national databases, against which all third country nationals are checked upon border checks. Systematic checks of EU citizens against relevant databases were introduced in April 2017. Interpol's Database on Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) is consulted and reported regularly.

The police and the Border Guard have placed liaison officers in certain Finnish consulates abroad. Liaison officers participate in visa issuance processes and thus can identify possible terrorism indicators. Additionally, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service has short term experts focusing especially on counter terrorism posted at certain Finnish consulates. The Border Guard also participates in activities of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps with personnel and technical equipment.

Travel document security

Passports in Finland are issued with biometric identifiers. Passports are equipped with high quality security features and security printed. The photo is laser-printed. Identity cards contain a chip with the citizen certificate. Passports can be issued only within the national passport data system. The data system is controlled by the Finnish Police.

Security of radioactive sources

Finland complies with the International Atomic Energy Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and with its implementing Import and Export Guidance (IAEA, Vienna, 2004). National regulations based on the Radiation Act includes specific requirements on the security of radioactive sources. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety and security of radioactive sources by prior authorisation, regular inspections and national register of radioactive sources.

Relevant Finnish authorities have worked together to develop a national nuclear security detection architecture for nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. The authorities have defined common requirements for future detection systems to optimize the compatibility and information sharing. The key operational capability will be based on mobile or relocatable technology with remote expert support for the front-line officers (reach-back).

STUK contributes significantly to the work of the ERNCIP (European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection) Thematic Group on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Radiological and Nuclear Threats.

The Finnish Customs controls the border crossing traffic of radioactive materials through the license control, examinations based on risk analysis and random selection, and also by radiation detection. While the implementation of radiation monitoring at borders is fully under the jurisdiction of the Finnish Customs, STUK's role is to provide expert advice.

Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes

The role of internet and social media is significant in terms of violent radicalisation, dissemination of propaganda, recruitment and communication.

The use of Internet for both operational and propaganda purposes (violent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism) will continue in the future.

The Finnish Cyber Security Strategy was approved in 2019. It sets out the key national objectives for the development of the cyber environment and the safeguarding of related vital functions. The core of the Finnish Cyber Security Strategy 2019 consists of three strategic guidelines. Those guidelines are the following:

- Development of International Cooperation
- Better Coordination of Cyber Security Management
- Development of Cyber Security Competence

Finnish telecommunications providers are obligated by law to report to NCSC-FI significant information security violations or threats to information security in the services and anything else that prevents or significantly interferes with telecommunication services. Telecommunication providers are also obliged to notify NCSC-FI of personal data breaches in their networks and services. NCSC-FI also acts as a national POC and CSIRT member under NIS directive. To complement the mandatory reporting, NCSC-FI also welcomes voluntary reports from all other organisations in public and private sector as well as from individuals and foreign parties.

NCSC-FI maintains the national information security situation awareness system. The global information security situation is constantly being monitored for threats, anomalous events, security incidents, and vulnerabilities in information systems that may be of relevance to Finnish interest. NCSC-FI provides vulnerability coordination services in an effort to minimise the harmful effects of faulty and vulnerable software to the end users and the public at large.

Legal co-operation including extradition

Extradition from Finland to a foreign country is regulated in the Act on Extradition. The European Convention on Extradition is applicable between the Member States of the Council of Europe. Extradition is conditioned on the fulfillment of certain minimum requirements. Those include, for example, the severity of the offence or length of sentence and dual criminality (i.e. the act or behavior is punishable in both states). The Finnish legislation contains prohibitions against extradition for political offences. According to Section 2(1) of the Act on Extradition between Finland and the other Nordic Countries, a Finnish citizen shall not be extradited for a political offence. Section 3 of the Act provides that a person who is not a Finnish citizen may be extradited for a political offence only if the offence or a similar act is punishable under Finnish law. According to Section 6 of the Extradition Act, no one shall be extradited for a political offence.

However, extradition is permitted if a political offence also includes or involves another offence which is not of a political nature, and if the act as a whole cannot be considered mainly political. In the Act on Extradition between Finland and other Member States of the European Union, the political nature of an offence is not a ground for refusing extradition.

The terrorist threat in Finland

The terrorist threat in Finland has remained at level two (elevated) on the four-point scale since 2017. According to the latest Terrorist Threat Assessment, published in March 2023, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) has identified far-right and radical Islamist operators who probably have the desire and capacity to carry out violent attacks. Supporters of these ideologies

pose the most likely threat, either as individuals or in small groups. Attacks remain unlikely in the short term.

Supo has identified some individual right-wing extremists who left Finland for the Ukrainian war zone. Participation in the conflict will also increase the likelihood of radicalisation of these Finnish individuals. Networking on social media platforms, disseminating propaganda and promoting violence are integral to the activities of the extreme right in Finland. Some Finnish people also have links to Siege culture, in which supporters of white supremacy incite terrorist violence and race war to overthrow the prevailing social order.

Activists associated with the Nordic Resistance Movement, which was disbanded in 2020, have continued similar activities in new formations. While organized far-right movements do not currently pose a terrorist threat, they establish a potential breeding ground for radicalising individuals.

Significant terrorist support activities can nevertheless be found in Finland, and some 350 individuals are categorized as counter-terrorism target individuals. This figure has not changed significantly since last year. The list of target individuals is not permanent, and individuals are continually added and removed.

Most of the CT targets remain supporters of radical Islamism. Police in Finland apprehended a man in December 2022 on suspicion of training to commit a terrorist offence. Radical Islamist materials were found in his possession. The most likely approach to mounting a terrorist attack linked to radical Islamist ideology will be a simple one, and will target the civilian population or authorities in public places. The principal measures taken in Finland to support radical Islamism concern the transfer of funds and the spread of ideology online. Dissemination and consumption of propaganda mainly occur via encrypted instant messaging applications and chat groups. Attacks are incited against such targets as those representing a different faith or sexual minorities. Individuals radicalized online may follow the propaganda of several radical Islamist terrorist organisations, with no clear allegiance to any particular one of them.

The foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon continues to affect the radical Islamist operating environment in Finland. There are still some individual supporters of radical Islamism with links to Finland living in the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq. It is unlikely that networks of those who have returned from conflict zones or individual returnees will be inspired to engage in terrorist operations in Finland in the short term.

2. Stationing of armed forces on foreign territory

2.1 Provide information on stationing of your States armed forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law.

In Finland, military crisis management is regulated by the Act on Military Crisis Management. The Act takes into consideration the development of international crisis management activities, in order for Finland to be able to participate in full in crisis management tasks, especially within the framework of the United Nations, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and also in other forms of international crisis management. In accordance with the Act, Finland may participate in international military crisis management authorized by the UN Security Council,

or exceptionally in other international military crisis management, with the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security or supporting humanitarian assistance operations or protecting the civilian population, taking into account the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law. The implementing party may be the UN, the OSCE, the EU or some other international organisation or group of countries. The Act also includes regulations concerning soldiers' right to use force in crisis management missions.

In 2022, Finland took part in ten (10) military crisis management operations or missions with approximately 350 troops. The operations were led by NATO (KFOR, NMI), by the EU (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali and EUTM Mozambique) and by the UN (UNIFIL, UNTSO and MINUSMA). Finland was also participating in OIR in Iraq and Kuwait. For the year of 2022, Finland designated a unit (Katanpää Mine Countermeasures Vessel) for the NRF Pool of Forces.

The Finnish Defence Forces may also provide assistance, falling within its mandate, to another State, the EU or an international organisation, taking into account the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law. At the request of a competent ministry or authority, the Defence Forces may also take part in providing international assistance to support another Finnish authority.

3. Implementation of other international commitments related to the Code of Conduct

3.1 Provide information on how your State ensures that commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an element of indivisible security are implemented in good faith.

Finland seeks to fulfil its obligations under international arms control agreements in an open and transparent manner, and to follow both the letter and the spirit of the commitments undertaken. The provisions of arms control treaties and other international obligations, insofar as they are of a legislative nature, are brought into force by a Government Act. As described in Section II of this questionnaire, Finland has constitutionally established procedures to ensure that the performance of all authorities, officials and Government bodies is supervised.

3.2 Provide information on how your State pursues arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures with a view to enhancing security and stability in the OSCE area.

The Government Report on Finland's Foreign and Security Policy, published in October 2020, underlines the importance of arms control in strengthening predictability, stability and security. Finland aims at contributing actively to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to nuclear disarmament, to the global regulation of autonomous weapon systems, the control of conventional arms, and to curbing the illicit arms trade. These aims are promoted politically, with financing, and through practical support measures on the ground.

The Government's Defence Report, issued in September 2021, defines defence policy guidelines for maintaining, developing and utilising Finland's defence capabilities. The report and its implementation steer both the deepening of defence cooperation and the development of national legislation. In the report, the importance of international arms control and export control cooperation and confidence building measures is highlighted.

In the current security environment, the focus is increasingly on the implementation of existing commitments. Where formal verification regimes are absent, the role of confidence-building measures (CBMs) is highlighted. Arms control is increasingly linked to conflict prevention and crisis management, and to sustainable development.

Finland continues to value and implement its commitments under key instruments such as the 2011 Vienna Document and the Treaty on Open Skies. Finland participates in the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) work to modernise the Vienna Document and was one of the countries that put forward a proposal to update the Vienna Document in 2019.

Finland welcomes discussions on the future of conventional arms control in Europe. Finland supports endeavours contributing to military transparency, predictability and stability in Europe. Finland shares the vision of full and general disarmament and strives for global reductions in all categories of arms. Finland engages in an open dialogue with civil society on disarmament and arms control issues.

Finland is active in international cooperation to prevent proliferation and the use of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The European Union's WMD Strategy serves as a guideline for Finnish action. Finland works actively to enhance the effectiveness of international export control regimes as a key tool to preventing proliferation.

Finland stresses the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and of all its three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Finland participates actively in the NPT 2020 Review Conference, contributing to the implementation of the Treaty as a whole. Finland continues active participation in the current review cycle and a representative from Finland chaired the 2023 NPT PrepCom. Finland takes part in the Stockholm initiative on nuclear disarmament and the CEND initiative, and supports the work of the IAEA with financing, training and expertise.

Finland contributes actively to international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, material and associated expertise. Finland is a strong supporter of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and contributes to their implementation with financing, training and expertise. Finland participates actively in the G7 Global Partnership Program and in international initiatives such as the GICNT (Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism), PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative), IPNDV (International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification) and NSCG (Nuclear Security Contact Group), and the Global Health Security Agenda.

The EU Strategy on small arms and light weapons (SALW) provides the framework for Finland's SALW -related action. The regional activities of the EU and the OSCE in SALW control are also of great importance. Finland fully supports the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and is a major donor to the UN Trust Facility for Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and to the UN funding facility SALIENT in this regard. Finland also places great value to the work and negotiations of the Open-Ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition.

Finland was one of the original co-authors of the UNGA resolution that eventually led to the negotiation and the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Finland continues to actively

promote the implementation and universalisation of the treaty, including by contributing to the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund.

Finland is a State Party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and has ratified all its protocols and amended protocols. Finland participates actively in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

Finland acceded to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 2012 and complies fully with it (FTS 13/2012). Finland completed destruction of its anti-personnel mine stockpiles in 2015. Finland supports humanitarian mine action which reduces post-conflict threat and impact of landmines and unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions. During 2021–2025, Finland supports humanitarian mine action in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia and Ukraine with 15 million euros.

Finland supports the humanitarian aims of the Convention on Cluster Munitions but is nationally currently not in a position to join the convention. Finland follows closely the implementation of the convention, and continues to evaluate progress in military technologies and to monitor the situation. As of yet, no such changes in conditions have taken place that would enable Finland's accession to the convention.

Finland monitors developments in the field of international arms control, anticipates their effects on national defence and takes them into account in Defence Forces development programmes. The defence establishment, for its part, fulfils the various obligations included in international arms control agreements as well as supports and participates in inter-authority cooperation relating to arms control.

Finland participates actively in international military and civilian crisis management. Finland's Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy was published in 2009. Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management was updated in April 2014.

In the OSCE area, Finland has made substantial contributions, inter alia, to the EU civilian crisis management missions in Georgia (EUMM), Moldova/Ukraine (EUBAM), Ukraine (EUAM) and Kosovo (EULEX). From 2014 to 2022, Finland seconded civilian experts to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. In 2022, Finland also seconded to OSCE Secretariat, to the OSCE ODIHR, EUSR Azerbaidžan, EUSR Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nato StratCom CoE Latvia, OSCE Mission to Moldova as well as the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Finland has continued to support OSCE's projects and programs in fulfilment of the OSCE principles and commitments through extra-budgetary contributions. In 2022, about 1 300 000 euros were channelled to different OSCE projects. The geographic focus of the project co-operation was in Ukraine, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Finland is committed to UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, and has integrated them in its internal and external policies. Finland underlines the need for comprehensive implementation of the 1325 agenda. Finland will continue to give political and financial support to further these aims in the OSCE and other international forums.

If the international assistance is based on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union; if it involves significant military

resources or if it may involve the use of military force, if it is of significance from the foreign and security policy perspective or is far-reaching and important in principle, the decisions on the provision of assistance are made by the President or the Government in accordance with the Act on the Making of Decisions Concerning the Provision of and Request for International Assistance. Assistance that may involve the use of military force requires the involvement of the Parliament in the decision-making process. In cases falling outside the scope of the above-mentioned Act, the decision on the participation of the Defence Forces in provision of international assistance is taken by the Ministry of Defence, after consulting the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the Act on the Defence Forces. International assistance described above was not provided in 2022.

Section II: Intra-State elements

1. National planning and decision-making process

1.1 What is the national planning and decision-making process in determining/approving military posture and defence expenditures in your State?

(This reply also partly covers some aspects of question 2.1.)

The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). The Chief of Defence (CHOD) is responsible for all matters related to the exercise of military command, including operational readiness of the FDF. Administratively, the FDF and the CHOD are subordinate to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The MOD is responsible for the general guidance of the defence administration, as well as for the defence policy guidelines and international defence policy co-operation including resources of the FDF. The Defence Command functions as the supreme headquarters of the CHOD and as the central administrative authority for the defence establishment. In addition to strategic planning and command, it is also responsible for the development and coordination of the activities of the individual services as well as for international co-operation. The three single service headquarters are responsible for the performance, development and operations of their own service in accordance with the tasks assigned by the CHOD, and will be supported by the introduction of the integrated, network-enabled C4I system.

Finnish Parliament makes the decisions on the central principles of defence by using its legislative, supervisory and budgetary powers in accordance with the Constitution. The Finnish Government is responsible for the highest executive power in all security situations. The Government also draws up reports on security and defence for Parliament to discuss and approve.

It is the task of the Government Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy to prepare and give guidance on important issues regarding foreign, security and defence policy.

All Ministries are responsible for preparations for crises and national defence arrangements in their respective areas of responsibility. Under the leadership of the State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, the officials responsible for readiness matters in the Ministries are in charge of readiness preparations in their sector and related work across the state administration. It is the remit of the Security Committee to assist the government and ministries in matters pertaining to

comprehensive security. The Security Committee follows the development of Finnish society and its security and coordinates proactive preparedness which is related to comprehensive security.

The Ministry of Finance provides the guidelines for the defence budget, which is approved annually by the Parliament. The Ministry of Defence establishes the financial guidelines for defence planning. The Commander of the Defence Forces executes the financial steering of the Defence Forces.

Part of the defence expenditure is “outsourced”, meaning that some areas (infrastructure, some logistics and maintenance), have been contracted at the central level (either by the MoD, Defence Command or any other central level defence institution) with service suppliers from outside the MoD and/or Defence Forces.

A decision to participate in a military crisis management operation is taken, on the basis of a Government proposal, by the President of the Republic. Before making its proposal, the Government must consult or report to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee or consult the Parliament, depending on the operation and Finnish contribution in question. The decision to place a military unit on high readiness (standby unit) in, for example an EU Battle Group for military crisis management operations, will also be taken by the President of the Republic on the basis of a Government proposal submitted after the government has consulted the Parliament. During the operation the MOD may make minor adjustments to the Finnish contribution. The MoD may also decide to second individual military personnel to military tasks of limited nature in military crisis management or similar tasks in other international crisis management. In both situations, a prior consultation with the MFA is required.

1.2 How does your State ensure that its military capabilities take into account the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability?

The main goals of Finland’s foreign and security policy are to safeguard Finland’s independence and territorial integrity, to avoid becoming involved in a military conflict and to improve the security and wellbeing of the people of Finland. Finland works to prevent military threats and to reduce tensions.

Finland’s security environment changed fundamentally when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. After the invasion, Finland reassessed its security policy situation and applied for NATO membership on 17 May 2022. The NATO member countries signed the Accession Protocol concerning Finland’s NATO membership in Brussels on 5 July, making Finland an invitee of the Alliance. Finland became a member of NATO on 4 April 2023.

Finland condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and is implementing European Union sanctions. Finland has supported Ukraine in many ways, including by training of Ukraine military personnel and sending arms assistance, which it remains committed to continue.

Finland's new government was inaugurated on 20 June 2023. The Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy and Government’s Defence Report will be drawn up at the beginning of the government term.

By joining NATO, Finland has become a militarily allied country. Finland's NATO membership strengthens security in Finland and stability in Northern Europe. As a member of NATO, Finland will maintain a credible defence capability in all circumstances and will be prepared to support its NATO allies according to its obligations. Finland wants to see a stronger European Union and stronger European defence within the framework of NATO.

The new Government's Defence Report will define the longer-term goals for Finland's defence as a NATO member and provide the guidelines for the maintenance and development of Finland's defence capability until the early 2030's. The Defence Report and its implementation ensures that Finland's defence capability meets the requirements of the operating environment.

NATO membership, the Nordic co-operation, the European Union and other multilateral cooperation form the framework for Finland's international defence cooperation. In addition, bilateral defence co-operation especially with Sweden, Norway, the UK and the US is of great importance.

Finland continues to participate actively in international training and exercises, military crisis management and in other international co-operation and activities. Participation in military crisis management is part of conducting Finland's foreign and security policy and international co-operation. Finland participates in increasingly complex crisis management operations in ever more demanding and high-risk operating environments. Finland takes into account the changes in international crisis management and evaluates its participation in operations from the standpoint of effectiveness and national goals. By participating in military crisis management, Finland simultaneously improves the Defence Forces' capabilities and capacities.

2. Existing structures and processes

2.1 What are the constitutionally established procedures for ensuring democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, intelligence services and the police?

All forces and services mentioned above are subordinate to politically nominated ministers of the Government, which in turn is accountable to the Parliament. The parliamentary committees regularly call in the ministers in their respective fields of competence to hearings on issues of concern. The parliamentary committees are also entitled to monitor the actions of the executive bodies. Individual MPs may pose questions in writing, to which the competent minister has the obligation to reply and also an oral questioning procedure is practiced.

All forces and services mentioned above base their action on relevant legislation, which defines the basis and limitations of their powers. No action may arbitrarily infringe on the fundamental rights of individuals, which are extensively enshrined in the Constitution since a reform in 1995. In case of violations a range of adequate legal and other recourse is available.

The respective forces and services are subjected as follows:

- Armed forces; same authorities and procedures as mentioned in answer to question 1.1.
- Internal security forces; no forces belonging to this category.
- Military intelligence operates within the Defence Command under the Ministry of Defence.
- The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service operates under the Ministry of the Interior.

- All police activities are controlled by the National Police Board.
- The Finnish Border Guard is the central national authority responsible for border security in Finland operating under the Ministry of the Interior.

These services are based on the relevant laws and controlled by the respective ministries, Government and Parliament, and through this, linked to the parliamentary control.

2.2 How is the fulfilment of these procedures ensured, and which constitutionally established authorities/institutions are responsible for exercising these procedures?

The Parliamentary Ombudsman has been charged with legal supervisory competence, which extends over the activities of all authorities and other bodies performing public functions. He or she may act on complaints or at his or her own initiative. The Ombudsman submits an annual report to the Parliament on his or her work, including observations on any shortcomings in legislation. Additionally, the Chancellor of Justice of the Government supervises the lawfulness of the official acts of the Government, the President of the Republic and all authorities and other bodies performing public functions. The Chancellor of Justice submits an annual report to the Parliament and the Government on his or her activities and observations on how the law has been obeyed. The Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice may prosecute or order that charges be brought in matters falling within the purview of their supervision of legality. The State Financial Inspectors have the right to control the use of budgetary finances.

The Intelligence Ombudsman supervises the legality of civil and military intelligence and the realization of basic and human rights in intelligence activities. The Ombudsman is an autonomous and independent authority that started his/her oversight activities as of June 2019, i.e. when the acts on civilian and military intelligence entered into force.

2.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces, and how does your State control that such forces act solely within the constitutional framework?

The main principles of Finland's defence specified in the Government's Defence Report to Parliament are the following:

- General conscription,
- Territorial defence,
- Defence Cooperation,
- Ability to provide and receive military assistance,
- Training conscripts for wartime units in the reserve and providing the units with the necessary material,
- Development of the peacetime command and administrative structure primarily to meet the wartime requirements,
- Responding to the military threats of various degrees by controlling the readiness of the Defence Forces.

Finland's defence is based on a strong national defence capability as part of the Alliance's collective deterrence and defence. Finland participates in the planning of NATO's defence and collective deterrence.

The Army plays a decisive role in defending the country and repelling aggression. The Navy and the Air Force have important roles in territorial surveillance and in protection of territorial integrity.

The Act on the Defence Forces and other respective legislation stipulates the tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces within governmental structure and provides the legal framework for carrying out those tasks in accordance with the constitutional framework.

Organisational oversight is conducted by the Ministry of Defence and the Parliament, especially through the Parliamentary Ombudsman, as well as through topic related authorities such as environmental authorities. Furthermore criminal cases that are not dealt with as disciplinary cases in the Defence Forces are prosecuted by public prosecutor and decided within the civilian court system.

The Finnish Border Guard is responsible for border security in Finland as part of Finland's internal security, subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. The main duties are to control Finland's borders on land and at sea, carry out border surveillance, conduct border checks on persons at land border crossing points, ports and airports, and perform search and rescue operations, particularly at sea. The Border Guard also performs police duties, seeks to prevent, expose and investigate severe cross-border crimes in collaboration with other law enforcement authorities in Finland and implements customs controls at border crossing points where the Finnish Customs is not present. The Finnish Border Guard carries out national defence tasks in collaboration with the Finnish Defence Forces.

3. Procedures related to different forces personnel

3.1 What kind of procedures for recruitment and call-up of personnel for service in your military, paramilitary and internal security forces does your State have?

Liability for military service is based on the Constitution, the reformed Conscription Act of 2007 and the Conscription Decree of 2007. Every male Finnish citizen is by law liable for military service and therefore subject to call-up. The period of liability is for male citizens between the ages of 18 to 60.

Under the Conscription Act of 2007, Regional Offices organise call-ups in every municipality, beginning no earlier than on 15 August and ending no later than on 15 December. The call-up is applied to 18 to 29 year-old men (only once). Information on and a notice of the call-up are sent by the Regional Office. A medical examination is also done in municipal health centres in advance to check the ability for military service.

The call-up takes one day during which general information is given. After the medical examination done by a physician, the fitness for military service is determined and the decision for military service is made or a three-man call-up board grants exemption from military service. The board consists of one senior officer, another officer of a lower rank and one representative from the municipality. In general, military service is carried out within the two years following call-up, at the age of 19 or 20 but at the latest before the end of the year when a man turns 30.

Since 1995, it has also been possible for women to perform military service on a voluntary basis. There are no call-ups for women but Regional Offices provide information and medical examinations. A female conscript has the rights and duties equal to those of a male one. The

difference is that within 30 days from starting military service she has a right to leave without having to give an explanation or her superior can terminate the service but only for well-justified reasons. After the end of the 30-day period, she is equally liable for service as any man until the end of the age of 60.

The total amount of conscripts is around 21 000 of which some 650 conscripts complete their basic military training at the Border Guard Units. Conscript service at the Border Guard Units is similar to service in Units of the Defence Forces. Conscripts are selected through the call-up organization explained above.

3.2 What kind of exemptions or alternatives to military service does your State have?

Military service is compulsory for men, but on statutory grounds that have been provided in acts and decrees, there are some alternatives to the exemption from military service. Unarmed military service is allowed. For women the military service is possible on a voluntary basis.

A limited or permanent exemption for health reasons can be granted by the military authorities if the health or physical fitness does not fulfil the requirements for military service. A medical certificate is required.

Those registered as permanent residents on the autonomous Åland Islands have a right not to do military service. No alternative service is arranged and no application is required from them. However, they can serve on voluntary basis.

According to the reformed Non-Military Service Act (1446/2007) a man who on grounds of conviction is unable to perform any kind of military service within the Defence Forces will be exempted from military service and he will be liable for civilian service instead. A special application for exemption is required.

A Finnish man who has dual (or multiple) citizenship as well as a man who has been granted Finnish citizenship under the age of 30 are also required to perform military service, but if they have performed it in their second or previous country, they can be exempted from peacetime military service in Finland. A free-form application is required.

A Finnish man who has dual (or multiple) citizenship can be exempted from military service in peacetime if he lives permanently abroad, has no family ties in or connections to Finland, has no property in Finland and will receive no legacy from Finland. A free-form application is required. If living permanently abroad has continued at least 7 years, no application is required.

The legislation for all the above-mentioned cases is based on:

- Conscription Act 1438/2007,
- Conscription Decree 1443/2007,
- Act on Women's Voluntary Military Training 285/2022,
- Decree on Women's Voluntary Military Training 371/2022,
- Act on the Provision of Health Care in the Defence Forces 322/1987,
- Non-Military Service Act 1446/2007,
- Act on the Autonomy of the Åland Islands 1144/1991

3.3 What are the legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all forces personnel as well as conscripts?

Legal and administrative procedures protecting the rights of personnel in the Finnish Defence Forces are based, in general, on law. Protection of the personnel in regular employment is very much the same as with all state civil servants. Detailed provisions are laid down in the State Civil Servants Act (750/1994). The only major differences between personnel employed by the Defence Forces and other state civil servants is that defence personnel can be transferred to another office without their own consent and that there are certain restrictions on political activities for military personnel.

Legal protection of conscripts is based on clear rules of competence and procedures and on the supervisory function of the higher authorities. The constitution proclaims the basic norms and authorization to issue more specific rules and regulations. Conscripts are guaranteed by law the possibility to appeal over the actions of his/her military superiors. A conscript who is dissatisfied with the actions taken by his/her military superiors may have these actions investigated by a higher military superior. In case a military superior has imposed a disciplinary punishment on a conscript, he/she may appeal to a general Court of First Instance.

In addition to the above-mentioned, it is possible to have any actions by military personnel as well as complaints about their treatment, general facilities or medical care etc. in the Defence Forces to be investigated by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. These complaints can be issued in writing or directly to the Ombudsman via internet. The Ombudsman regularly visits several garrisons. During these visits, conscripts can discuss privately with the Ombudsman.

Based on the EU whistleblowing legislation, the Finnish Defence Forces has, after a trial which began in 2020, launched in 2021 an internal whistleblowing channel whereby any actions of military personnel can be brought to the attention of the legal division for further investigation either by name or anonymously.

4. Implementation of other political norms, principles, decisions and international humanitarian law

4.1 How does your State ensure that International Humanitarian Law and Law of War are made widely available, e.g. through military training programmes and regulations?

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Law of War are endorsed through military programmes and regulations at all levels. They are part of the training and education for officers taking BA (Bachelor of Military Science) and MA (Master of Military Science) degrees as well as for conscripts. Reservists are being trained in IHL in rehearsal training and exercises as well as in training provided by the National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK). There are over 20 legal advisors in the Finnish Defence Forces who teach and advise military personnel on International Humanitarian law thus ensuring that IHL and the Law of War are taken into account in the Finnish Defence Forces.

The Finnish Defence Forces conducts teaching and information sequences to all personnel including conscripts and reservists concerning International Humanitarian Law. This training is under constant development. Furthermore, there is active cooperation with police and prosecution authorities, which comprises also questions related to IHL.

Personnel taking part in crisis management missions are given special training prior to the transfer to the area of operation. Personnel training for international operations receive special instructions on humanitarian law, the law of war and combating human trafficking as well as special rules of behaviour, which include among other things a zero-tolerance on human trafficking. The training was further developed in 2020 with special real-life simulating situations.

The Defence Forces send participants regularly to the following courses on IHL:

- Course in San Remo arranged by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law,
- Vienna Course on International Law for Military Advisers organized by Austrian Ministry of Defence, the ICRC and the European Security and Defence College,
- Course on LOAC for military personnel organized by the Finnish Red Cross,
- Courses in NATO School concerning IHL and other operational issues,
- Workshop on the Code of Conduct arranged by the Swiss General Staff and the Swiss Military College,
- Course on the Law of Armed Conflict for senior officers of armed forces medical services arranged by the International Committee of Military Medicine

Since 1988, the Government of Finland has, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, provided yearly financial support to the Finnish Red Cross for the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law in Finland. Dissemination has included tailored training for relevant professional military and civilian audiences, such as military staff, prosecutors and judges, as well as general IHL training for wider public.

In addition, Finland has an active national Committee for International Humanitarian Law that also promotes and disseminates IHL. This Committee works under the auspices of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and it brings together IHL experts from different ministries, the Defence Forces, universities and from organisations such as the Finnish Red Cross, the Finnish Branch of Amnesty International and the Finnish Society for the Law of War and Military Law. This national Committee was already established in 1993 with the mandate to especially:

- Co-ordinate the implementation and dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and other international humanitarian law instruments as well as,
- Promote international humanitarian law and raise awareness about the Geneva Conventions and their protocols,
- The committee also shares information about IHL training and different activities in Finland,
- Prepares for the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and other relevant international conferences,
- It also monitors new developments in international humanitarian law and consider their implications for Finland.

As a whole, the Committee offers a valuable venue for expert discussions on international humanitarian law. Stakeholders can easily share information and launch initiatives on IHL. We consider their role very important in enhancing both awareness and implementation of the Geneva Conventions.

4.2 What has been done to ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually accountable under national and international law for their actions?

To ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually held liable under national and international law for their actions, conscripts are trained to be fully familiar with the Code of Conduct in accordance with Article 83 of the 1977 Protocol I additional to the Geneva Convention. The training includes the basics of the Code of Conduct, the set of ten rules for the soldier (an updated version was issued July 2013) and internationally recognized distinctive emblems. Each soldier is given a copy of the Soldier's Manual, which deals with the essential matters from the soldier's point of view.

Familiarization with the Code of Conduct takes place, as part of the training in security policy, during the basic training period for all conscripts. The combatant's training during the special training period includes lessons related to the Code of Conduct relevant to the training activities of the conscripts.

The Public Information Division of the Defence Staff has compiled the teaching material on security policies, which also includes material for teaching the Code of Conduct. This material includes instructions for the teacher, slides and videotapes. All company-level units have used this material.

See also answer to 4.1.

4.3 How does your State ensure that armed forces are not used to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity?

Finland adheres to most of the Conventions of IHL as well as to the human rights conventions. Finland has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (FTS 8/1976) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (FTS 5/1976). Finland is also a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (FTS 19/1990) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (FTS 60/1991) and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts (FTS 31/2002). Finland is also a party to the Hague Conventions of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (FTS 8/1955), the Additional Protocols I, II (FTS 82/1980) and III of the Geneva Conventions (the declaration provided for in Article 90 of Protocol I was made when the Protocols were ratified) and The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (FTS 58/2002).

The Government of Finland respects these conventions and ensures that all people within its jurisdiction are guaranteed the rights and freedoms enacted in these conventions. The Finnish Constitution guarantees democracy, human rights, individual rights, human dignity, equality and justice. The Ministry of the Interior is the ministry for internal security responsible for public order and security with police authorities, not the Ministry of Defence nor the Finnish Defence Forces.

4.4 What has been done to provide for the individual service member's exercise of his or her civil rights and how does your State ensure that the country's armed forces are politically neutral?

Protection of personnel in regular employment is very much the same as with all state civil servants. Detailed provisions are laid down in the State Civil Servants Act. The only major differences between personnel employed by the Defence Forces and other state civil servants is that defence personnel can be transferred to another office without their own consent and that

there are certain restrictions on political activities of military personnel (one cannot be a member of a political party nor be put up as a candidate for parliamentary elections).

Legal protection of conscripts is based on clear rules of competence and procedures and on the supervisory function of the authorities. The constitution proclaims the basic norms and authorization to issue more specific rules and regulations.

By virtue of the Conscript Act, no person may, without an acceptable reason, be placed in a different position due to age, origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, and state of health, disability, gender, sexual orientation or any other reason related to the individual.

In every Finnish garrison, there is a Conscript Committee whose main purpose is to look after and develop the service conditions of conscripts. The members of the Committee are chosen by election among those conscripts who serve in that garrison. Only conscripts have the right to vote in these elections. Finnish conscripts are also free to join the Union of Conscripts, which is a national organization for lobbying and representing the interests of conscripts.

According to the Finnish Penal Code, a soldier or a person in military service in the Border Guard (excluding conscripts), who joins a political party or an association engaged in, or clearly supportive of, party politics, or fails to resign the membership of a party or an association referred to above can be prosecuted for unlawful political activity.

4.5 How does your State ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law?

Under the Constitution of Finland, the competence to conclude treaties is given to the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government. According to the Constitution, the acceptance by the Parliament of international obligations and their denouncement is required for such treaties and other international obligations that contain provisions of a legislative nature, are otherwise significant, or otherwise require approval by Parliament under the Constitution. The acceptance by the Parliament is required also for the denouncement of such obligations. The provisions of treaties and other international obligations, in so far as they are of a legislative nature, are brought into force by an Act. Otherwise, international obligations are brought into force by a Decree issued by the President of the Republic.

Finland follows the so-called dualistic tradition; i.e. treaties become internally applicable law only through a domestic legislative act. The incorporation is normally a statute in blanco, a legislative act, which merely refers to the treaty. The hierarchical level of the statute in blanco is either both an Act of Parliament and a decree issued by the President or merely a decree, depending on the consideration mentioned above.

Finland fosters the strengthening of multilateral cooperation and international law. Finland obeys its international obligations closely. This system is in-built in the Finnish Security and Defence policy so that, for example, when taking new international obligations, Finland brings its internal law and workings into conformity with the obligations.

Section III: Public access and contact information

1. Public access

1.1 How is the public informed about the provisions of the Code of Conduct?

Parliamentary and administrative proceedings concerning defence matters are subject to the general rule on the publicity of official documents to which public access is guaranteed by law – The Act on the Openness of Government Activities. This access may only be limited on grounds of national security or on other grounds specified in law, which, inter alia, regulate classification of documents and handling of classified documents.

Mass media, the Internet as well as the publicity activities by the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces themselves are means to disseminate public information on defence matters. The Ministry of Defence has enhanced the possibilities of the general public to access defence information via a major project on developing communication through new technologies and providing access to the Ministry's database. The website works in three different languages: Finnish, Swedish and English. Further information on defence matters is available at the Ministry's website at www.defmin.fi and at the website of the Defence Forces at www.mil.fi.

The Ministry of Defence Media and Communications Unit also replies to individual questions and letters from the public. Articles in the major daily papers and TV appearances are a frequent way to communicate to the public on the activities of the Ministry of Defence as well the Defence Forces.

It is highly significant for the Finnish policy of openness that the public not only have access to information but that they also understand the wider framework of our defence planning and the relevant background information related to the armed forces. This is demonstrated for example by distributing to the general public the Government's Defence Report to the Parliament in 2021.

1.2 What additional information related to the Code of Conduct, e.g., replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, is made publicly available in your State?

Besides the Code itself, there are no other publications regarding the Code translated into Finnish language. Naturally, foreign academic research with regard the subject is available through internet for any citizen in Finland.

1.3 How does your State ensure public access to information related to your State's armed forces?

See answer 1.1 of this section.

2. Contact information

2.1 Provide information on the national point of contact for the implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Unit for Security Policy and Crisis Management
Political Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
P. O. Box 176, 00023 Government, Finland
Email: POL-10@formin.fi

Defence Policy Department
 Ministry of Defence
 P. O. Box 31, 00131 Helsinki, Finland
 Email: kirjaamo.plm@gov.fi

Section IV: Implementation of UNSCR 1325 "Women, Peace and Security", Voluntary information exchange

1. PREVENTION

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS

Name of the treaty	Party by: ratification P(R) , accession P(a) , succession P(s) , acceptance P(A) , approval P(AA) , or Not party	Law and date of ratification, accession, succession, acceptance, or approval	
Universal legal instruments			
1.	Protocol Supplementary to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000)	P(R) party by ratification	date of ratification 10.02.2004
2.	United Nations Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)	P(R) (Party by ratification);	date of ratification: 4 September 1989.
The Council of Europe legal instruments			
3.	European Convention Against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005) CETS No: 197	P(A) Party by acceptance;	date of acceptance: 30 May 2012.
4.	European Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (2011) CETS No: 210	P(A) Party by acceptance;	date of acceptance 17 April 2015.

Other arrangements		Yes	No
5.	National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security	X	
6.	National legislation to implement the UN CEDAW convention (if a party), with particular reference to combating discrimination in employment, education, access to health services and participation in institutions ensuring democratic oversight and public scrutiny of the security sector.	X	
7.	Other related information, clarification or details to share: Finnish Defence Forces has created its own WPS action plan, which is guiding the implementation of Finland's NAP in defence forces and in military operations.		

Type of Measure		Yes	No
1.	Mechanism to assess risk of abuse of small arms to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence and violence against women and children		X
2.	Inclusion of women's organisations and women in religious, ethnic minority or community groups in measures - to counter and prevent terrorism and violent extremism	X	
	- to raise awareness of the potential risks of exploitation and radicalization ¹	X	
3.	Inclusion of gender perspective and special needs of women and girls in a national counter-terrorism strategy ²		X
4.	Inclusion of specific matters related to the protection of women's and girls' rights in the basic education of armed forces.	X	
5.	Availability of specialised in-service training for armed forces personnel on the protection of women's and girls' rights.	X	
6.	Inclusion of specific matters related to the protection of women's and girls' rights in the pre-deployment training for international peacekeeping missions.	X	
7.	Plans to address and gather information from local women's populations in areas at risk of conflicts.	X	

¹ See also similar question 3a in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report.

² See also similar question 3a in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report.

8.	Mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of gender mainstreaming into operations	X	
9.	Feedback mechanisms: - from operations to chiefs of defence or military planners - between forces leading multi-national missions and forces providing personnel to such missions	X X	
10.	Membership of a regional network or leadership network such as the WPS Chiefs of Defence Network	X	
Other related information, clarification or details to share: no specific mechanism to assess risk of abuse of small arms (1), however the risks related to small arms deployment are being minimized through small arms register and holder permits.			

2. National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security

The fourth Finnish WPS NAP was drafted in winter 2022-2023. The process was coordinated by the MFA Finland and conducted in close cooperation with other government ministries and offices, CSOs and members of the Finnish Academia taking the nexus-approach into account. The open and participatory drafting process provides a good practice of an inter-governmental and cross-sectoral cooperation. The process allowed for a formulation of a common understanding of shared nationwide WPS objectives between relevant stakeholders and strengthened the dialogue between government officials and civil society.

The WPS NAP is being implemented by MFA Finland, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Forces, the Ministry of the Interior and the Crisis Management Centre (CMC Finland), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of the Environment.

The civil society partners committed to implementing the Action Plan are the CMI - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation, Finn Church Aid, the Rule of Law Centre, Political Parties of Finland for Democracy - Demo Finland, the Finnish Missionary Society, Finnish Refugee Council, the Finnish Red Cross and the Family Federation of Finland. A large number of other research organisations and NGOs also work to promote the achievement of the Action Plan's objectives. A follow-up mechanism and indicators for the NAP are under development. The work is coordinated by the MFA in cooperation with a WPS Follow-up group consisting of implementing authorities, implementing CSOs and other members of the Civil Society.

The Finnish WPS NAP does not have a separate budget, but the implementing bodies will cover the cost of implementation separately. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces have participated in the drafting of the NAP and presented important goals and areas for development there. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces carry out the development work assigned to them.

With regard to the Defence Administration, the main objectives have been:
1. Better gender balance in the security sector and crisis management.

Objectives related to a better gender balance include increasing the number of women in voluntary conscript service and military personnel, as well as in crisis management operations. The aim is that women will account for at least 7% of all crisis management personnel and that the number of gender advisers and contact persons are increased.

2. Incorporate the gender perspective into planning, implementation, evaluation in the security sector and crisis management

Crisis management operations and peacekeeping operations have been developed so that the gender perspective is better considered in their planning, implementation and monitoring. The Defence Administration also participates in NORDEFECO cooperation to develop crisis management activities that promote equality and non-discrimination.

3. The development of training and education of gender perspective in all military training.

Training has been developed in cooperation with the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). Women, Peace and Security related training has been developed in the National Defence University and the International Centre for the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces will ensure that the gender perspective is included in the training of conscripts, staff and crisis management personnel. In pre-deployment training the personnel get basic information about the gender perspective.

An implementation and progress report is given annually to the Committee of Foreign Affairs. The report is prepared by the MFA in coordination with other implementing bodies and actors.

3 Measures to prevent sexual and gender-based harm

3.1 Horizon scanning, intelligence and risk?

How do you include systematic gender analysis of areas at risk of conflict, including gender disaggregated socio-economic indicators, power over resources and decision-making, increases in sexual and gender-based violence, on-line and other threats of violence against women in public life, journalists and those providing humanitarian assistance?

These actions are part of the operational activities of the Finnish military crisis management forces. The force's GFP supports the force in the planning and implementation of these actions. However, there are differences in the quality of the implementation of these actions in different operations. In some operations, these actions have been of higher quality than in others.

How do you incorporate a gender perspective into actions preventing and combatting the tensions, which lead to conflict, such as increases in sexual and gender-based violence, terrorism, violent extremism and human trafficking?

The Finnish military crisis management forces are monitoring whether phenomena like this increase in their area of operations. If this is observed, they are reported to higher staffs and local security authorities.

3.2 Planning

How do you incorporate a gender perspective into operational planning?

The Army Staff and the Naval Staff draw up an operational plan for each military crisis management operation, which deals with the gender perspective in the operation.

How do you plan to address and gather information from local women's populations in areas at risk of conflict?

Finnish military crisis management forces keep in touch with the local women and collect information.

3.3 Awareness and understanding of WPS at all levels and types of security personnel.

What training do you give on incorporating a gender perspective and protecting the rights of women and girls to security personnel at basic education, officer training and specialised in-service training?

The Finnish Police Board organises training on prevention of discrimination and abuse to all police personnel. Military training has been developed in cooperation with the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). Women, Peace and Security related training has been developed in the National Defence University and the International Centre for the Defence Forces. The Defence Forces will ensure that the gender perspective is included in the training of conscripts, staff and crisis management personnel. In pre-deployment training the personnel get basic information about the gender perspective.

How do you train security personnel to protect women and girls, men and boys from sexual and gender-based violence?³

This is part of the training described above.

3.4 Vetting of security personnel, especially pre-deployment

What measures do you take to vet and prevent the recruitment, retention, promotion and deployment of security personnel with a record of sexual or gender-based violence or other violations of human rights?⁴

Prior to each deployment to civilian crisis management missions, a security clearance of the selected candidate is requested from Finnish national authorities prior to confirming the secondment. In case of a record of alleged violations of human rights in the security clearance report, Crisis Management Center (CMC Finland) provides the candidate a possibility to elaborate the alleged violation. However, in case of a record of sexual or gender-based violence or other violations of human rights, a candidate will not be seconded to the position in question, nor will they be considered for secondment at a minimum, a limited timeframe. In case the person applied for secondment in the future, CMC Finland would assess each case individually based on the gravity of the violation. Finnish soldiers who are sent on operations must not have a criminal background. Everyone's criminal record is checked.

3.5 Other preventative measures

Prior to secondment, in case of security forces personnel, CMC Finland requests a statement from the current employer (Police, Border authorities, military) on the staff member's suitability for secondment. This statement should include information on any violations of serious nature. However, the security forces personnel which are seconded by CMC Finland are primarily seconded as civilian personnel, with a few exceptions. The management of operations should observe the occurrence of such phenomena. Offenses lead to suspension of service and criminal investigation in the home country.

³ See also similar question 6a in the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

⁴ See also similar question 2 and 8 in the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

4 Leadership, accountability and assurance

4.1 Integrating WPS into the command climate

How do you integrate a gender perspective and WPS into your policy and operational framework, including military manuals, national security policy frameworks, codes of conduct, protocols, standard operating procedures and command directives?

CMC Finland requires that each seconded person signs the organisation's Code of Conduct document which includes WPS and a gender perspective. CMC Finland applies a zero tolerance for sexual and gender-based violence or other human rights violations.

In the Defence Forces, it is intended to mainstream a gender perspective in all activities. In part, the gender perspective has been included in these documents, but the work is still in progress.

4.2 Accountability and Performance assessment

What measures, systems or procedures do you have on individual and collective accountability for acting in accordance with such policies or directives?

CMC Finland receives performance evaluation reports for each individual from the mission/organization after the secondment. In case of clear reports on sexual or gender-based violence or other violations of human rights, the individual may be repatriated and will not be considered for further secondments in the near future.

CMC Finland also trains all secondees on the organization's code of conduct policy in pre-deployment trainings for Finnish civilian experts to be seconded to crisis management missions. Acting against policies and instructions leads to various disciplinary measures.

4.3 Assurance

How do you provide specialist advice to operational commanders on WPS?

In the Finnish crisis management forces, there is a GFP that advises the management.

What systems or measures do you use to co-ordinate specialist advice on WPS throughout your security forces and to provide democratic oversight?

A group of gender advisors will be appointed to the domestic organization of the Defence Forces, who will advise the management and coordinate and develop gender activities.

5 Sharing of good practice

5.1 How do you share good practice and learn from others?

In the defence sector this is mostly done through Lessons learned activity.

6 PARTICIPATION

A. Checklist of key measures taken by participating States

Please indicate if your State has the following measures in place to increase women's participation in security forces and decision making, including at all stages of any peace-

making process. More detailed information of such measures can be included in Part B below.

	Type of Measure	Yes	No
1.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics on applicants to armed forces	X	
2.	Policies to attract female candidates (targeted campaigns, review of accession tests etc.)	X	
3.	Policies to promote equal opportunities for women and men across the security sector	X	
4.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of armed forces personnel: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - By rank - By promotion - By retention 	X X	X
5.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of complaints by armed forces personnel of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discrimination - sexual harassment - gender based harassment - sexual violence - gender-based violence 	X X X X X	
6.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of complaints by civilian personnel in the security sector of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - discrimination - sexual harassment - gender based harassment - sexual violence - gender-based violence 	X X X X X	
7.	Anonymous staff surveys/climate assessment surveys or similar (monitoring incidences of behaviour contrary to military standards of conduct)	X	
8.	Collection and monitoring of sex-disaggregated statistics of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - personnel deployed on operations and peace-keeping missions - and by rank 	X X	

9.	Collection and monitoring of sex-disaggregated statistics of decision makers in the security sector		X
10.	<p>Other related information, clarification or details to share:</p> <p>Recruitment within the Ministry of Defence The ministry's recruitment practices are based on the principle of gender equality. The employer operates in such a way that representatives of different genders apply for open positions. Gender equality is considered even as the job posting is being prepared. The most qualified applicant is selected for the position, regardless of gender, gender identity, gender expression or ethnic background. All positions in the ministry are suitable for men, women, gender minorities and people with different ethnic backgrounds. Gender equality is taken into account in all stages of the recruitment process, including the recruitment substitutes and trainees. In the Ministry of Defenses' recruitment interviews, interviewers include representatives of different genders in order to achieve as equal a recruitment as possible.</p> <p>Career advancement within the Ministry of Defence The ministry supports the development of the personnel's professional skills and the diversification of work tasks. The employer creates equal opportunities for everyone to advance in their career. Keeping civil servants' knowledge and skills up-to-date is ensured by enabling participation in training, and supporting voluntary training. Equal career advancement opportunities are also considered in substitute appointments. Civil servants' readiness and willingness to develop professional skills, diversify work tasks, advance in their careers and, if the civil servant wishes, accept international assignments are discussed in connection with their annual development discussion. The employer supports independent study and willingness for task and personnel rotation.</p> <p>Ministry gender equality working groups The Minister of Defence has set up a working group on operational gender equality to plan and support gender mainstreaming at the ministry and in the Defence Administration. The Government's joint network of working groups on operational gender equality and non-discrimination supports the groups in their work.</p> <p>Gender impact assessment The objective is to assess all the decisions, budgeting, and legislation beforehand from a gender equality perspective. The aim is to promote gender equality and prevent any undesirable effects in terms of it. It is possible to make corrective proposals for reducing discrimination and any undesirable impacts, thus promoting gender equality and removing obstacles to gender equality based on the impact assessments.</p> <p>Surveys in the Ministry of Defence The Ministry's personnel survey examines issues related to gender equality and gender harassment on an annual basis. Statutory workplace surveys are carried out in cooperation with the occupational health care service provider every four to five years. The surveys also address issues related to equality and non-discrimination.</p> <p>Women's participation in voluntary military service Women's participation in voluntary military service and military tasks will be encouraged further. In addition, information and analyses concerning women's voluntary military service will be increased in order to augment women's interest towards military service. In the year 2022, 1,211 women started military service in Finland, which is the highest level so far. Over 1,000 women completed the service.</p> <p>The joint accommodation experiment continued in 2022</p>		

	<p>Temporary experimentation of joint accommodation (gender neutral) proved successful and promoted, among other things, equal treatment between genders. The experiences and results gained from the experiment have mainly been positive. At the end of 2022, the Ministry of Defence decided that the experiment would continue until the end of 2023. The purpose of continuing the experiment is to collect more data and obtain broader results.</p> <p>Report of the Parliamentary Committee</p> <p>The Parliamentary Committee submitted its report in November 2021 proposing that the compulsory enrollment day should be organized for the entire age group. Among other things, the Committee estimates that a joint enrollment day would provide more extensive information regarding military service. The Ministry of Defence has established a cross-administrative working group tasked with examining and planning the extension of enrollment in accordance with the Committee's target state. The working group will examine the impacts of developing a neutral enrollment process on legislation and the authorities' responsibilities, activities, and resources. The term of the working group runs from 1 September 2022 to 30 September 2023.</p> <p>Prevention and handling of discrimination and inappropriate behavior in the Defence Forces</p> <p>In 2022, the Defence Forces updated comprehensive instructions on the prevention and handling of discrimination and inappropriate behavior. The guidelines contain concrete instructions for both supervisors and those who have experienced discrimination or harassment, on how to promote a good operating culture, how to prevent inappropriate behavior, and how to deal with problematic situations.</p>
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B. More detailed information for sharing good practice on participative measures between participating States

1. Measures to increase the number of women in general and in decisionmaking positions in the armed forces and the ministry of defence (and other security forces- optional).

In Finland, conscript service is mandatory for men. Women can perform conscript service as volunteers. Completing conscript service is a prerequisite for training leading to a permanent military position and for obtaining a permanent military position. There are no ready statistics on those who applied for training leading to permanent military service and who started in permanent military service. Number of male and female applicants and those who completed conscript training | year 2021:

	Women	Men
Applicants	1300	25000
TOTAL Commenced to Conscript Training	1000	21000
TOTAL Completed Conscript Training	900	19000

The numbers of men and women serving in permanent military positions in 2021:

Number of Women OF-6 And Higher		Number of Men OF-6 And Higher	27
Number of Women OF-3 To OF-5	40	Number of Men OF-3 To OF-5	1612
Number of Women OF-1 To OF-2	123	Number of Men OF-1 To OF-2	3702
Number of Women OR-5 To OR-9	186	Number of Men OR-5 To OR-9	2280
Number of Women OR-1 To OR-4	32	Number of Men OR-1 To OR-4	239
Total	381	Total	7860

The numbers and shares of women both in conscript service and in permanent military positions are slowly increasing. However, we think that the increase in the number of women is slow, and we are trying to recruit more women for military positions with the help of various measures.

2. What are the numbers and percentages of complaints raised by women and men about discrimination, harassment, sexual or gender-based violence?

In the Defence Forces, sexual harassment and other inappropriate treatment are monitored with a work atmosphere survey that is carried out once a year and with a wider equality survey that is carried out once every three years. The number of people reporting sexual harassment has been small, and serious matters such as sexual violence have not been reported at all. In 2022, sexual harassment was reported in 23 surveys, 20 by female, 3 by men. All cases should be handled at the workplace level between management, experts and parties. A good guide has been prepared for this. All results of work environment surveys and gender equality surveys are reviewed by gender. Based on the results, different measures are planned to improve equality.

2 Measures to increase the numbers of women and specialist WPS advisers in peacekeeping forces.

The numbers on women and men in Finnish military crisis management forces 2021:

Number Of Women OF-6 And Higher		Number Of Men OF-6 And Higher	
Number Of Women OF-3 To OF-5	3	Number Of Men OF-3 To OF-5	63
Number Of Women OF-1 To OF-2	14	Number Of Men OF-1 To OF-2	174
Number Of Women OR-5 To OR-9	13	Number Of Men OR-5 To OR-9	194
Number Of Women OR-1 To OR-4	4	Number Of Men OR-1 To OR-4	236
Total Number	34	Total Number	667

The Defence Forces participates in ten different crisis management operations. GFP have been appointed to five Finnish crisis management operations.

3 Democratic oversight of Security Forces and WPS

The Finnish MFA reports on the WPS NAP implementation to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Finland on an annual basis. Crisis management operations report of their own activities to the Army Command. Defence Command reports on the activities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for the annual parliamentary report). Finland is known to have many women in positions of power, including in the government. Of the 200 members of Finnish Parliament, 92 are women. This is 46 % of the total number.

3.3 PROTECTION

A. Checklist of measures taken by participating States

	Type of Measure	Yes	No
1.	Specialist Advisers on WPS: -Gender Advisers -Gender Focal Points -Women Protection Advisers	X X	X
2.	Policies to protect women and others in conflict and post-conflict areas from sexual abuse and exploitation by your State's security personnel ⁵	X	
3.	Policies, which set out the duties of commanders and other superiors to prevent abuse or exploitation by their subordinates.	X	
4.	Collection and monitoring of reported cases of exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces: -referred -investigated - acted upon	X X	
5.	Measures to increase your State's capacity to investigate alleged violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in areas of conflict or post-conflict including sexual and gender-based violence ⁶	X	

More detailed information for sharing good practice on protective measures between participating States

The defence sector of Finland uses NATO definitions in all materials, which are presented for example in Bi Sc Directive 40-1.

In the defence sector operational reporting instructions are developed in such a way that specific issues affecting women and girls are considered in all operations. Reporting is good in some operations, but in some operations it still needs to be developed.

⁵ See also similar question B2 in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report as well as question 3a in NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

⁶ See also similar question 4a in similar question in NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

How are military, para-military and security forces trained to respond to sexual violence and gender-based harm?

This is covered in all military training and pre-deployment training. The occurrence of such crimes must be accompanied and must be addressed within the limits allowed by the mandate of the operation. Crimes must be reported to the local security authorities if they operate in the conflict area.

2 Investigating alleged violations

2.1 How do you identify, record, investigate and prosecute any alleged violations, cases of exploitation and abuse perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces? What experience do you have of such investigations and prosecutions?

The Defence Forces have instructions on how to report incidents that have been observed or are directed at oneself. Milder cases are handled by the Defence Forces. Clear crimes, such as rape and violence, are handled by the civil police and the civil court. There are few cases, but in our experience, these are handled effectively in the Finnish Defence Forces and the judiciary.

2.2 What are the number and percentage of reported cases of exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces that are referred, investigated and acted upon?

There have been very few such cases in recent years, 0 to 3 per year.

2.3 How do you ensure access to justice for victims of conflict related violence including cases of exploitation and abuse by military, para-military and security forces?

Crimes committed in the defence forces and security forces are investigated by the civilian police and resolved in the civilian judiciary. There is no military court in Finland

3.4 SUSTAINING PEACE

A. Checklist of key measures taken by participating States

	Type of Measure	Yes	No
1.	Measures to ensure the involvement of women from the outset in seeking a peaceful settlement of potential or actual conflicts.	x	
2.	Measures to support those who have experienced sexual or genderbased violence during or post-conflict to support their recovery from trauma	x	
3.	Measures to support the role of women as agents of change and transformation in areas emerging from conflict	x	

4.	Measures to support capacity building in the security and other sectors of fragile states or post-conflict situations to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially relating to women and girls	x	
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1.1 How do security personnel support and seek to embed the involvement of women in peacekeeping and throughout the peace building and post -conflict process?

Some military crisis management operations train local security officials to take these issues into account. In some crisis management operations, contact is made with local women's organizations and efforts are made to support their activities.

1.2 What training are your security personnel given as regards survivor focus?

According to our information, these issues are not included in the training of the Defence Forces.

1.3 What roles do your security personnel or other personnel play in support of demobilisation, access to humanitarian assistance or to facilitate re-integration post-conflict?

Some military crisis management operations promote demilitarization and support the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, such operations are rarer, and there are currently no such operations.

3.5 Final reflections

1. What do you consider biggest obstacles as well as what are the priorities for your country on WPS in the context of the Code of Conduct?

The biggest obstacle is that the understanding of the WPS perspective has only spread to some of the personnel of the Defence Forces, the issue is not known widely enough.

The most important goal in military crisis management operations is ensuring the safety of women and girls and improving their status within the limits set by the mandates of the operations.