



FSC Chairmanship: Portugal

OSCE Chairmanship: Germany

**63rd JOINT MEETING OF THE
FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION
AND THE PERMANENT COUNCIL**

1. Date: Wednesday, 19 October 2016

Opened: 10.05 a.m.

Closed: 12 noon

2. Chairperson: Ambassador M. da Graça Mira Gomes (FSC) (Portugal)
Ambassador E. Pohl (PC) (Germany)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: REVISITING THE 1996 OSCE
FRAMEWORK FOR ARMS CONTROL

Presentations by:

- *Ambassador F. Seixas da Costa, former Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Portugal*
- *Ambassador S. Baumann, Deputy Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office*

Chairperson (PC), Chairperson (FSC), Mr. F. Seixas da Costa (FSC-PC.DEL/27/16 OSCE+), Ms. S. Baumann (FSC-PC.DEL/25/16 OSCE+), Slovakia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC-PC.DEL/16/16), Norway (FSC-PC.DEL/20/16), Switzerland (FSC-PC.DEL/21/16 OSCE+), Belarus (FSC-PC.DEL/22/16 OSCE+), Turkey (FSC-PC.DEL/26/16 OSCE+), Canada (FSC-PC.DEL/28/16 OSCE+), Georgia, Poland (FSC-PC.DEL/15/16 OSCE+), Austria (FSC-PC.DEL/18/16 OSCE+), Azerbaijan

(FSC-PC.DEL/19/16 OSCE+), Ukraine (FSC-PC.DEL/17/16), Armenia
(FSC-PC.DEL/23/16 OSCE+), United States of America
(FSC-PC.DEL/24/16), Russian Federation (Annex)

Agenda item 2: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

None

4. Next meeting:

To be announced



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation
Permanent Council**

FSC-PC.JOUR/50
19 October 2016
Annex

ENGLISH
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63rd Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC
FSC-PC Journal No. 50, Agenda item 3

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Distinguished Co-Chairs,

The 20th anniversary of the Framework for Arms Control gives us occasion to look back in order to gain a better picture of the circumstances in which the document was created, to see how the opportunities connected with it have been squandered over the years and to understand the situation we are in today, when the system of “hard” security in Europe and its constituent, arms control, are in the throes of crisis.

The Framework was created towards the end of the euphoric and romantic period that is sometimes called the end of the Cold War era and the “golden age” of arms control. It still appeared then that a common European security space without dividing lines was possible. It is impossible to separate the Framework from the other “achievements” of the OSCE Lisbon Summit, in particular the Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, which served as a prototype for the Charter for European Security.

It is therefore not surprising that the preamble to the Framework states: “Arms control, including disarmament and confidence- and security-building, is integral to the OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative concept of security.” Furthermore, it is emphasized that the purpose of the Framework is “to contribute to the further development of the OSCE area as an indivisible common security space by, *inter alia*, stimulating the elaboration of further arms control measures”.

However, differences had already begun to appear at that time in the parties’ views of the way the politico-military situation in Europe was developing.

Our Western partners assumed that earlier security problems, which had been the result of confrontation between States and their politico-military alliances and had been resolved by means of “traditional” arms control, were a thing of the past and that the time had come to search for answers solely to new challenges, and necessarily under the “American leadership” proclaimed by the then President of the United States of America.

Russia, on the other hand, demonstrated greater realism and insisted that the lack of reform of a NATO inherited from a previous era, the way it was developing and also the fact that arms control agreements concluded earlier were not being adapted to the new conditions were no less serious challenges to European security. Consequently, we proposed continuing work on the development of “traditional” instruments in this area.

As a result of difficult discussions and joint work, a number of provisions on matters of principle were included in the document. For example, “military imbalances that may contribute to instabilities” were added to the list of challenges and risks. It was recognized that the evolution of military and political organizations should be consistent with the concept of co-operative security and with arms control goals and objectives, and the need for consultations and co-operation on this matter was noted. Another basic principle included in the document was logically connected with those provisions – no participating State, organization or grouping should strengthen its security at the expense of the security of others, or regard any part of the OSCE area as a particular sphere of influence.

Unfortunately, however, the hopes of building the European security architecture on the basis of the OSCE were not to be. The commitments not to ensure one’s own security at the expense of the security of others not only remained on paper, but were also cynically ignored in practice by the West, evidently drunk on the euphoria of the “final victory” in the Cold War, which apparently allowed it free rein and gave it the right to administer justice and mete out punishment. Shortly after the Lisbon Summit, the NATO countries, hiding behind false pretexts and trampling on the principles of the non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, rained their bombs and missiles on Yugoslavia.

Arguing that a “security vacuum” in Central and Eastern Europe was inadmissible and ignoring the concerns of Russia (and not only Russia for that matter), the Alliance effectively expanded its sphere of influence by force. Moving eastwards, the dividing lines were not erased but deepened. This was not limited to reckless geopolitical expansion; the military infrastructure advanced towards our borders and a theatre of military operations was opened up.

As a result of NATO’s enlargement, the political and material foundations were laid for the emergence of a new Iron Curtain in Europe. Furthermore, in recent years NATO has once again embarked on an official course of coercive “containment” of Russia and of changing the balance of military forces in the European region in its favour, including in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders, contrary to the Russia-NATO Founding Act. In this way, a new NATO-centric European security structure is now being built according to the principle of “not with but against Russia”. To see this for yourselves, just take a careful look at the wording of the decisions of the last two summits of the Alliance.

In the context of our discussion today, this has produced a fundamental conflict between NATO’s political and military policy and the very goal of the Framework for Arms Control – “to create a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments that will give expression to the principle that security is indivisible for all OSCE participating States”.

Let me say a few words about arms control itself – the main subject of the Framework. It set out a number of negotiating principles, purposes and methods for further development of arms control. The document entitled Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Co-operation, which was also adopted by the Lisbon Summit, was developed on the basis of the Framework.

The provision regarding the need for new negotiations and efforts to complement the contribution of existing agreements in order to provide effective responses to the military challenges to the security of the participating States was of fundamental importance at that stage. First and foremost, this concerned the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) – it was not without reason that a document on the scope and parameters of negotiations on the adaptation of that Treaty was adopted by the States Parties to the CFE Treaty virtually simultaneously with the Framework. It might also be mentioned that during the period of negotiations the participants had committed themselves to “exercise restraint [...] in relation to [...] the postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces”.

The adaptation of the CFE Treaty gave it a chance to preserve its viability as one of the pillars of the system of “equal and indivisible security”. However, this process has still not been completed – the NATO countries preferred to use the Agreement on Adaptation as a bargaining chip for political issues, trying to force the solution of local conflicts on their conditions. As a result, they did not implement the key Istanbul commitment regarding the prompt ratification of that Agreement, and Russia was forced to suspend implementation of the clearly outdated CFE Treaty.

It seems that in the light of that lesson we ought today to look critically at the provision of the Framework, clearly inspired by the success of the 1995 Dayton Accords, that deals with the intention to solve political problems of regional conflicts and crises with the aid of arms control instruments and “move the discussion of regional security issues to a more practical and concrete plane, in order to devise measures aimed at reducing regional instability and military imbalances among OSCE participating States”. The dismal experience of the CFE Treaty has demonstrated – as is already generally recognized today – that conflicts cannot be resolved by means of arms control.

Another contentious provision of the Framework concerns the intention to devise measures ensuring “full implementation of arms control agreements at all times, including times of crisis”. As subsequent international experience has shown, this goal is scarcely achievable.

Having referred to the refusal of our partners to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty, we cannot but also recall their perennial reluctance to modernize the Vienna Document. As a result, this window of opportunity has closed, and today it is difficult to predict when it will open again. Much here depends on the political decisions and practical actions of the NATO countries.

There have been extremely worrying reports recently that the legislators and some military leaders of one of the key States Parties to the Treaty on Open Skies – the United States of America – are also calling into question this pillar of European arms control.

It is clear that actions undermining strategic and regional stability inevitably give rise to reciprocal measures and are detrimental in the long term to the entire system of international arms control treaties. Among such actions impacting on the “European security equation”, particular mention might be made of the withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and its unilateral steps to establish an anti-missile defence system in Europe, with its consequences for strategic stability and global and regional security. We would add that, unlike Russia, the United States has still not returned its non-strategic nuclear weapons to its national territory. They have plans to modernize them and are also rehearsing their use within the framework of NATO’s “joint nuclear missions”, which undermines the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

None of these actions fit in with the optimistic picture painted by the Framework’s authors.

Distinguished Co-Chairs,

As revealed by today’s discussion and the frequently cited recent article by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on conventional arms control in Europe, it would seem that interest in the problem of arms control is beginning to reappear in Europe. For its part, Russia has always remained open to discussion of questions of international security and stability on the basis, it goes without saying, of equal rights and mutual consideration of interests. Time will tell whether our partners are ready for such work and on what system of co-ordinates – NATO-centric or pan-European – they intend to build European security under the new conditions. In that context, it would certainly be useful and timely to study and assimilate the lessons to be learned from the Framework for Arms Control.

Thank you, distinguished Co-Chairs. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.