

**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council**  PC.JOUR/1267 14 May 2020

#### **Chairmanship: Albania**

#### **1267th PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL**

1. <u>Date</u>: Thursday, 14 May 2020 (via video teleconference)

 Opened:
 10.05 a.m.

 Suspended:
 1.10 p.m.

 Resumed:
 3 p.m.

 Closed:
 6.25 p.m.

2. <u>Chairperson</u>: Ambassador I. Hasani

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Permanent Council of the technical modalities for the conduct of meetings of the Council via video teleconferencing technology during the COVID-19 pandemic (SEC.GAL/45/20).

3. <u>Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:</u>

Agenda item 1: REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ODIHR)

Chairperson, Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR.GAL/18/20), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/462/20), Croatia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/501/20), Azerbaijan (PC.DEL/461/20 OSCE+), Turkey (PC.DEL/491/20 OSCE+), Switzerland (PC.DEL/463/20 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/472/20), Norway (PC.DEL/474/20), Georgia (PC.DEL/469/20 OSCE+), Belarus (PC.DEL/464/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom, Kazakhstan (PC.DEL/504/20 OSCE+), Liechtenstein (PC.DEL/466/20 OSCE+), Iceland (PC.DEL/495/20 OSCE+), Canada (PC.DEL/494/20 OSCE+), Kyrgyzstan (PC.DEL/470/20 OSCE+), Canada (PC.DEL/467/20), Bosnia and Herzegovina (PC.DEL/471/20 OSCE+), Ukraine (PC.DEL/486/20), Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan

Agenda item 2: REPORT BY THE OSCE PROJECT CO-ORDINATOR IN UZBEKISTAN

Chairperson, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (PC.FR/14/20 OSCE+), Croatia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia and Moldova, in alignment) (PC.DEL/499/20), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/477/20), Switzerland (PC.DEL/468/20 OSCE+), Turkey (PC.DEL/498/20 OSCE+), Turkmenistan, United States of America (PC.DEL/473/20), Norway (PC.DEL/507/20), Kazakhstan (PC.DEL/475/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom (PC.DEL/476/20 OSCE+), Canada, Uzbekistan

Agenda item 3: DECISION ON THE EXTENSION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF OSCE OBSERVERS TO TWO RUSSIAN CHECKPOINTS ON THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER

Chairperson

**Decision**: The Permanent Council adopted Decision No. 1368 (PC.DEC/1368) on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the text of which is appended to this journal.

United States of America (interpretative statement, see attachment 1 to the decision), Croatia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova and San Marino, in alignment) (interpretative statement, see attachment 2 to the decision), United Kingdom (interpretative statement, see attachment 3 to the decision), Ukraine (interpretative statement, see attachment 4 to the decision), Canada (interpretative statement, see attachment 5 to the decision), Russian Federation (interpretative statement, see attachment 6 to the decision)

Agenda item 4: REVIEW OF CURRENT ISSUES

Chairperson

 (a) Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea: Ukraine (PC.DEL/487/20), Croatia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia and Moldova, in alignment) (PC.DEL/502/20), United Kingdom, Turkey (PC.DEL/497/20 OSCE+), Canada (PC.DEL/490/20 OSCE+), Switzerland (PC.DEL/478/20 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/480/20)

- (b) *Situation in Ukraine and the need to implement the Minsk agreements:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/482/20), Ukraine
- (c) Violation of educational and linguistic rights of national minorities in Latvia during the COVID-19 pandemic: Russian Federation (PC.DEL/485/20), Latvia (PC.DEL/492/20 OSCE+)
- (d) Anti-Semitism in the OSCE region: Russian Federation (PC.DEL/496/20), Croatia-European Union, Lithuania (PC.DEL/506/20 OSCE+), Ukraine, Latvia, Switzerland (PC.DEL/489/20 OSCE+), France, United Kingdom, Belarus, Canada
- (e) The death penalty in the United States of America: Croatia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Andorra, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/500/20), Norway (also on behalf of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) (PC.DEL/493/20), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/484/20), United Kingdom, United States of America (PC.DEL/481/20), Belarus

# Agenda item 5: REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHAIRMANSHIP-IN-OFFICE

Announcement of the distribution of a written report on the activities of the Chairmanship-in-Office (CIO.GAL/65/20 OSCE+): Chairperson

Agenda item 6: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

- (a) Announcement of the distribution of a written report of the Secretary General (SEC.GAL/65/20 OSCE+): Secretary General
- (b) Participation of the Secretary General in the meeting of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation Group held on 11 May 2020: Secretary General (SEC.GAL/65/20 OSCE+)
- (c) Participation of the Secretary General in a high-level interactive dialogue session of the 2020 Virtual Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development on "Sustaining Peace in the Time of COVID-19", held on 13 May 2020: Secretary General (SEC.GAL/65/20 OSCE+)
- (d) Distribution to OSCE Secretariat staff members and personnel of an interoffice memorandum with an update on the OSCE's response to COVID-19, issued on 8 May 2020: Secretary General (SEC.GAL/65/20 OSCE+)

(e) *Town Hall meeting for Vienna-based staff, to be held on 15 May 2020:* Secretary General (SEC.GAL/65/20 OSCE+)

Agenda item 7: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Parliamentary elections in Serbia, to be held on 21 June 2020*: Serbia (PC.DEL/505/20/Rev.1 OSCE+)
- (b) *Local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be held on 4 October 2020:* Bosnia and Herzegovina (PC.DEL/483/20 OSCE+)
- 4. <u>Next meeting</u>:

Thursday, 21 May 2020, at 10 a.m., via video teleconference



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council**  PC.DEC/1368 14 May 2020

Original: ENGLISH

**1267th Plenary Meeting** PC Journal No. 1267, Agenda item 3

#### DECISION No. 1368 EXTENSION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF OSCE OBSERVERS TO TWO RUSSIAN CHECKPOINTS ON THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER

The Permanent Council,

Recalling its Decision No. 1130 of 24 July 2014 on the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border (PC.DEC/1130),

Decides:

1. To extend the mandate of the deployment of OSCE observers to the two Russian border checkpoints of Donetsk and Gukovo on the Russian-Ukrainian border until 30 September 2020;

2. To approve the arrangements and the financial and human resources for the Observer Mission as contained in document PC.ACMF/20/20 of 3 April 2020. In this respect, authorizes the use of 468,000 euros from the 2018 cash surplus to fund the proposed budget for the duration of the mandate to 30 September 2020.

Original: ENGLISH

## INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

By the delegation of the United States of America:

"In connection with the adoption of the decision for the extension of deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the United States would like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the OSCE Rules of Procedure:

The United States finds it deeply regrettable that Russia continues to block the expansion of the geographic scope of the Observer Mission, despite the clear, strong, and continued support from other participating States to do so. We once again must accept an inadequate, limited-scope mission covering just two border checkpoints, which together account for only a few hundred metres of the 2,300 kilometre Ukrainian-Russian border, much of which Ukraine does not control.

Due to Russia's unwarranted restrictions of the border Observer Mission's work, the Mission fails to ascertain the full extent to which Russia participates in or facilitates the flow of arms, funding, and personnel to support its proxies in eastern Ukraine.

We note that point 4 of the Minsk Protocol delineates a clear role for the OSCE to monitor and verify both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian international border, and to create a security zone in the border areas of Russia and Ukraine. There are strong linkages between ceasefire monitoring and border monitoring, and it is to the detriment of all efforts to resolve the conflict that the OSCE approach to these activities has been impeded by one participating State. Russia's repeated refusal to allow expansion of the scope of this mission demonstrates, regrettably, once again, Moscow's unwillingness to take its Minsk commitments seriously.

Mr. Chairperson, I request that this interpretative statement be attached to the decision and to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson."

Original: ENGLISH

### INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

The delegation of Croatia, in its capacity as EU Presidency, passed the floor to the representative of the European Union, who delivered the following statement:

"In connection with the decision of the Permanent Council on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the European Union would like to make the following interpretative statement under the relevant provisions of the Rules of Procedure.

The European Union's views on the vital importance of the monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian State border are well known. Effective and comprehensive monitoring of this border is an integral part of a sustainable political solution in line with OSCE principles and commitments, which re-establishes full Ukrainian control over its sovereign territory, including the border. We recall that the Minsk Protocol calls for permanent monitoring of the border and verification by the OSCE and that the Minsk Package of Measures includes a commitment to reinstate full Ukrainian control over its entire international border.

The OSCE Observer Mission's currently very limited mandate and its small size does not provide for a comprehensive border monitoring. We therefore reiterate our call for a significant expansion of the Observer Mission to all border crossings on the Russian-Ukrainian State border currently not under control of the Ukrainian Government as well as monitoring between these border crossings. This should be supported and co-ordinated with border monitoring on the Ukrainian side of the border by the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and we reiterate the need for the SMM to be assured safe and unhindered access to all parts of the border currently not under Ukrainian Government control since border and ceasefire monitoring are very closely interlinked. Further we underline the need for sufficient equipment and sufficient freedom of movement for the Observer Mission at the current crossing stations in order to monitor movements on the border more effectively.

We do not see any grounds for the Russian Federation's continued resistance to the long overdue expansion of the Observer Mission, including the improvement of its equipment and urge it to reconsider its position.

We welcome the mandate extension by four months, and would support an extension to a longer period of time increasing the Mission's continuity and consistency.

We request that this interpretative statement be attached to the decision and to the journal of the day."

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia<sup>1</sup>, Montenegro<sup>1</sup>, and Albania<sup>1</sup>, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

<sup>1</sup> The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Original: ENGLISH

### INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

By the delegation of the United Kingdom:

"In connection with the decision of the Permanent Council on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the United Kingdom would also like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the OSCE Rules of Procedure.

We very much share the views expressed by the European Union and others that the establishment of genuinely comprehensive monitoring of the entire segment of the Ukraine-Russia State border outside Ukrainian Government control, as well as the restoration of full Ukrainian control over that border, is essential.

While joining consensus on this decision, we wish to reiterate that the Mission's limited scope, as well as the excessive restrictions placed on it by Russia, mean that it is a far cry from the comprehensive border monitoring foreseen under the Minsk Agreements.

The Mission is only present at two checkpoints along an over 400 km stretch of the Ukraine-Russia State border, which is outside of Ukrainian Government control; and even at those two checkpoints, its freedom of movement is severely limited. This impedes its ability to observe certain categories of crossing (such as people in military style outfits) and the trains at Gukovo border crossing point. The Mission's observation is further hindered by Russia's refusal to allow the observers to use monitoring tools such as binoculars.

The United Kingdom joins the many other calls on Russia to end all undue restrictions placed on the Observer Mission and end its objection to the expansion of the Mission to the entirety of the uncontrolled section of the border. We also reiterate the importance of full, safe and unimpeded access for the Special Monitoring Mission to the entire territory of Ukraine, including the border.

Let me also take this opportunity to reiterate the United Kingdom's unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, including its territorial waters.

I request that this statement be attached to the decision and to the journal of the day."

Original: ENGLISH

### INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

By the delegation of Ukraine:

#### "Mr. Chairperson,

In connection with the Permanent Council decision on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, the delegation of Ukraine would like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The delegation of Ukraine consistently reiterates the importance of having a substantial and broad OSCE monitoring at the segment of the Ukrainian-Russian border adjacent to the Russia-occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. We urge the Russian Federation to lift all restrictions, which undermine the efficiency of the Mission's monitoring at the 'Gukovo' and 'Donetsk' checkpoints.

Having signed the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, the Russian Federation committed to ensure permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian State border and verification by the OSCE with the establishment of a security zone in the border areas of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As a part of the implementation of this provision, the mandate of the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian border checkpoints 'Gukovo' and 'Donetsk' must be expanded. This will greatly contribute to the sustainable de-escalation and peaceful resolution of the situation in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

We reiterate our call on the Russian Federation to allow expansion of the mandate of the border Observer Mission to all sections of the border that are temporarily not under control of the Ukrainian authorities. We deeply regret that until now the Russian Federation continues to strongly resist it. Such persistent reluctance on the part of Russia can be attributed only to its unchanged intention to continue intervention in Ukraine's Donbas, including by sending heavy weapons, military equipment, regular troops, fighters and mercenaries, sponsoring the terrorist activities on the territory of Ukraine. We continue to urge Russia to cease immediately these internationally wrongful acts.

In this connection, the delegation of Ukraine recalls that Russia has not responded to numerous requests for explanations regarding the presence in the temporarily occupied parts of Donbas of modern Russian weapons and military equipment including the electronic

warfare systems RB-341V 'Leer-3', R-934B 'Sinitsa', RB-636 'Svet-KU', R-330Zh 'Zhitel' and RP-377UVM2 recorded by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.

We call upon the Russian Federation to demonstrate its full commitment to the implementation of the Minsk arrangements in good faith and to allow proper and comprehensive permanent monitoring by the OSCE of the Ukrainian-Russian State border adjacent to the temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with establishment of a security zone in the border areas of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

The delegation of Ukraine requests that this statement be attached to the decision and registered in the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson."

Original: ENGLISH

## INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

By the delegation of Canada:

"Mr. Chairperson,

In connection with the decision of the Permanent Council on the extension of the deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, Canada would like to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the OSCE Rules of Procedure:

Canada strongly believes that a comprehensive and substantial OSCE Observer Mission mandate would include the Russian side of the border adjacent to the Russia-occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. The request for expanding the mandate to all sections of the border that are currently not under control of the Ukrainian authorities has been reiterated several times by participating States, with the exception of one. We regret that the Russian Federation continues to resist an expanded geographical mandate and much needed equipment for the OSCE border observation mission.

As ceasefire and border monitoring are closely interlinked, Canada reiterates the call to allow OSCE monitors the necessary freedom of movement for the implementation of their mandate, with assurances of the SMM's safe and unhindered access to all parts of the border currently not under Ukrainian Government control and the Observer Mission access to the current crossing stations to monitor movements more effectively. We urge the Russian Federation, as part of its Minsk Protocol commitments, to lift all restrictions, which undermine the efficiency of the Mission's monitoring at the 'Gukovo' and 'Donetsk' checkpoints.

Canada requests that this statement be attached to the decision and reflected in the journal of the day.

Thank you."

ENGLISH Original: RUSSIAN

#### INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

By the delegation of the Russian Federation:

"The Russian Federation has joined the consensus regarding the Permanent Council decision on the extension of the mandate of the team of OSCE observers at the two Russian checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk on the Russian-Ukrainian border for four months (until 30 September 2020), viewing the work of this team as a voluntary confidence-building measure outside the context of the fulfilment by the parties to the internal Ukrainian crisis – the Ukrainian Government, Donetsk and Luhansk – of their commitments to reach a settlement.

We reaffirm the immutability of the mandate and the places of work of the team, which were clearly laid down in Permanent Council Decision No. 1130 of 24 July 2014. That decision was based on the invitation made on 14 July 2014 by the Russian Federation in the wake of the Berlin Declaration issued on 2 July 2014 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine. The organizational modalities of their work, which are laid down in the mandate of the team of OSCE observers, do not provide for functional co-operation with OSCE field operations in other States.

The Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 in no way mentions the deployment of OSCE observers on the Russian side of the border with Ukraine. Nor is there any reference to this in the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements adopted on 12 February 2015 and subsequently endorsed by United Nations Security Council resolution 2202. The decision to allow OSCE observers on Russian territory and Ukrainian border guards and customs officers to be present at Russian checkpoints is solely a gesture of goodwill on Russia's part.

I request that this statement be attached to the adopted decision and included in the journal of the day."