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Please find attached the Chairperson's Report and reports of the Working Session Rapporteurs of the 2004 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

2004 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

Vienna, 9 and 10 March 2004

CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY

CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT

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CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT

CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT TO THE
FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION ON THE FOURTEENTH
ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

Vienna, 9 and 10 March 2004

Mr. Chairperson,

As the Chairperson of the closing plenary session of the fourteenth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), held in Vienna on 9 and 10 March 2004, Germany has the honour to report to the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on the proceedings, discussions and results of this Meeting.

In accordance with Chapter XI of the Vienna Document 1999, the Meeting served to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. The agenda and modalities of the fourteenth AIAM were determined in FSC.DEC/1/04. The Meeting consisted of two Working Sessions, each subdivided in two parts. The Meeting's opening plenary session and the working sessions were chaired by Albania, while the closing plenary session was chaired by Germany. For the first time, the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation as well as the Partners for Co-operation were invited to attend the AIAM in full.

1.   Opening plenary meeting: In his introductory statement (FSC.AIAM/33/04), the Chairperson of the opening plenary meeting welcomed the AIAM as an opportunity to discuss all aspects of the implementation of agreed CSBMs as well as of defence policies, military structures, armaments, deployments and activities of participating States. He encouraged delegations to contribute to an open debate on how to strengthen and enhance the implementation of CSBMs. In his statement on the implementation of CSBMs since the thirteenth AIAM held in 2003 (FSC.AIAM/18/04), the current Chairperson of the FSC underlined the importance of the AIAM in enhancing confidence and security in the OSCE area and as a conflict prevention and crisis management tool. The FSC Chairperson highlighted a number of broad areas and specific topics which formed the focus of FSC work during the past year, such as:

—   The FSC contribution to the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, adopted at the Ministerial Council in Maastricht;

—   FSC activities to implement the FSC Roadmap on the Bucharest Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism; in this context the FSC Chairperson recalled, *inter alia*, FSC Decision No. 7/03 on the threat posed by Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS);

—   FSC measures to facilitate the implementation of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, including the OSCE Handbook on Best Practice Guides;

—   The OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition adopted at the Ministerial Council in Maastricht;

— And other measures and developments which enhance the effectiveness of the CSBM acquis. Among those, the FSC Chairperson welcomed the progress achieved in the communications network to which now 47 participating States are connected.

Subsequently, the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) delivered a situation report on the work of the CPC in support of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC.AIAM/20/04). He underlined the efforts undertaken by the CPC to assist participating States in the implementation of agreed CSBMs, such as regularly providing surveys on information exchanges and organizing regional or national seminars and training workshops. The CPC Director expressed his view that increased attention should be paid to assistance so that all participating States can fully participate in the implementation process. He thanked participating States that sent experts to the events organized by the CPC. Also, the CPC Director stated that the increasing number of issues dealt with in the FSC had immediate consequences for the CPC, resulting in a need to reconfigure the FSC support unit as a "Co-operative Security Section" within the CPC.

2.   Working Sessions: The following report on the Working Sessions summarizes key elements which may guide future work in the FSC. More detailed information can be found in the reports of the Working Session rapporteurs (FSC.AIAM/35/04, FSC.AIAM/36/04, FSC.AIAM/37/04/Corr.2, FSC.AIAM/38/04).

In Working Session 1 the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 was discussed. Delegations underscored the continued importance of the Vienna Document in providing a broad-based framework for arms control in the OSCE area. Many delegations expressed their general satisfaction with the implementation of the Vienna Document, even though certain deficits remained. The first part of Working Session 1 focussed on Annual Exchange of Information, Defence Planning, Risk Reduction and Military Activities. *Inter alia*, the following issues were raised:

— Among the proposals relating to the Annual Exchange of Information, the suggestion for the introduction of an electronic exchange of data relating to major weapons and equipment systems was welcomed, as was a proposal for a database of weapons on the delegates' website to be set up by the CPC. Furthermore, there was agreement that the definition of air combat units following reassignment to air forces should be discussed, as well as the incorporation of advances in technology and increased military potentials. Also, on the basis of an earlier initiative taken by the FSC Chair, a need was identified to make full use of the reminding mechanism and to explore ways of formalizing future action;

— On Defence Planning information, delegations agreed on the importance of timely submission within three months of approval of the military budget. However, delegations were unable to reach agreement on a standardized format for this purpose. Also on Defence Planning, the possible benefits of long-term analyses of military expenditure were generally recognized. The idea of holding a military doctrines seminar was supported by some delegations;

— The discussions on Military Activities, comprising prior notification, observation of certain military activities and annual calendars, focussed, *inter alia*, on different

perceptions of the decline in notifications of military activities. Several delegations believed that this was the result of shifts in threats and military strategies. They called for a reduction in thresholds in order to increase transparency. Other delegations held that fewer notifications demonstrated the success of the Vienna Document. It was advocated by some delegations to increase voluntary measures, although limited funds could make this difficult for some participating States.

The second part of Working Session 1 focussed on contacts, evaluation and inspection. Delegations expressed their appreciation for the high degree of co-operation and professionalism displayed in implementing the respective provisions of the Vienna Document. Among a variety of implementation issues, the following were raised:

— Some delegations stated that the interest in military contacts seemed to be declining. In order to improve participation, it was offered to discuss a number of options such as the elaboration of general guidelines for visits; submission of a written report at the end of the visit; invitation of Partners for Co-operation; sending nil-reports if a participating State does not intend to participate; increasing the number of visitors, or joint invitations by neighbouring States;

— It was also stated that the significant reduction of the number of units of armed forces in the OSCE area decreases the possibilities available for implementing the Vienna Document evaluation and inspection regime. Several measures were discussed for improvement:

— To increase the number of passive quotas, of inspectors and the evaluation time;

— To allow the use of a helicopter belonging to the inspecting State;

— A more balanced distribution of inspections;

— To count interpreters as auxiliary personnel;

— To provide comprehensive explanation of "force majeure" and "stationed forces".

— One delegation complained about the so-called "quota race". This could create logistical problems and a situation where annual quotas were exhausted at an early stage;

— An intensive but inconclusive discussion centred on issues such as limited possibility to count announced weapons and systems during evaluation visits, timely submission of signed and counter-signed inspection reports, still existing transit and immigration problems of the verification teams, introduction of digital cameras and GPS, limited possibilities to inspect units, and refused briefings during recent inspections.

3. Working session 2 was dedicated to discussing the operation and implementation of other FSC-agreed measures and documents. Delegations welcomed the ongoing expansion of the FSC toolkit, while noting that there is still room for improvement in the implementation

of some commitments. The <u>first part of Working Session 2</u> focussed on regional measures and the OSCE Communications Network:

— With regard to bilateral and regional agreements, delegations provided information on activities as compiled in the updated CPC overview (FSC.GAL/20/04). Delegations agreed that these agreements promote the principles of transparency, mutual confidence and co-operation between participating States. It was pointed out that the application of such complementary confidence-building measures in the OSCE region can serve as a link between national security policies and the OSCE-wide system of collective security. It was recommended to address this issue with the Mediterranean and Asian Partners. The possible role for OSCE missions and field operations in the promotion of regional measures remained inconclusive;

— On the OSCE Communications Network, delegations welcomed that as of March 2004, 47 out of 55 participating States were connected and that the INA (Integrated Notification Application) software had been fielded in. Several delegations thanked the CPC, the OSCE missions and participating States that had assisted in the procedure. It was proposed that participating States which are not yet connected should turn to the FSC and provide information about their needs in order to obtain assistance. Support was expressed for a survey to assess training needs.

The <u>second half of Working Session 2</u> was dedicated to further FSC-agreed measures and documents. Delegations noted with satisfaction the operation and application of these documents and welcomed recent steps to expand the existing toolkit. In this regard, the ongoing work on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and the requests for assistance received pursuant to the Document on Conventional Ammunition were highlighted. On the other hand, it was deplored that some participating States fail to submit relevant information as provided in the respective documents. As a possible remedy the suggestion was made that CPC provide a handbook which would contain a survey of deadlines together with the pertinent documents. *Inter alia*, the following other issues were raised:

— With regard to the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspect of Security, some delegations informed on implementation activities and their readiness to share their experience in implementing the Code by sending training teams or by organizing seminars. A possible role of the OSCE field missions was also suggested;

— With regard to the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, FSC efforts to elaborate standard elements for end-user certificates were welcomed, as were recent initiatives concerning MANPADS. One delegation announced an initiative to elaborate OSCE principles on the control of brokering in SALW. The progress achieved with regard to the request for assistance submitted by one participating State was noted with satisfaction. One delegation drew attention to the problems arising during the assessment of information exchanges, that is, discrepancies in understanding definitions, inconsistencies in export and import figures, and errors in registration and accounting. Also, it was suggested to consider how to operationalize the implementation of the OSCE Handbook on SALW Best Practice Guides;

— With regard to the Principles governing Conventional Arms Transfers, it was suggested to revitalize the discussion on the information exchange. In this context,

one delegation drew attention to the agreement to exchange information on national laws, practices and co-operation with international non-proliferation regimes;

— With regard to CSBM information exchanges in general, it was suggested to conduct joint analyses of the returns in the FSC. However, another delegation argued that this should remain the prerogative of each State.

4. Closing plenary session: In the closing plenary session, the four rapporteurs delivered their reports on the proceedings and outcomes of the working sessions. Subsequently, several delegations expressed their views on the format of rapporteurs' reports. While some expressed a preference for short oral summary reports to be complemented by more detailed written reports, other delegations expressed a preference for full-length oral reports identical with the written versions. Delegations agreed that all reports should be consistent in the way that references are made to the interventions made by delegations.

The Chairperson of the concluding plenary session summarized that the exchange of views during the fourteenth AIAM was efficient, frank, comprehensive, co-operative and open-minded. He stated that delegations had actively seized the opportunity to assess the implementation of the politico-military acquis of the OSCE and to identify the issues that needed to be further addressed. He appealed to delegations to follow up to their proposals as work in the FSC progresses and requested CPC to compile and distribute the suggestions made during this AIAM as a basis for further discussion in the FSC. In closing, the Chairperson expressed his appreciation to the Mediterranean Partners and Partners for Co-operation for their interest to participate in this meeting in full. He also thanked the current FSC Chair, Albania as the Chair of the opening plenary session and the working sessions, the co-ordinators and rapporteurs of the working sessions and the CPC for their contributions, as well as interpreters and conference services for their dedicated work. Finally, it was agreed that the fifteenth AIAM will be held in the first half of March 2005, with the exact date, agenda and modalities to be determined by the FSC in due course.

Before the meeting was concluded, one delegation appealed to all delegations to vigorously pursue the initiatives suggested with regard to new CSBMs, stating that this had not been the case in recent years. The delegation recalled that adapting existing tools and creating new tools where necessary is envisaged in the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century as a task for the FSC.

Mr. Chairperson, this is a synopsis of the two days of discussion at the fourteenth AIAM. More detailed information can be found in the documents referred to in this report.

REPORTS OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEURS

WORKING SESSION 1
Part A

Tuesday, 9 March 2004

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

— Annual exchange of military information

— Defence planning

— Risk reduction

— Military activities

    (i) Prior notification of certain military activities
    (ii) Annual calendars
    (iii) Constraining provisions
    (iv) Observation of certain military activities

Introduction

In his opening remarks, the Co-ordinator, Colonel Anders Gardberg, invited the participants to follow the broad outline of debate put forward in his Food-for-Thought paper (FSC.AIAM/7/04). He urged them to focus primarily on implementation issues and to consider possible amendments to existing instruments.

1. Annual exchange of military information

One delegation recalled the suggestion for the introduction of an electronic exchange of data relating to major weapons and equipment systems. Several delegations welcomed the proposal, and one suggested that, in addition, the CPC could set up a database of weapons on the delegates' website. That suggestion also received support.

Several delegations raised concerns about gaps in implementation and, specifically mentioned the possibility of improving the reminding mechanism to tighten procedures. Delegations applauded the proactive measures taken by the previous FSC Chairperson in making direct contact with delegations whose notifications were late or incomplete and exploring their difficulties. Several delegations welcomed the suggestion that the FSC Chairperson, with the support of the CPC, should make full use of the reminding mechanism, and referred to the need to explore ways of formalizing future action.

One delegation cautioned that problems had arisen in the definition of air combat units following reassignment to air forces (FSC.AIAM/3/04), and called for further discussion of the matter. There was general agreement that this anomaly should be discussed further in the FSC.

One delegation suggested that the exchange of information had become less relevant because it lagged behind advances in technology and the increased military potential of participating States. It had expanded its views in a Food-for-Thought paper (FSC.AIAM/23/04). It therefore did not envisage the need to reopen Vienna Document 1999 and voiced a request for discussion of the issue in the FSC, in order to consider the way forward.

2. Defence planning

An important aspect of the discussion was the need for timely submission of defence planning information. Several delegations stressed the importance of that information and the need for it to be submitted within three months of approval of the military budget. While there was general agreement on the importance of that deadline, delegations were unable to reach firm conclusions as to how to monitor or impose it.

On the same subject, there was debate on whether a standardized format should be used for the submission of defence planning information. Most delegations did not see the need for such a format, since the Vienna Document was quite specific as to information requirements. One delegation suggested broad headings for defence planning presentations and said that it would be using those headings in a forthcoming presentation. Several delegations considered that this might be useful.

The delegations discussed the benefits of long-term analyses of military expenditure prepared by experts. Several delegations favoured that approach. However, the financial implications were looked upon as a possible barrier. One delegation floated the idea that the FSC might analyse the data itself with the help of the CPC and then distribute tasks among delegations.

The Co-ordinator advanced the idea of holding a military doctrines seminar, and two delegations believed that this would be beneficial.

3. Risk reduction

There were no interventions on this topic.

4. Prior notification of certain military activities; observation of certain military activities; and annual calendars

The above subjects were combined and debated together. The discussions focussed on different perceptions of the sharp decline in notifications of military activities. There was broad agreement that the reason for the decline was that participating States' activities remained within the thresholds, but there were different views as to whether or not that was a matter for concern.

Several delegations believed that the decline in notifications was a result of shifts in threats and military strategies. Transparency had suffered as a result. Those delegations called for a reduction in thresholds in order to increase evaluation activity and transparency,

without the need to reopen the Document. Other delegations did not agree that transparency was at risk, since fewer notifications demonstrated the success of the Vienna Document.

Among the delegations that did not support a reduction in thresholds were those that advocated increased voluntary measures. Those delegations argued that the Vienna Document was versatile enough to afford many opportunities for participating States to take voluntary measures to increase transparency. One delegation highlighted its intention to voluntarily invite 200 observers on exercises in 2004, but another delegation responded that limited funds would make that difficult for many participating States. In conclusion, one delegation suggested that the FSC should seek a completely new approach to the problem.

Conclusions

The working session was characterized by a desire among delegations to engage in constructive discussion, to seriously explore each other's concerns and to find the best ways of enhancing implementation. The Co-ordinator closed the session by reminding delegations to turn their ideas into substantive suggestions for discussion in the FSC.

WORKING SESSION 1
Part B

Tuesday, 9 March 2004

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

—   Contacts

—   Inspection

—   Evaluation

Introduction

The working session on contacts, inspection and evaluation was co-ordinated by Brigadier Georg Aminoff, Military Adviser in the Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the OSCE; the rapporteur was Captain Thomas Schmidt, Switzerland. The co-ordinator based his introduction on his working paper FSC.AIAM/6/04, raising pertinent questions and encouraging the delegations to offer factual contributions. He recalled the leftovers from 2003 and the need to clarify the implementation practice in these areas.

1.   Contacts

The co-ordinator recalled the data on visits in 2003 to air bases (seven in 2003, three announced for 2004), military contacts (military facilities: six in 2003, two announced for 2004; observation visits: four in 2003, one announced for 2004), military co-operation, demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems (two in 2003, one announced for 2004) as shown in his working paper. He stressed that a visit to an air base in one participating State had not been attended as numerously as expected. Generally the interest in such visits seemed to be lessening, and it would be necessary to determine the reasons for such an evolution.

One delegation declared that it had attended and organized many contact activities in 2003 and drew a positive picture that reflected interest in learning more about the organization of other armed forces. However, the same delegation regretted the absence of general guidelines which would provide minimal standards for contacts. Further, a report similar to those on inspections and evaluations should be written. The same delegation suggested that the report could be prepared by an outsider, as it would then be more neutral than if done by the visited participating State. Confirming the statement of the co-ordinator, the delegation expressed its frustration about the fading interest in contact activities. With a view to strengthening confidence and transparency, one Partner for Co-operation (Afghanistan) had been invited for the first time in 2003 to a contact activity.

One delegation reminded the group that a procedure for such reporting existed already (VD 99, paragraph 29/30.6): the visitors meet, reach a consensus and present an oral report to the host participating State. Written documentation and distribution might usefully constitute the next step.

Some delegations supported the initiative to invite Partners for Co-operation and encouraged other participating States to do likewise as a concrete measure within the outreach framework.

One delegation noted that smaller participating States suffered heavy financial burdens as a result of contact activities, thereby identifying a possible reason for the lack of participation; the cost factor could in some instances make it difficult to foster interest in these activities. The same delegation proposed that a participating State not intending to participate should answer immediately with a negative reply in order to allow better planning and organization of contacts. The delegation stressed that VD 99, paragraph 19, contained guidelines for airbase visits and emphasized that shopping centres, child-care centres and so on were not part of the core facilities to be inspected. Therefore, a best practice guide on contact activities should be established.

Another delegation noted a trend towards lower participation in contacts and a decline in the competence of the participants. The same delegation referred to a proposal made during the AIAM 2003 (FSC.AIAM/7/03), suggesting certain guidelines with regard to the structure of such a demonstration. Generally, contacts should not be used as promotional activities (e.g., exposition of the weapon industry, of SALW, etc.) but should stick strictly to the measure as set out in VD 99.

One delegation underlined again the costs of participation (travel arrangements, accommodation, etc.) and put forward the possibility that neighbouring participating States could organize common visits (co-ordination of timing, transport, etc.) in order to lower expenditures for the participants.

The question was discussed whether increasing the number of visitors would improve the quality of participation. Several delegations thought not and recommended keeping the limit of two visitors.

Another delegation mentioned that one reason for the decreasing interest lay in the fact that a large fraction of the participating States had joined NATO. NATO members would not feel any urge to visit, evaluate and inspect other NATO members just to see and count what they already knew about.

A delegation referred to a visit of four newly appointed heads of verification as being very valuable, since it offered the possibility of discussing implementation issues in a "free atmosphere without the need for competition".

2.   Inspection/Evaluation

The co-ordinator invited the delegations to report on their experience and to formulate further proposals for improving compliance with the VD 99 as well as the quality of inspections/evaluations.

One delegation noted a trend towards a significant reduction of the number of units due to the reforms of armed forces in the OSCE area, a trend that decreased the possibilities available for carrying out evaluations. Three measures could improve the situation:

— Increase the number of passive quotas from one evaluation per 60 units to, say, 40 units.

— Increase of the number of inspectors to five, avoiding polemics concerning interpreters and allowing integration of inspectors from other participating States.

— Increase the evaluation time from 12 to 24 hours to improve the quality of an evaluation (one problem being long distances between the units to be evaluated).

No delegation opposed the suggestion regarding increase of passive quotas. Nevertheless, some delegations expressed doubts concerning the efficiency of such a measure. One delegation rejected the proposal to increase the number of inspectors. Another delegation rejected the increase of evaluation time.

One delegation expressed its satisfaction, that, after the AIAM 2003, progress in implementing the agreed measures had been made. Nevertheless, pressure should be brought to bear on those participating States that were not willing to comply and thereby damaged the credibility of the VD 99. The same delegation favoured creating a list of points of entry (POE) yearly updated in notification form. Also, the inspected State should allow the use of a helicopter belonging to the inspecting State if unable to provide one of its own. If necessary, the inspecting State should cover the cost of the fuel needed for overflight using a helicopter of the inspected State.

Another delegation proposed that the VD 99 should be updated in the light of improvements in the implementation of inspections. This could serve as a model for a "modernized VD 99", which would not be redrafted but only adjusted and supplemented. Propositions for update: exhaustive explanation of force majeure, stationed forces, more balanced distribution of inspections.

One delegation justified the denial of an inspection in February 2004 by invoking insufficient security of the inspection team, which could have been the target of a terrorist attack within the specified area. Two other delegations offered thanks for the explanation of this denial. Further, the VD 99 did not specify a procedure regarding the nature of information to be provided in case of force majeure. Therefore, a common understanding of the notion of force majeure should be agreed upon in FSC Working Group A, followed by the development of a mechanism in Working Group B. Another delegation said that adducing *force majeure* could be a legitimate argument, but should not be used as a pretext to delay an inspection forever.

One delegation introduced an FFT (FSC.AIAM/4/04) proposing that interpreters should be considered as auxiliary personnel not included in the inspection/evaluation team. In an evaluation team of three (two nationals and one guest), the interpreter would otherwise replace one inspector, thereby decreasing the efficiency of the team. In the case of an inspection team of four, the team could not be split if necessary into subteams. Also, there

should be more than one interpreter attached to an inspecting team, because a single interpreter could not work 12 hours non-stop. The question was also raised whether the inspected State, the inspecting State or both should be entitled to provide interpreters.

Many delegations supported the aforementioned FFT. One delegation emphasized its agreement with the principle that inspectors as well as interpreters should be increased and that interpreters should be considered as auxiliary personnel. However, if inspecting States sent more than one supplementary person, they should cover the additional expenditure. Another delegation suggested that participating States bringing interpreters should pay for those a symbolic amount, for example 120 euros.

Some delegations stressed that during evaluation visits they were not always able to count the announced weapons and systems. Another delegation replied that visiting an installation and getting a detailed briefing would be much more important than counting. Yet another delegation mentioned that "seeing" the major weapon systems did not necessarily mean "counting" them.

Many delegations favoured the introduction of digital cameras and GPS. The VD 99 did not specify a particular type of camera, so the use of any existing type of camera should be allowed. With ongoing technical progress, the means of inspection should be adapted. The reason put forward for GPS use lay in its precision, giving a better overview of the specified area. A few delegations strongly opposed the use of GPS as well as of digital cameras, stating that conventional techniques were largely sufficient to for correct implementation of the VD 99.

Some delegations insisted that inspection reports should be delivered no more than 14 days after the end of the inspection, emphasizing that an improvement of quality and objectivity (no changes or false compromise) of the reports was clearly needed. One delegation proposed that the inspection report should be signed and counter-signed.

One delegation remarked that although the transit of inspecting teams had been facilitated, problems concerning the immigration of the teams persisted. Often, immigration officers were not informed about the arrival of a team. A liaison officer should take care of the inspectors already before passport control and inform the immigration services.

Another delegation complained again — as in the past year — about the quota race and the related logistical problems and asked for understanding on the part of the participating States. Furthermore, the participating States were requested kindly not to send a request on a public holiday (published by the OSCE). One delegation warned that the triggering of "unnecessary" inspections should not be exaggerated. This could lead to an exhaustion of quota and the inspection would fail in its main function, creating a situation where there were no quotas left when an inspection really was well motivated.

One delegation called attention to the fact that during recent inspections some units could not be inspected and that briefings had been refused. That showed the need to seek a common understanding of VD 99 art. 82 and art. 98.

Announcements
(in order of occurrence)

— Spain will organize three events in the Madrid area from 26 to 29 April 2004:

— Visit to Torrejón air base
— Visit to the army aviation unit (land forces)
— Presentation of recently introduced weapon systems (e.g., Eurofighter 2000).

The partners of the Mediterranean dialogue will be invited.

— Germany will organize a visit to an airbase and a military installation. To be decided.

— The Czech Republic will organize three events from 20 to 24 September 2004:

— Visit to 21 Airbase Čáslav
— Visit to the 13th Artillery Brigade Jince
— Demonstration of the equipment system BMP-1 MPP-40p.

WORKING SESSION 2
Part A

Wednesday, 10 March 2004

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

— Regional measures

— Communications Network

Mr. James Cox, of the United States delegation, co-ordinated the first part of the session, and Mr. Ricardo Mor, of the Spanish delegation, was the rapporteur.

1. Regional measures

Introduction

The Co-ordinator opened the session by presenting his food-for-thought paper, which had been circulated ahead of time, and proposing topics for discussion, such as the future of regional measures and the enhancement of security from the point of view of participants; the potential applicability of such measures between OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation, and between OSCE States and others; the promotion of regional measures as a component of conflict prevention and increased transparency in subregions where they did not exist; and such other regional measures as delegations might wish to address.

He also mentioned the updated overview of regional and bilateral agreements and initiatives in respect of CSBMs and other specific security issues related to the OSCE area prepared by the CPC as a useful compendium of many such existing agreements.

On the basis of a report by the CPC, he informed the meeting that, in 2003, 15 inspections and 26 evaluation visits had taken place pursuant to regional measures or bilateral agreements.

Discussion

Four delegations provided information about new bilateral and multilateral agreements involving CSBMs in accordance with the Vienna Document 1999 in the regions of the Baltic, central Europe, south-eastern Europe and the Black Sea. Those delegations stressed how satisfied they were with the implementation of the agreements, which indicated that the activities concerned were effective tools for the promotion of the principles of transparency, mutual confidence and co-operation between participating States.

Concerning the future of regional measures, one delegation pointed out how important it was to complement national security policies with the application of such confidence-building measures in the OSCE region. Another delegation supported that

approach and stressed that the updated overview prepared by the CPC showed that the system worked and that participating States considered the agreements on regional measures to be an important security framework.

With respect to the potential applicability of regional measures between the OSCE participating States and the Partners for Co-operation, one delegation proposed that the Chairperson should address the questions posed by the Co-ordinator to the Mediterranean and Asian Partners in order to obtain their views. That proposal was supported by another delegation.

One delegation asked about a possible role for the OSCE field missions in the promotion of regional measures in the States in which their offices were located. Another delegation supported that idea. One delegation, however, replied that the possibility of work by the field missions in that respect should be looked upon with caution, particularly in conflict areas where an involvement of the OSCE offices in regional measures would probably not be useful.

One delegation recalled the discussion in Working Session 1 concerning the voluntary prior notification of certain military activities and pointed out that, on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements, such voluntary measures could have multiplied positive effects between States.

Conclusions

There was general agreement that the regional measures complemented OSCE-wide CSBMs, and that they contributed to transparency and co-operation between States. The announcements of new regional measures made by several delegations showed that regional and bilateral agreements were useful tools for security-building, and that there was still room for other options and initiatives. Vision was needed to address the possible role of OSCE field missions in the promotion of regional measures and the applicability of CSBMs between OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

2.   Communications Network

Introduction

The Co-ordinator recalled that an Internet-based system using INA (Integrated Notification Application) software had been fielded in 2003. By the end of the year, 47 of the 55 participating States had been connected. One topic proposed for discussion concerned the steps that could be taken to ensure that all 55 participating States could be connected in 2004. Other issues suggested related to the participating States' assessment of the new communications system, management responsibilities and implementation and training needs for the Network.

Discussion

Two delegations provided information about their completion of the activities involved in joining the Network in 2003, and both stressed the benefits of the connection in terms of speed, security and low budgetary requirements. They thanked the CPC, the OSCE missions involved and other participating States that had assisted them in the whole procedure. The same two delegations had recommended to those remaining participating States that were not yet connected to take the necessary steps to complete the process. It was pointed out that the Network was itself a CSBM. That fact was also noted by other delegations in their statements.

One delegation pointed out that, since the Network served as a complementary diplomatic channel, its integrity required special attention in terms of protection and security. That view was supported by the Co-ordinator and other delegations. In that connection, the CPC noted that the problems with the connections were currently being solved much faster than in the past because the Network's capacities had been improved in terms of security and rapid reaction. Status reports were being generated daily.

One delegation recalled that, during the Communications Group (CG) meeting in December 2003, it had been noted that the OSCE would assume full responsibility for the Integrated Notification Application (INA) software of the Communications Network in the near future. That delegation had agreed to take the lead in establishing an informal working group with three more delegations to survey training requirements. The attention of the participants was drawn to the survey on comprehensive OSCE Communications Network training attached to document FSC.DEL/69/04, and the participating States were requested to complete and return it no later than 1 April 2004. Another delegation expressed support for the survey and requested that its results should be distributed so that all the participating States could assess the actual capacities for training and future options with regard to resources and organization. There was general agreement that the survey can be very useful for the development of the Network as a whole.

Several delegations proposed that Network Management Team responsibilities should be reviewed. A new assessment of the current NMT responsibilities was needed, and one delegation indicated that that message should be conveyed to the FSC so that the Communications Group would take the initiative on the matter.

One delegation asked about the specific problems of the remaining participating States that were not yet connected. The Co-ordinator proposed that those participating States should turn to the FSC and provide information about their needs in order to obtain assistance.

Finally, it was recalled that the CPC reported regularly (every two months) on the development and functioning of the Network. The CPC had also assisted several participating States in the year 2003, including assistance provided over a telephone line in co-operation with other donor participating States and the field missions.

Conclusions

There was general agreement that the OSCE Communications Network, with its Internet-based system using INA software, had acquired an added value, and that the Network itself was a valuable confidence-building measure contributing to enhanced transparency. Strong support was expressed for the survey to assess training needs in respect of the OSCE Communications Network, and it was emphasized that all the remaining participating States should join the Network in the current year. The need to review the current responsibilities of the Network Management Team in order to take the appropriate steps concerning future tasks was also stressed.

WORKING SESSION 2
Part B

Wednesday, 10 March 2004

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

— Principles governing conventional arms transfers

— Principles governing non-proliferation

— Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations

— Global Exchange of Military Information

— Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines

— Questionnaire on the Process of Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

— Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

— Small arms and light weapons

— Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition

The session was co-ordinated by Dr. Heinz Vetschera of Austria, and Mr. Vasily Pavlov of Belarus was the rapporteur.

The Co-ordinator opened the session by giving a short overview of his perception paper (FSC.AIAM/27/04) and called upon the delegations to concentrate on identifying shortcomings and problems in the implementation of the documents rather than suggesting amendments, changes or improvements to them. He also encouraged participating States to identify problems by themselves or refer to possible gaps in the record regarding implementation of the particular document by other States and ask for clarification/explanation of the reasons.

Principles governing conventional arms transfers

One delegation presented "food-for-thought" paper (FSC.AIAM/05/04) concerning the reactivation of verification and implementation assessment mechanisms with regard to conventional arms transfers, arguing that the FSC decisions on the review of the Document on Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers were not being applied in the same way. An annual review meeting on the information exchange exercise and on the questionnaire, as well as the deliberations in FSC Working Group A should be used to that end.

The proposal attracted general support by the delegations, which acknowledged that the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers were a valuable tool to prevent unauthorized access to weapons.

One delegation provided information on the practice of preparing its national report on export controls and arms transfers, and suggested that the report should be presented at the FSC's Security Dialogue with a view to intensifying the dialogue on the issue.

One delegation stressed the importance of revitalizing the discussion on all the existing documents while devoting greater attention to the information exchange on conventional arms transfers, which was turning into a mere exchange of papers, without analysis of substance.

Principles governing non-proliferation

One delegation emphasized that the participating States had agreed to exchange information on national laws and practices, as well as on co-operation with international non-proliferation regimes. And that understanding had not been fulfilled.

Another delegation drew attention to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which represented a first step towards concluding a legally binding document in that field.

Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations

There were no speakers on the subject.

Global Exchange of Military Information

The co-ordinator called upon the delegations to share their views on identifying the problems in implementing the GEMI mechanism.

One delegation stated that some States failed to submit information in digital format, in accordance with the relevant FSC decision, and urged those States to rectify their practices. It also suggested developing a standard format for the submission of digital information.

Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines

The co-ordinator stressed the importance of focussing on the implementation of the existing questionnaire, and not on an updated draft, which was to be discussed in the FSC.

One delegation suggested several improvements to the implementation process: to encourage electronic submission of replies to the Questionnaire and to provide courtesy translation to the CPC; to make the information available to the public and NGOs for constructive comments; and to authorize the CPC to circulate the information.

Another delegation drew attention to the fact that 10 States had failed to provide the prescribed information, and to the need to determine why that was the case. The delegation

also underscored the value of the workshop on anti-personnel landmines and the food-for-thought paper on updating the Questionnaire, noting that it would help to facilitate and strengthen the discussion on the issue.

Questionnaire on the Process of Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

With a view to eliminating an unnecessary administrative burden, one delegation suggested that those States that had completed the process of the Chemical Weapons Convention ratification should not be required to provide annual information, and that the CPC should update the information submitted earlier.

Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (CoC)

One delegation stressed the significant military reform that was being carried out in its country. That included amendments to the national legislation. OSCE assistance in that area was also appreciated. Other delegations described activities in implementation of the CoC taking the form of seminars on parliamentary control over the armed forces that had been conducted with OSCE assistance. Two delegations stated their readiness to share their experience in implementing the CoC, either by sending out a training team, or by organizing annual seminars devoted to it and to international humanitarian law.

A possible role of the OSCE field missions was also referred to.

One delegation suggested a standardized format for the first question of the Questionnaire that would bring it into conformity with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee's Questionnaire and eliminate additional administrative burden. That suggestion was supported by another delegation which suggested that, in the absence of new information, no answer should be required.

Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

One delegation provided clarifications as to the reason for the delay in submission of its national information on SALW for 2003.

One delegation drew attention to the need to ensure control of illicit trade in SALW. In that respect, it underscored the importance of the FSC's efforts in the area of end-user certificates that could fill the gaps in that area. It also welcomed the efforts with regard to MANPADS, as well as the idea of adopting the Wassenaar Arrangement "Best Practices for Export Controls".

One delegation suggested considering the possibility of conducting a review of the OSCE Document on SALW. The view was expressed that that might be considered, but an adequate justification would be required. A review should not be conducted just for its own sake.

Another delegation stressed the importance of the adoption of Best Practice Guides (BPGs) in 2003, and suggested that an information exchange should be conducted on the implementation of BPGs in the participating States.

One delegation touched on the food-for-thought on brokering, and said that the model OSCE principles to control brokering activity would soon be submitted to the FSC.

One delegation drew attention to the problems coming to light during the assessment of information exchanges, namely, differing understandings of the definition of SALW, inconsistencies in export and import data and errors in registration and accounting.

Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition

One delegation informed the FSC about its request for assistance in accordance with the Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition. The statement was corroborated by the delegation that co-ordinated activities in that area.

Another delegation announced that it had submitted a request for assistance of the same kind, and would welcome the help of other OSCE participating States.

One delegation suggested that the CPC should provide a handbook which would contain a summary of deadlines together with the documents. That would serve to increase the effectiveness of reporting and implementation. The delegation also suggested that a joint analysis of information exchanges on CSBMs should be conducted by the delegations that had adequate potential and human resources for the purpose. Some delegations, however, argued that it should be the prerogative of each State to conduct such research.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation

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412th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 418, Agenda item 3

DECISION No. 1/04
AGENDA AND MODALITIES OF THE FOURTEENTH
ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

9 and 10 March 2004

Vienna Document 1999:

(148)   The participating States will hold each year a meeting to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed CSBMs. Discussion may extend to:

(148.1)   —   Clarification of questions arising from such implementation;

(148.2)   —   operation of agreed measures, including the use of additional equipment during inspections and evaluation visits;

(148.3)   —   implications of all information originating from the implementation of any agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building in the framework of the OSCE.

I. Agenda and indicative timetable

Tuesday, 9 March 2004

10–10.45 a.m.	Opening plenary meeting

— Opening of the meeting by the Chairperson;
— Remarks by the Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation;
— Situation report by the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).

10.45 a.m. – 6 p.m. (to be continued, if needed)	Working Session 1: Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999: clarification, assessment and conclusions

— Annual exchange of military information;

— Defence planning;
— Risk reduction;
— Military activities:
  (i) Prior notification of certain military activities;
  (ii) Annual calendars;
  (iii) Constraining provisions;
  (iv) Observation of certain military activities;
— Contacts;
— Evaluation;
— Inspection.

1–3 p.m.   Lunch break

Wednesday, 10 March 2004

10 a.m. – 4.30 p.m.   Working Session 2: Operation and implementation of other
(continuation of   FSC-agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and
Working Session 1,   conclusions
if needed)

— Regional measures;
— Communications network;
— Principles governing conventional arms transfers;
— Principles governing non-proliferation;
— Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations;
— Global exchange of military information;
— Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines;
— Questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
— Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;
— OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons;
— OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition.

5–6 p.m.   Closing plenary meeting

— Working sessions reports;
— Discussion;
— Concluding remarks;
— Date of the 2005 AIAM;
— Closure.

1–3 p.m.   Lunch break

II. Organizational modalities

1.   The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) will last two days and will be organized in the form of opening and closing plenary meetings together with working sessions dealing with all the topics contained in the agenda (I). The indicative timetable provides more detail.

2.   The organizational meeting of chairpersons, co-ordinators, rapporteurs, and the CPC will be held on 8 March 2004 at 3 p.m. The working hours of the AIAM will be 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 3 to 6 p.m.

3.   Interpretation into the OSCE official languages will be provided.

4.   The meeting will be chaired by participating States, in rotation in accordance with the French alphabetical order, following on from the chairing of the closing plenary meeting of the 2003 AIAM by Ukraine. The chair of the opening plenary meeting and working sessions will be held by Albania, while the chair of the closing plenary meeting will be held by Germany.

5.   Debates in the working sessions will be oriented to problems and solutions and there will be no formal statements. Possible national statements for the opening plenary should only be presented in written form and are to be distributed in advance. The working sessions are designed to be very informal meetings of national experts with the objectives of answering questions, exchanging information and allowing for constructive debate between participating States. Delegations are strongly encouraged to provide detailed explanations and concrete examples of their own implementation experiences. Delegations are welcome to distribute written contributions in advance of the meeting, both on agenda points and on related matters for possible discussion. All delegations are strongly encouraged to provide national experts to participate in the AIAM.

6.   The CPC will circulate the revised Annual Survey on CSBM Information Exchanged and the AIAM 2003 Survey of Suggestions by the middle of February. These will serve as a basis for preparatory work by delegations and co-ordinators.

7.   Each working session will have one designated co-ordinator and one rapporteur. The task of the co-ordinators will be to facilitate the discussion, while the task of the rapporteurs will be to present an oral report to the closing plenary meeting.

8.   The co-ordinators will circulate a list of topics and questions for facilitating the discussion in their working sessions. They will be supported by the CPC in this regard. They will ensure that all relevant areas are addressed.

9.   During the first part of the closing plenary meeting, the rapporteur from each working session will give an oral report to the delegates on the issues that were addressed during the working session. This report should include problem areas, improvements in implementation accomplished by OSCE participating States, suggestions for further improvement, and any

other relevant information. After each oral report, the rapporteur will answer questions. Delegations are encouraged to comment on or add to the reports presented by the rapporteurs.

10.   Delegations with volunteers for co-ordinators or/and rapporteurs for the working sessions should provide the names of the individuals and working session to the Chairperson of the FSC as soon as possible, but not later than 6 February 2004. The names of the co-ordinators and rapporteurs for each working session will be made known to all delegations not later than 13 February 2004.

11.   During the first FSC plenary meeting following the AIAM, the chairperson of the closing plenary meeting will report on the AIAM to the FSC. Not later than 8 April 2004, the CPC will provide a written report of suggestions made during the meeting aimed at improving the implementation of CSBMs.

12.   The recommended approach, to ensure the most productive discussion in the FSC as participating States consider, as required, suggestions made during the meeting aiming at the improvement of the implementation of CSBMs, is for delegations to bring forward suggestions or topics of interest by means of food-for-thought papers. Discussions on initial papers could lead to further work in the FSC.

13.   The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Partners for Co-operation (Afghanistan, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand) are invited to attend all meetings of the 2004 AIAM.