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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

**Best Practice Guide
on National Procedures for
Stockpile Management and Security
of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

*) Corr.1 due to change of distribution status only, text remains unchanged

**BEST PRACTICE GUIDE ON
NATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY
of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

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This Guide was originally drafted by the governments of Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The review and update process of the Guide was led by the United Kingdom.

I. Introduction

1. Aim

The aim of this best practice guide (BPG) is to provide guidance for the effective management and security of national Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) stockpiles. This guide is intended to help establish high common standards and serve as the basis for the development, application and facilitation of further national standards in the field of improving national stockpile management and security.

The OSCE participating States (pS) recognize that proper national control over their stockpiles of SALW (including any stockpiles of decommissioned or deactivated weapons) is essential in order to prevent loss through theft, corruption and neglect. To that end, they agree to ensure that their own stockpiles are subject to proper national inventory accounting and control procedures and measures.

Although not binding in nature, this BPG helps to establish a common understanding of vital aspects of SALW Stockpile Management and Security amongst all 57 OSCE participating States and lays the ground for further practical OSCE assistance in this area for interested States.

2. Scope

This BPG deals only with SALW as categorized by the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (OSCE, 2012)¹.

For the purpose of this BPG *Stockpile Management of weapons* is the term used to describe those procedures and activities that are necessary for the safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation and handling of SALW, namely referred to as *Safety*; whereas *Security* describes the situation in which the risk of intentional harm has been reduced to a tolerable level, e.g., by decreasing illegal proliferation of SALW.

The OSCE BPG aim to provide guidance on all stages of the life of SALW or ammunition from manufacture, to stockpile management including accounting, storage, transportation and security, through to destruction, deactivation or legal transfer by sale, gift or loan. The scope of the guide is to elaborate a methodology for the development of policy and general operational guidelines and procedures on all aspects of SALW stockpile management and security procedures.

¹ FSC.DOC/1/00/Rev.1, 20 June 2012: According to the OSCE Document, small arms and light weapons are man-portable weapons made or modified to military specification for use as lethal instruments of war. Small arms are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by individual members of military and security forces. They include revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns. Light weapons are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by several members of military and security forces serving as a crew. They include heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of calibres less than 100mm. This categorization excludes ammunition.

The SALW sub-category of Man-Portable-Air-Defense-Systems (MANPADS) is covered by a single BPG reflecting the special procedures needed for their duty and care, including destruction methods.

Ammunition for SALW as well as combined ammunition and SALW storage sites are not a main feature of this guide, except in relation to their potential storage and transportation with SALW. Guidance on ammunition storage may be found in the OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition and in the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).

3. References

The original reference materials for this guide are the national returns to the OSCE Information Exchange on Stockpile Management and Security Procedures of 30 June 2002. A number of additional documents from other international organizations, national governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were also used.

For the purpose of the review of this OSCE BPG, its content now should complement other international guidelines relating to the life-cycle management of SALW such as the *Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium* (MOSAIC) and the *International Tracing Instrument* (ITI).

For a more prescriptive and detailed guide on SALW stockpile management, see UN Modular Small-Arms-Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) 05.20, Stockpile Management: Weapons.

A list of references can be found at Annex A.

4. Methodology

The national SALW authority should be responsible for ensuring the national conditions that enable the effective management of national SALW stockpiles. The national SALW authority is ultimately responsible for developing and managing SALW regulations and coordination activities within its national boundaries. National SALW regulations form the standard agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that SALW programmes, processes and services are implemented and fit for their purpose.

The subject of stockpile management and security can be technically complex. Therefore, it is important to understand the terminology in current use and the way the standards were developed. These standards are a synthesis of practices as identified in the answers of participating States to the OSCE information exchanges as of 30 June 2002 as well as from other sources. While these best practice standards are not exhaustive, they form a sound basis for most cases. These measures are reasonable, cost effective and will enhance any national programme of weapons stockpile management. Selected answers and information were chosen for best practice only when the following criteria were applied.

a) *Types of stockpile*

The different types of stocks taken into account for stockpile management and security of SALW are national stockpiles of the military and security forces, including reserve stocks and the inventory of reserve organizations, as well as government-held surplus stocks. This excludes manufacturers' stocks², as well as SALW that are part of the personal equipment of military and security force personnel. Former armed forces SALW now in private possession are also excluded. Further detail may be found in MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 6.

b) *Transport*

In this context, transport means secure movement of SALW:

- from provider (manufacturer or dealer) to an ultimate recipient (military and security forces);
- from a governmental or supplier storage site to a military and security forces storage site;
- from one military and security forces storage site to another military and security forces storage site (including to reserve stocks and inventory of reserve organizations);
- from a military and security forces storage site to one or several units/formations;
- from a military and security forces storage site to a destruction facility; or,
- from a military and security forces storage site to a dealer or buyer (e.g. for elimination of surplus).

Transports can be conducted by land, air, and sea.

II. Procedures

Certain procedures covered by this BPG can help to design, monitor and evaluate SALW policies, programmes and practices and to assess how existing SALW efforts align with international standards. Using this BPG as a tool enables users to navigate the standards quickly. Furthermore, the UNIDIR Assessment Tool (<http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/tools/>) provides a self-assessment method to sort their provisions by importance, generate assessment questionnaires on operational issues covered by the MOSAIC and analyse the assessment results (including quick identification of priorities and potential gaps), in order to evaluate the implementation of existing small arms control policies, programmes and practices.

Weapons ID Sheets, which detail the visual information required to accurately identify and record particular types of weapons may also be used: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/de/weapons-and-markets/tools/weapons-id-database.html>

1. The appropriate characteristics of stockpile locations

See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 7.

a) *Standard laws and regulations*

² See OSCE BPG on National Control over Manufacture

The stockpile location should operate within all appropriate international regulations, national laws and regulations governing the storage of SALW, as well as those covering security and health and safety.

b) Additional regulations governing stockpiles

Each stockpile location should have its own set of regulations and standard operating procedures, in the form of a legal document conforming to national laws and regulations, covering such issues as described in paragraph (d) above, for ease of reference and to facilitate quick reaction in the event of an emergency. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.4.

c) Secured site

The stockpile location should be a secure and protected armoury within a secure establishment. The existence of SALW stockpiles should be made known to those in charge of overall security at the site, and, as appropriate, to security authorities in the local area.

d) Location of stockpiles

It will normally be most practical to locate stockpiles close to where they are required to be issued to personnel. Depending on the national defence policy and the view of the authorities on how expeditiously the SALW should be available to the personnel, the stockpiles can be concentrated in one location or more broadly spread. This mainly depends on the prevailing threat analysis. Consequently, forces designed for rapid reaction need to ensure that their SALW are available without delay, so they are more likely to be stored locally; SALW for reserve forces and surplus weapons will more likely be stored at centralized sites. Wherever stockpiles are located, they should be regularly reviewed in terms of requirement and the stocks should be kept to the minimum levels consistent with the role of the personnel and/or the capacity of the site.

e) Assessment of locale

An assessment of the surroundings of the storage location should be carried out in specified periods, for example every three years, depending on the current risk situation, in order to assess the potential security risk for the inventory. An assessment of the environment surrounding the stockpile location should be conducted in order to measure the potential security risk to the stockpile. The locale should also be taken into account in the preparation of contingency plans for an emergency situation. For example, a heavily-populated urban environment presents different conditions and factors to be considered from that of an isolated rural environment. Consideration should also be given to the risks presented to the local population in the event of a UEMS³, or a deliberate attack on the site.

Regulations for a stockpile location should:

³ Unintended Explosion at a Munitions Site. Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Site (UEMS) – Small Arms Survey. [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html#:~:text=Unplanned%20explosions%20at%20munitions%20sites%20\(UEMS\)%20are%20a%20global%20problem,%2C%20damaged%2C%20or%20improperly%20stored.](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html#:~:text=Unplanned%20explosions%20at%20munitions%20sites%20(UEMS)%20are%20a%20global%20problem,%2C%20damaged%2C%20or%20improperly%20stored.) Unintended Explosion at a Munitions Site.

- Outline the scope of the instructions;
- Detail who is the officer in charge of the location (name, location and telephone number at minimum);
- Outline any security threats;
- Detail all personnel at the location with security responsibilities (security officers, safety officers, armaments officers, transport officers, stores officers, accounting officers etc.);
- Outline security procedures to be followed in different areas of the establishment (storage, servicing etc.);
- Outline control of access to buildings, areas, compounds;
- Outline control of security keys;
- Outline accounting procedures, including for audits and spot checks;
- Cover authorization, education and briefing of staff, and security training, which should include drills with local first response services (police, fire, and ambulance);
- Detail action to be taken on discovery of intrusion, theft, loss or surplus;
- Detail the response to be taken by any emergency or response forces;
- Prescribe actions to be taken in response to activation of alarms.

Details of personnel and security threats should be updated as required. All other details should be updated periodically. A set of standard operating procedures (SOP) should underpin the security regulations. All personnel working at a weapons storage area should be trained in application of these SOP. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.5.

2. Lock-and-key and other physical security measures

a) *Security assessment*

A security assessment should be developed for each stockpile, taking into consideration such factors as: object of protection, threat analysis, existing material stockpiled, surrounding area, possible physical measures of protection, other technical measures, access control, and guarding and controlling of stock inventory. The possibility of land and airborne threat approaches should be considered. Differences regarding the objects to be secured can be very important depending on several factors – among them, the dimension and type of the storage site and the type of armament stored. Unit level stocks and facilities require different means of protection depending on whether they are located inside or outside military security or armed forces facilities. The security system should reduce the possibilities of sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism or any other criminal acts. The security system should also provide an integrated capability to detect, assess, communicate, delay and respond to any unauthorized attempt at entry. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 8.

b) *Cost-benefit analysis*

Bearing in mind that total security is impossible, a reasonable cost-benefit relation between the means of physical security and the stores to be secured should be undertaken. Security should be maintained at the maximum level possible, consistent with operational, safety and mission requirements to reduce protection cost.

c) *Physical security*

Physical security measures should be a combination of:

- security staff;
- active or passive systems; and,
- devices.

These measures depend on the location and type of the stockpiles and should be based on the security assessment. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 8 and Clause 9.3.2.

d) *Storage*

Small unit level arms should be stored in arms racks or metal containers that should be constructed in such a way as to prevent easy removal and should be secured with spot-welded bolts, as a minimum. Unless the arms are under constant surveillance, additional security measures should be considered. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.9.6.

e) *Storage building doors and windows*

The storage building doors should be armoury vault doors or solid hardwood with steel plate on the outside face, with door bucks, frames, and keepers rigidly anchored. They should be secured with security padlocks and hasps. The storage building gates and doors should be secured from being taken off their hinges when closed, and the locks secured from being cut off (broken). Windows and other openings should be kept to a minimum, closed and firmly locked. Armoury doors should be kept locked or bolted on the inside when individuals are working inside. Those inside should have the means to communicate with those outside. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.9.

f) *Alarm and intruder detection systems*

Only approved alarm systems (according to international standards) should be used. They should be checked periodically. The need to use electronic detection systems must be checked in advance. The environmental conditions in which the weapons storage is located are decisive. It is recommended a daily visual check and periodical in-depth checking are undertaken. Intruder detection systems should include point sensors on doors, windows and other openings and interior motion or vibration systems. Intruder detection systems should activate a response from the guard force as soon as possible and in accordance with the delay offered by the physical security measures of the weapons storage area. The alarm system should be connected to a central monitoring station.

Alarm systems installed in the SALW storage buildings should remain operational for no less than 24 hours after a switch-off of the main power supply, and give audible and visual signals in case of alarm. Alarm systems should have no block or switch-off devices (except for those being a constructive part of the system and intended for its activation; they should be located inside protected facilities). All alarm system wires, including those transmitting information about intrusion in the storage buildings, should be concealed. A daily record should be maintained of all

alarm signals received. This record should be regularly reviewed in order to identify and correct any problems with the reliability of the intrusion detection system. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.9.5.

g) External lighting systems

Exterior building and doors should be equipped with appropriate lighting. The intensity of the light should allow detection of unauthorized activities. Switches for the light should be accessible only to authorized staff. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.10.

h) Guard patrols and dogs

Patrols should be made at prescribed intervals, and random checks should also be conducted. Security staff should check the arms storage installation during off-duty hours. Security staff should be designated, trained and properly equipped, and should be ready to react in a timely fashion to respond to possible incidents. Military working dogs should be used as a complementary measure. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.10.

i) Fencing

Required perimeters should be fenced, and they should meet minimum standards. Clear zones should be established around the fence, both inside and outside, with adequate extension. The perimeter fence should have a minimum number of gates consistent with operational requirement. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.10.

j) Key controls

Keys for armouries and/or stores should be issued only to those personnel who require access in order to perform their official duties. The number of keys should be the minimum necessary and the keys themselves should be difficult to reproduce. Keys for SALW storage locations should be held separately from those of their related ammunition stores, and within secure containers that allow to establish the fact of opening them and to control their reception (return) by authorized persons. Keys should not be unsecured or unattended. The handling of keys should be registered. This registration should be kept for a minimum period of at least one year. Inventories of keys should be conducted periodically. Master keys deserves special attention. In case of loss of a master key, the replacement of the whole key system is absolutely necessary. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.8.

k) SALW and related ammunition

In principle, SALW and related ammunition should be stored separately. Small quantities of arms and ammunitions could be stored together for the purposes of maintaining limited site security (e.g. arming a reaction force to provide security for the storage site or arsenal). Weapons should only be stored fully assembled in secure armouries. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 11.

l) Procedures for immediate reporting of any loss

Any losses or recoveries of SALW should be reported as soon as possible to the Security Officer (who should notify the overall site Security Officer and others as appropriate). See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 11.2.

For state military institutions, theft (loss) of SALW should be reported to a sufficiently high level (not lower than head (deputy head) of the ministry (agency)). This will facilitate adoption of effective decisions to prevent such incidents.

Reports should include:

- Identification of the specific stockpile location and/or the storage sites (if the report is communicated externally) and of the individual, who is reporting;
- Item identification, quantity, serial numbers and other identifying marks;
- Date, time and place of loss/recovery and outline of circumstances of loss or recovery;
- Action taken: who is investigating the loss; who has been informed; any action being taken to prevent any further loss.

m) Additional security measures

Central control or monitoring systems should be installed wherever required to ensure immediate security checks. In this case all alarm signals will emanate from the central control station from which a response force can be dispatched. Other additional systems, such as video cameras, should be used to assist in locating and evaluating an unauthorized intrusion. Components should be stored separately where appropriate e.g. grip stocks.

3. Access control measures

a) Right of access

The right of access should vary according to the type of installation and the category of SALW. Generally, only approved staff with a legitimate reason should be authorized to gain access, and full records of authorizations and access should be maintained. Authorization should only be granted by designated commanders or chiefs of Security. The access authorization should be checked regularly by security.

b) Security clearance

Security clearance should be mandatory for all personnel allowed access to SALW stockpiles. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.7.

c) Issuance of and access to keys

Keys for SALW stores should be issued only to those personnel who require access in order to perform their official duties. The handling of the keys should be registered. Ordinarily, no individual should be allowed to have access to the keys to both the SALW and related ammunition

stores. If, in certain circumstances, personnel might have access to both areas, a double checking system is recommended. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.8.

4. Inventory management and accounting control procedures

See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 11.

a) *Management and system*

Ideally the state should have a unified database comprising data on small arms of all state military institutions and law enforcement agencies that would allow getting quick access to necessary information about the given arms and using this information when exchanging data with other states. Where not possible to achieve a single unified database, there should be a national database for each ministry/law enforcement agency.

National competent authorities should have access to all records about SALW throughout their lifecycle and information about any operations with them except for some cases provided for in national legislation.

It is essential that a system is in place to manage the inventory of SALW and account for the stores. Whether the records are kept manually on paper or held on a computer database, back-up copies of the data should be kept at a separate location in the event of loss or theft of the originals. It should be clear to all those involved in inventory management and accounting for how many years' records should be kept. Records should be held for as long as possible, with a view to improving the traceability of SALW. (See also International Tracing Instrument Clause IV.).

b) *Audit of records*

Once a system is in place it should be regularly audited and its effectiveness reviewed. The records should themselves be checked and subject to security inspections at regular intervals – ideally at least once every six months. Checks and inspections should be recorded in dedicated logs that are then themselves should be inspected at regular intervals by an independent authority.

c) *Stock-check or inspection of SALW Stores*

Checks of stores, which should also include unannounced 'spot checks', should normally be conducted by authorized personnel other than those allowed unsupervised access to holdings. Where bulk stores are being checked, seals on boxes should be inspected, and where a large amount of boxes are stored, care should be taken to carefully inspect the boxes in the middle of the stockpile, as well as those others which are not easily inspected on a visual basis. SALW should be accurately counted (i.e. individually) and quantities agreed with stock records. Issue, receipt, and expenditure documentation should be examined to ensure their accuracy, and that transactions have been correctly authorized. Procedures for immediate reporting of loss and theft must be in place.

d) Separation of Powers

Checks and balances should be put in place to ensure that personnel involved in the management of small arms and light weapons stockpiles do not simultaneously hold responsibilities that would make it easier for them to steal or otherwise divert weapons while hiding their malfeasance from view.

For state military institutions, control over SALW circulation and keeping record of lost and stolen SALW in these institutions and interaction with law enforcement agencies on these matters should preferably be entrusted to specialised units established for these purposes on a sufficient subordination level to ensure prompt response to violations by senior officials from these institutions.

5. Protection measures in emergency situations

Protection measures in emergency situations should be complemented by an overall site security plan, together with comprehensive regulations for the stockpile location. An emergency plan should be prepared which includes details of enhanced security procedures to be followed in emergency situations (or when the site is on a higher alert status than normal). Ideally, stockpile locations should be able to call on armed response forces to prevent loss or damage to the SALW in storage during an emergency situation (and any legal implications should be addressed beforehand). See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.6.

6. Procedures aimed at maximising transport security

See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 13.

a) Objective

Transport of SALW requires specific security and safety measures. Transport regulations and security are imperative in order to prevent loss and theft of SALW as well as to prevent abuse and illicit trafficking. Strategies for clandestine transports are part of such standards.⁴

b) Regulations

National civilian ordinances and military regulations are an essential basis for the standardization of transport security. These should be combined with international agreements like the “European Agreement on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road” or the “International Ordinance on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Rail (Appendix I to the International Agreement on Rail Freight Transport)”. It should be noted that SALW in themselves are not “dangerous goods” in this respect. Transportation should be planned and conducted as is customary for other precious items (e.g. currency, gold, diamonds, etc.). It is when SALW are transported with related ammunition that

⁴ Strategies for clandestine transports, such as air transport, may involve not flying directly to the final destination, using circuitous routes with multiple landings and involving several interacting groups and a number of subsidiary or intermediate actors, not all of whom may be aware of the nature of the cargo. This strategy can also be used for official legal SALW transports in order to enhance security.

they should be considered “dangerous goods”. Effective regulation for cargo verification and inspection mechanism can help prevent illicit transfers of SALW that are facilitated by falsified transport documentation.

c) Documentation

Each transport of SALW should be accompanied by cargo documentation/freight papers. Hand-over/take-over protocols requiring signatures upon receipt should also be in place.

d) Emergency Procedures

As a rule, SALW and related ammunition should be transported in separate vehicles. Only in exceptional circumstances should they be transported together. In case of accident, standardized contingency plans should be available to all personnel. The plans should include directives for traffic and safety regulation, instructions for medical care, as well as notification procedures in order to contact the authorities in charge, weapons experts, and medical and fire prevention personnel.

e) Land transport

Land transport can be conducted by marked or unmarked security forces military vehicles (sometimes even armoured vehicles), civilian transport, or secured and sealed railway wagons or containers. If civilian contractors are used to move SALW by land, then procedures for authorization, security, monitoring, and inspection of both the movements and of the contractors themselves should be in place beforehand. They should be either equipped with specific protection measures (e.g. alarm systems on vehicles or electronic tracers in boxes), monitored by the police or military police, or guarded by military or security forces, depending on the quantity of SALW transported and the respective risk assessment. Transport routes should generally be planned in advance and information concerning these routes should be treated as classified.

f) Air Transport

Military air transport should follow military regulations and procedures.

Air transport can be conducted by transport agents. These are individuals or organizations, such as cargo companies or air freight agencies, who assume primary responsibility for facilitating, managing, or organizing the transport of the stocks of SALW from the point of dispatch to their final destination. They may use leased or chartered freighter aircraft with hired air crews. Such agents should obtain the necessary overflight authorization for the countries through which the goods will be transported. Detailed flight and routing plans should be charted and overseen to ensure adherence.

g) Sea Transport

SALW shipments should be conducted in locked/sealed containers by cargo companies or agencies by leased or chartered ships with hired crews. Shipments should be inspected in transit and checked

upon receipt by the receiving authority to ensure that seals are intact. The shipments should be checked for any other signs of theft or loss.

h) Additional Measures

The following additional measures should be implemented:

- The SALW should be rendered inoperable and functional parts should be stored separately;
- Procedures and arrangements for regular traffic between the same two locations should be varied and reviewed regularly;
- Containers should be placed door-to-door and should make use of the barriers of rail doors;
- SALW should be placed in the rear of containers;
- Special training for drivers and accompanying personnel should be provided;
- Transports should be equipped with communication systems;
- Risk assessments should be carried out prior to transportation of SALW.

7. Precautions and sanctions in the event of loss and theft

a) Objective

Impeccable and authoritative regulations for the investigation and clarification of the loss and theft of SALW, as well as the effective prosecution of any violations, can help reduce SALW proliferation. They are also an important factor in preventing the diversion of SALW from the legal to the illicit market. The lack of regulations, lax security, poor record-keeping, neglect, and corruption can all increase the likelihood of theft and loss.

b) Authority for Investigation

A designated independent authority should be responsible for the investigation and clarification of loss and theft of SALW. It should have the necessary competence and the possibility to act without delay. In general, this should be a military prosecutor or military legal authority, or a government authority, acting in co-operation with civil police and local authorities. It should be an individual or organisation unconnected with the weapon management system.

c) Records

The identity of lost or stolen weapons shall be recorded and retained for at least 20 years by an appropriate national authority in order to facilitate their timely identification upon recovery.

8. Security training for personnel regarding SALW stockpile locations/buildings

a) Personnel Selection

The careful and systematic selection and recruitment of all personnel involved in tasks regarding stockpile management and security of SALW is essential. The requirements should include reliability, trustworthiness, and conscientiousness, as well as the appropriate professional

qualifications. In addition, every individual should be subject to security clearance. See also MOSAIC 5.20 Clause 9.7.

b) Security Training and Personnel Management

Key personnel should receive periodic training on regulations, behaviour, and procedures relating to security within SALW stockpile locations, inventory management and record-keeping. This specific security training should be provided at the time of assignment to duty and should be regularly updated. If any changes are made, or new directives or regulations come into effect, a training update should be provided. For emergency situations, such as damage to property, burglary and theft, intrusion and intelligence activities, or fire and natural disasters, special training should be given which also includes appropriate practical exercises. Terms and conditions of service for personnel should be of a sufficiently high standard to reduce susceptibility to bribery, corruption, laxity, and low morale. Additional personnel should be trained to review appropriate measures to prevent such offenses.

9. Assistance for improving stockpile management and security procedures

a) Objective

It is imperative that experience and knowledge is made available for every State, over and above the OSCE information exchanges on SALW and the standards provided by this best practice guide.

b) Assistance

States that have identified problems and discrepancies but which lack the capacity or resources to solve these problems, should seek assistance from other States, or from regional or international organizations that are in a position to provide it.

c) Training

Countries with the ability and capacity to provide assistance and training in order to improve national stockpile management and security procedures should be encouraged to offer workshops and training courses, or at a minimum designate a point of contact from which other States can request such support.

d) Co-operation

It is also important to co-operate regularly and exchange information and experiences with international organizations (e.g. United Nations, UNIDIR, Wassenaar Arrangement, NATO/EAPC, etc.), research institutes (e.g. Small Arms Survey), and NGOs working on SALW issues (e.g. International Alert, Saferworld, International Action Network on Small Arms, World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities, etc.).⁵

⁵ For the role and engagement of the NGOs in relation to the small arms issue, see Bachelor, P. 'NGO Perspectives: NGOs and the Small Arms Issue', *UNIDIR disarmament forum* 2002 no. 1, pp. 37-40.

III. Security Plan

1. Context

This section outlines the procedure for the development of a security plan, and the Annex gives an example of a model plan. Because security plans should be tailored to the requirements of each site and its inventory, of specific locations and their holdings, a standard model cannot be prescribed in its entirety. Nevertheless, some essential elements can be identified. The elements outlined in this section should be taken into account in developing a specific security plan for SALW stockpiles.

Sites at which SALW stockpiles are located should ideally have a specific security plan for each SALW location, or, at minimum, information reflecting the SALW locations should be included in the overall security plan of the parent site.

2. Purpose and elements

The security plan can be used for the following purposes:

- i) **Analysis:** The plan can be used as an analytical tool for planning and updating the security system of a site.
- ii) **Allocating responsibilities:** After a thorough risk assessment, the commander of the responsible authority will have the fullest information readily available for deciding security priorities, as well as for addressing any residual risk not covered by the security system.
- iii) **Inspections:** Examination of a security plan will allow well-prepared inspections to focus on the weakest areas of the security system.
- iv) **Investments in security:** These priorities should be a consequence of the security plan.
- v) **Determining the role of personnel:** In assessing the situation, distribution, and functions of the security staff and others with access to SALW locations.

3. Structure

The following elements for the structure of a security plan should be considered:

- i) **Denomination of the site.**
- ii) **Description of the site, including the surrounding area (especially insofar as it may affect security); identification of areas at different levels of security, main buildings and their functions; type of content and value of the various stocks; aspects of safety and environmental conditions; as well as any further information which may be used for the security plan. Section II paragraph 1 should be taken into account.**
- iii) **Risk assessment should include all possible risk and should not only be an essential part of the planning procedure but also of the security plan.**
- iv) **Physical security measures, such as active and passive systems, as well as the tasks of the security staff, should be described in detail for all areas of the site, in line with the conclusions of the risk assessment.**

- v) Contingency plans should be developed for all possible emergency scenarios in accordance with a risk assessment. These plans should be kept as a separate Annex of the security plan.
- vi) Procedures for reporting loss, damage, and further incidents should be considered. Prescriptions regarding maintenance of means, training of security staff, and any other indications concerning security should be included.
- vii) The security plan should be signed by the commander of the unit or chief of security.

4. Updating and classification

The security plan should be updated periodically, and especially, if a change in any of the factors on which it is based occurs (e.g. changes in the chain of command, in the function of the security chief, in the security means, or in the results of risk assessment). It should be a flexible document, easily adaptable to changing requirements and circumstances.

A minimum number of complete copies of the security plan should be made. One copy should be given to the officer responsible for inspection. Additional copies should only be provided if the recipient's "need to know" can be confirmed. The complete document should be classified at an appropriate level. Dissemination of parts of the document, which are classified at a lower level, should also be done on a restricted basis.

Annex A

References

- Exchange of Information on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security, submitted by the OSCE participating States, 30 June 2002.
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- 'Second Pfp Swiss Training Course on the Management of Small Arms: Stockpile Management and Security' (2002). Spiez, Switzerland. Partnership for Peace/Swiss Federal

Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports. Workshop Documentation.
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MOSAIC 01.20, Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations

MOSAIC 03.20, National controls over the international transfer of small arms and light weapons

MOSAIC 05.20, Stockpile management: Weapons

MOSAIC 05.50, Destruction: Weapons

EN 12320, Building hardware – Padlocks and padlock fittings – Requirements and test methods

ISO 8271, Door leaves – Determination of the resistance to hard body impact

SEESAC. RMDS/G 05.30, Weapons storage and security. 4th ed. SEESAC

For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Annex B

Model for a Security Plan

This is an indicative list of subjects that should be covered in a security plan:

1. Name, location, and telephone number of the establishment security officer.
2. Scope of the plan.
3. Content and value of the stocks.
4. The security threat.
5. Detailed geographic map of the site location and its surroundings.
6. Detailed diagrams of the layout of the site, including all its buildings, entry and exit points, and of the location of all features such as electricity generators/substations; water and gas main points; key communications nodes; road and rail tracks; wooded areas; hard and soft-standing areas, etc.
7. Outline of physical security measures for the site, including but not limited to details of:
 - fences, doors, and windows
 - lighting
 - perimeter intruder detection systems
 - intruder detection systems
 - automated access control systems
 - guards
 - guard dogs
 - locks and containers
 - control of entry and exit of persons
 - control of entry and exit of goods and material
 - secure rooms
 - hardened buildings
 - closed circuit television
8. Security responsibilities (including but not limited to the following personnel, as applicable):
 - security officer
 - explosives/safety officer
 - armament officer
 - production manager
 - transport officer
 - heads of department
 - stores/supply officers
 - foreman in charge of operations/accounting/movement
 - explosives workers
 - all personnel authorized to have access to the site
9. Security procedures to be followed in production/process areas, storage servicing, processing, trials, quality assurance, climatic and other tests, as well as further activities in respect of SALW.

10. Control of access to buildings, areas, compounds.
11. Procedures in case of handling and transport.
12. Control of security keys – those in use and their duplicates.
13. Accounting – audit and spot checks.
14. Security training, education, and briefings of staff.
15. Action on discovery of loss/surplus.
16. Details of response force arrangements (e.g. size, response time, orders, activation, and deployment).
17. Actions to be taken in response to activation of alarms.
18. Actions to be taken in response to emergency situations (e.g. fire, flood, raid etc.).