

Chairmanship: Moldova

754th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 14 May 2014

Opened: 9.35 a.m.

Closed: 12.30 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Popov

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE

Presentation on “European Security Overview: Challenges and Future Prospects” by Lieutenant General W. Wosolsobe, Director General of the European Union Military Staff, and Major General R. A. Kee, Director, Strategy and Policy, Headquarters United States European Command: Chairperson, Lieutenant General W. Wosolsobe, Major General R. A. Kee (FSC.DEL/86/14 OSCE+), Russian Federation, Canada, Ukraine, United Kingdom

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) *Situation in Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/87/14), Netherlands (Annex 1), Greece-European Union (with the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/88/14), Canada, United States of America, Turkey, Russian Federation (Annex 2)*

(b) *Financial contributions to the UNDP and OSCE Montenegro Demilitarization Programme (MONDEM) and the Capacity Development Programme for Conventional Ammunition Stockpile Management (CASM) in Serbia: Luxembourg (Annex 3), Montenegro (Annex 4), Serbia (Annex 5), FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (United States of America)*

- (c) *Large-scale military exercise in Azerbaijan, held on 16 and 17 April 2014:*
Armenia, Azerbaijan

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Report on the 64th meeting of the OSCE Communications Group and the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), held on 7 May 2014 (FSC.GAL/63/14 Restr.):* Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre
- (b) *Power breakfast on the prevention of sexual violence in conflict, to be held on 15 May 2014:* United Kingdom, Chairperson
- (c) *Meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons, to be held on 20 May 2014 (FSC.GAL/59/14 Restr.):* Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Spain)

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 28 May 2014, at 10 a.m., in the Ratsaal



754th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 760, Agenda item 2(a)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE NETHERLANDS**

Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to draw your attention to the successful completion of a Benelux mission to Ukraine in the period from 14 to 17 April, under Chapter X of the Vienna Document, with arrangements in accordance with Chapter IX. This Netherlands Benelux team, with guest inspectors from Georgia, Sweden and the Czech Republic, visited Ukraine based on a bilateral agreement between Ukraine and the Netherlands, to hold an event tailored to the specific regional needs identified by Ukraine, intended to dispel concerns about unusual military activities in the area of application of CSBMs and to provide clarity regarding the ongoing ambiguous regional security situation. The inspection request was transmitted with an F101 to Ukraine and all the OSCE participating States on 7 April 2014. Ukraine accepted the request with an F102 on 8 April 2014.

No notifiable activities were observed in the specified area. All the units visited in the specified area were conducting normal routine activities, while preparing for a worst-case scenario. The general military situation in the specified area was calm but tense during that period. The Ukrainian hosts, both members of the escort team, the verification agency, and all the military and civilian authorities we encountered demonstrated exemplary professionalism, transparency and willingness to comply with all requests by the inspection team. The report was distributed on the Communications Network on 29 April 2014, under reference number CBM/NL/14/0022/F103/O.

This inspection is a good example of how to apply the Vienna Document, both to the letter and in spirit, to its full potential, where a participating State offers every opportunity to show optimal transparency and build confidence and trust, especially in times of increased tension. We call upon the Russian Federation to show the same level of co-operation, and to offer comparable opportunities to visit areas close to the Ukrainian border in order to dispel concerns about unusual military activities, in the spirit of the Vienna Document.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.



754th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 760, Agenda item 2(a)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

In the light of the continuing hysteria and stream of false “information” and one-sided findings published in the foreign media regarding “the Russian threat to Ukraine”, we are compelled to address those present so as to dispel these myths and to say once again that the reasons for the destabilization of the situation in Ukraine need to be sought outside of Russia.

It is clear that this disinformation and propaganda campaign is being carried out as part of an information war. Some of our Western partners have considerable experience in these technologies and have undoubtedly been successful. This campaign is aimed at an audience that has no opportunity to verify the reliability of the information foisted upon it.

An example of this propaganda can be seen in a number of satellite images and maps published in April of this year on the website of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and then in *The Washington Post* allegedly showing a build-up of Russian troops in the regions bordering Ukraine.

We propose to examine these images carefully.

Slide 1. This slide shows the location of Russian military facilities in the region bordering Ukraine. The facilities that feature in the following satellite images are numbered. NATO experts claim that there has been a build-up in our military equipment at these facilities. Let us take a look at this “build-up”.

Slide 2. The area north of Belgorod. Data from August 2011 and March 2014 are compared. Certainly, for some countries, in Africa for example, 16 helicopters may look like a serious threat, but not for military operations in the European theatre conducted under modern-day conditions. By the same token, no mention is made of the fact that the helicopters are located at a previously prepared base with some infrastructure already in place. The number of helicopters is fully in keeping with the normal capacity of the base.

The second half of slide 2. Yeysk region. Data from October 2006 and March 2014 are compared. It is clear that the authors of this planted information deliberately selected as a

point of reference data that is eight years old, hoping to make the greatest impression on an uninitiated audience. Why did those who commissioned the article not use more recent material, for example, from last year? In addition, we note that half of the equipment shown in the image are vehicles, which do not add much to the offensive capabilities of any country.

Slides 3 and 4. An airfield, once again called Yeysk. Images from August 2013 and March 2014. In comparison to last year, the aviation equipment has increased by just three combat aircraft and one helicopter. This is evidently yet another sign of “the Russian threat to neighbouring States”. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that only part of one airfield apron is shown and not the entire airfield. It is altogether possible that there has been a reduction in the equipment in the rest of the airfield.

Slide 5. Buturlinovka airfield, data from May 2011 and April 2014. Here it is not at all clear what our NATO partners had in mind. If we make a detailed comparison of these photographs, we see no build-up of equipment, merely a change in the position of the aircraft on the different aprons. Or, do those who commissioned the article believe that we should not do this either because this kind of repositioning of aircraft at an airfield threatens Ukraine? We do not even mention that in January of this year a Polish evaluation team operating under the Vienna Document 2011 was told at a briefing that a regiment of aircraft had in fact been temporarily relocated to Buturlinovka, but not because of the developments in Ukraine (they had only just begun at that point) but as a result of the closure of a landing strip at Voronezh airfield.

Slide 6. Buturlinovka region (or is it Novochoerkassk?). Incidentally, this kind of carelessness in titling the images suggests that there might also have been some confusion with the dates, and instead of depicting the state of affairs in March and April 2014 they show, for example, the situation last summer.

The image mainly shows tents and vehicles. Furthermore, as we can see from the slide from 2013, the area is intended and, judging by the good condition of the tents and fencing, regularly used to house units undergoing training. The normal capacity of the facility has not been exceeded in this case either.

Slide 7. The fabrications of several Western military “experts” regarding the advance of approximately every third battalion of the Russian armed forces in the entire European part of the country towards the Ukrainian border are reflected in the map prepared by the Royal United Services Institute and published in *The Washington Post*. This would mean – just listen to this! – a third of all our forces in Europe are allegedly there.

The picture painted is indeed frightening, if we believe the stories that there are not just 40,000 but 100,000 Russian troops threatening Ukraine. I just wonder why neither the inspectors nor the Open Skies missions regularly flying over this area have looked for but so far failed to find these 70 plus battalions.

The fact is that this misleading map is aimed at a lay public and not at professionals in our field. Without getting into a discussion about the accuracy of the information on each battalion, I might note that our units and subdivisions are rotated around the training grounds during the year, and here it looks as if they are all advancing towards the border simultaneously. This is nothing if not absurd.

Let me cite in this regard the words of the Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Anatoly Antonov: “We call on ‘the official representatives’ of NATO and the Pentagon to stop their cynical deception of the world community with regard to the actual situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border. We believe that stubbornly imposing the Western public stereotypes from last century’s Cold War in the modern era of universal penetration of the Internet and free media is senseless and can only damage the reputation of the Western ‘propagandists’ themselves.”

Now let us turn to an analysis of genuinely reliable and objective material obtained during the implementation of one of the most effective international treaties in the area of arms control and confidence- and security-building – the Treaty on Open Skies – and see how well-founded the figures mentioned by the representatives of NATO and the United States of America are. The day before yesterday we shared our observations in the Open Skies Consultative Commission. However, we believe that they will also be of interest to the other OSCE participating States.

Slide 8. In recent months we have received on our territory several inspection teams under the Vienna Document 2011 and many observation flights under the Treaty on Open Skies. I should like to point out that the Russian Federation, in a spirit of goodwill, agreed to an extraordinary flight by Ukraine under the Treaty on Open Skies being carried out over its territory from 20 to 23 March 2014, although it was not obliged to do so.

During all these events, we did not in any way impede the selection of regions for inspection and flight routes. The attention of our foreign colleagues, including those from Ukraine, has been mainly concentrated on the border regions of Russia and Ukraine. **Slides 9 to 16.** A flight by the United States and Norway also took place last week along the border with the Kharkiv and Luhansk provinces. As you can see, the routes have been designed in such a way that every segment of the 2,000-kilometre Russian-Ukrainian border is photographed approximately two to three times each month. Kilometres of aerial film showing the real state of affairs at Russian Federation military facilities of interest to our partners have been obtained legally.

Let us take a look at the images of the Russian facilities obtained in 2014, which have raised concerns recently in various OSCE forums, and compare them with the images from 2012 and 2013. These slides show aerial surveys of Taman, Boguchar, Rostov-on-Don, Belgorod, Novorossiysk, Kushchevskaya, Morozovsk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk. This is material from observation flights conducted by Ukraine, the United States and Germany, Hungary and Canada, Germany and Latvia, Turkey and the United States, and so on.

The next slide (**slide 18**) shows a training ground near Taman, at which there are eight pieces of artillery. This is material from an observation flight by Germany and the United States (21 March 2014). This area was also observed earlier (**slide 19**). There has been a training ground there for a long time now, where firing exercises are regularly conducted.

Slides 20, 21 and 22. On these photographs you can see two bases for the storage and repair of military equipment in Boguchar. The area was observed from the air on 21 March 2014 by a joint group of Germany and the United States, on 22 March 2014 by a Ukrainian mission, and, for example, on 27 April 2013 by Hungary and Canada. The

difference compared to last year is 180 vehicles and armoured vehicles. Let me remind you that these are not combat units, but facilities intended for the storage and repair of military equipment.

Slides 23, 24 and 25. Now for the Rostov-on-Don air base. The photograph from 22 March 2014 on the screen now was taken by a Ukrainian mission. And now the same base, but a photograph from 27 April 2013 (an observation flight by Hungary and Canada). The difference compared to last year is 1 aircraft and 15 armoured vehicles. A massive increase, is it not?

Slide 26. The training centre at Belgorod. The photograph was taken on 21 March 2014 by a Germany and United States mission. It is clear from the image that the personnel and equipment are in a fixed facility. This training centre is known to our Western partners and is observed periodically, just as the units and subdivisions undergoing training there are rotated periodically.

Slides 27 and 28. Novorossiysk. This is the permanent location of the 7th Airborne Division and the 108th Airborne Regiment. The photographs were taken on 22 March 2014 by Ukraine and on 27 April 2013 by Hungary and Canada. The material from the Ukrainian observation flight shows that the number of armoured vehicles here is even 30 units lower than on 1 January 2014.

Slides 29 and 30. Kushchevskaya training air base. This material was submitted by the Ukrainian mission on 22 March 2014 and by Germany and Latvia on 13 September 2012. The difference in numbers is simply huge – one aircraft.

The air bases at Morozovsk (**slides 31 and 32**) and Primorsko-Akhtarsk (**slides 33, 34 and 35**). The photographs were taken by Ukraine in March 2014 and by Turkey and the United States in June 2013. The difference in terms of the number of aircraft at each of these bases compared to 2013 is 10 units, while the number of vehicles at Primorsko-Akhtarsk in 2014 was 30 units lower.

Some may say that the data we have taken to analyse are at least a month old, and much may have changed since then. Yes, this is because deciphering aerial photography material takes a long time. To avoid any provocation, we have in the meantime withdrawn from the border even the tactical divisions that were carrying out training exercises at the training grounds. Unfortunately, one thing remains unchanged, however – the desire of some of our partners to question the goodwill of the Russian Federation. Official representatives of NATO and the United States say that they have “no indication of a change in the position of Russian forces along the Ukraine border”. Traditionally, our NATO colleagues, and especially those from the United States, do not bother with any evidence in support of their position, other than the latest batch of unconvincing images. Unfortunately, time and time again one set of conclusions are drawn on the basis of verification measures in the presence of Russian representatives and in official reports, and then the opposite propagandistic clichés are transmitted to the public.

Let us take stock. We have every reason to return the “packs of lies” to the Permanent Representative of the United States who uttered them. There is a clear absence of a

“threatening (question: to whom?) build-up of Russian armaments and equipment”. If our partners have any objections, we are ready to listen to their arguments. Where are they?

As it is, we are obliged to note that their accusations are groundless and inflame the already difficult situation surrounding Ukraine. This is precisely what our presentation today demonstrates.

At the same time, we hear nothing about the concerns regarding the hundreds of victims of the punitive operation by the Kyiv regime against the inhabitants in the south-east. The concentration of Ukrainian armed forces on the Russian-Ukrainian border is also continuing. A 15,000-strong group of Ukrainian forces has been deployed in the border regions. There is also a build-up of NATO troops in Eastern Europe. For some of our partners this is all standard practice. For us, however, this is the latest example of double standards, which are already becoming the norm in the foreign policy of some States.

One of our Western colleagues recently said: “Strange people, you Russians. You come with these arguments, trying to prove something. Don’t you understand that no one needs the truth?” Notwithstanding, we believe that sooner or later our partners will have to begin to tell the public the truth. The growing number of commentaries in the Western media in which people express their dissatisfaction with the one-sided interpretation of events in and around Ukraine also convinces us of this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. We ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/760
14 May 2014
Annex 3

Original: ENGLISH

754th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 760, Agenda item 2(b)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF LUXEMBOURG

The Montenegro Demilitarization Programme (MONDEM) was established in April 2007 in response to a request from the Republic of Montenegro for a capacity-building programme for demilitarization and safe storage capacities in respect of small arms and light weapons. It is a joint programme of the Government of Montenegro, the UNDP and the OSCE. From the beginning, Luxembourg has continuously supported the MONDEM project with donations amounting to more than 100,000 euros, and it will donate an additional 15,000 euros to the Demilitarization Programme in 2014.

Furthermore, Luxembourg supported the Capacity Development Programme for Conventional Ammunition Stockpile Management (CASM) in the Republic of Serbia in 2012 and 2013 through contributions amounting to 50,000 euros. This project was initiated by the Ministry of Defence of Serbia in co-operation with the UNDP and the OSCE and is designed to support the efforts of the Serbian authorities in the destruction of conventional ammunition and the renovation of ammunition-storage facilities. Luxembourg will donate an additional 20,000 euros, thereby expressing our continued commitment to this joint endeavour.

We encourage all other participating States to take similar steps in favour of SCA and SALW projects.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/760

14 May 2014

Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

754th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 760, Agenda item 2(b)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF MONTENEGRO

The reduction of the risk posed by destabilizing accumulation of armament and ammunition surpluses, as well as stockpile management, remain our highest priority, and that is why we are very grateful to Luxembourg for this significant and timely donation for the MONDEM Programme.

The lack of the funding required for the third and final phase of MONDEM threatens the progress achieved so far, so any future contribution is of great importance.

Through its continued support to the OSCE SALW and conventional ammunition projects, Luxembourg is demonstrating its commitment to enhancing stability and security in the OSCE region.

I would like to reiterate our readiness to share with all partners the knowledge and lessons learned and to contribute actively to similar OSCE programmes.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all the contributors to the MONDEM Programme for recognizing its value and importance, as well as the CPC and the FSC Coordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition for their active support and promotion of all ongoing demilitarization projects.

Once again, I thank Luxembourg, and I would like to express the hope that donations for the MONDEM Programme through the OSCE will continue, enabling us to conclude this programme successfully.



754th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 760, Agenda item 2(b)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SERBIA

Mr. Chairperson,
Ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia, let me thank the Permanent Representation to the OSCE of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the financial support and contribution of an additional 20,000 euros to the Serbian Capacity Development Programme for Conventional Ammunition Stockpile Management (CASM) in respect of demilitarization of white-phosphorus-filled ammunition.

The donor support for the CASM Project in the Republic of Serbia by the OSCE participating States is still of great importance for its further implementation. In July 2013, approximately 161 tonnes of napalm powder were transported to the SAKAB specialized facility in Kumla, Sweden, and disposed of in an environmentally friendly and cost-efficient way. In November 2013, the first phase of the project, concerning disposal of the napalm powder, was completed. Now we are working intensively on the second part, demilitarization of white-phosphorus-filled ammunition, which is a much more complicated part of the first component of the CASM Programme. In the second phase, we have completed the demilitarization of 11,315 pieces of the 105-mm ammunition and transported them to Bulgaria for disposal in February 2014.

Furthermore, we would like to thank the donor States for their support and concurrence with the proposed changes, which include the combining of components 1 and 3 of the CASM Programme under the existing project. Component 3 of the CASM Programme envisages an upgrade of the Demilitarization Facility – TRZ Kragujevac, involving the replacement of mirrors with CCTV systems, and the installation of fire-fighting systems and anti-static flooring.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Conflict Prevention Centre; the FSC Support Section; and Lt. Colonel Mark Barlow, FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, for their tireless work on the CASM Programme.

The Republic of Serbia greatly appreciates the support for the projects by the OSCE participating States. Let me once again thank Luxembourg for their contribution and reaffirm

the readiness of Serbia to further co-operate with our OSCE partners on this particular matter, in a spirit of openness and transparency.

I thank you for your attention and ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.