

Chairmanship: Azerbaijan

1001st PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 16 February 2022 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m.

Closed: 12.55 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador R. Sadigbayli

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson, on behalf of the Forum, offered condolences to the delegation of Slovakia on the death of the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the OSCE and former Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Ambassador Radomir Boháč.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: “EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: THE ROLE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES”

– *Presentation by H.E. Mr. A. Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan*

– *Presentation by H.E. Ms. A. Ifkovits Horner, Assistant State Secretary, Head of the Eurasia Division, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs*

– *Presentation by Brigadier General S. Nurmi, Director of the National Defence Unit, Defence Policy Department, Ministry of Defence of Finland*

Chairperson, H.E. Mr. A. Azimov, H.E. Ms. A. Ifkovits Horner (FSC.DEL/96/22 OSCE+), Brigadier General S. Nurmi, France-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/91/22), United States of America (FSC.DEL/85/22 OSCE+), United Kingdom,

Ukraine (FSC.DEL/89/22), Turkey, Russian Federation (Annex 1), Armenia (Annex 2)

Agenda item 2: DECISION ON THE UPDATED BEST PRACTICE GUIDE
ON AMMUNITION MARKING, REGISTRATION AND
RECORD-KEEPING

Chairperson

Decision: The Forum for Security Co-operation adopted Decision No. 1/22 (FSC.DEC/1/22) on the updated Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Marking, Registration and Record-Keeping, the text of which is appended to this journal.

Russian Federation (interpretative statement, see attachment to the decision), Germany, Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Latvia) (Annex 3)

Agenda item 3: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/90/22), France-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/92/22), United States of America (FSC.DEL/86/22 OSCE+), United Kingdom, Canada, Russian Federation (Annex 4)

Agenda item 4: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

None

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 23 February 2022, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/1007
16 February 2022
Annex 1

ENGLISH
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1001st Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 1007, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

Allow me to thank you for organizing this plenary meeting on the role of non-aligned countries in the European security architecture. We consider this conversation to be timely. We are grateful to the distinguished keynote speakers for their presentations, which have significantly enlivened today's discussion.

The policy of non-alignment and neutrality is one of the oldest forms of State policy that contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability. Historically, such States have been perceived in the international community as "bridges" between the East and the West. The fact that the capitals of neutral and non-aligned States often become "platforms" for international organizations and host foreign delegations for high-level negotiations on international security issues is proof of their standing on the world stage and the respect for their mediation mission.

It should not be forgotten that, for many neutral and non-aligned States, their status has been "hard-won", having been achieved as a result of major wars. Their policy of non-participation in military blocs is an important factor in ensuring stability at the subregional and pan-European level. At the same time, the possible accession of neutral or non-aligned States to military alliances would have unpredictable consequences in the politico-military and foreign policy spheres. We are convinced that today, as before, non-alignment is the best guarantee of these States' security.

Mr. Chairperson,

Recently, we have witnessed an alarming tendency for neutral States to be drawn into the orbit of the North Atlantic Alliance. Joint exercises remain one of the main forms of their co-operation. For instance, dozens of aircraft from NATO countries and neutral States regularly take part in the Alliance's "Arctic Challenge" exercises, using bases on Swedish and Finnish territory, in particular. These exercises are clearly offensive in nature, since they include the practice of hitting ground targets and breaking through air defences. There is another specific example. Last year, the large-scale NATO exercise "Defender Europe 2021" was conducted with the involvement of the non-aligned countries Sweden, Finland and

Austria. During the large-scale manoeuvres, significant troop contingents were restationed along Russia's borders. We have noted this and express our concern.

The participation of neutral European Union Member States in the Permanent Structured Cooperation, which has been said to strengthen "the European pillar within NATO", also raises certain doubts.

All the trends I have mentioned point to the gradual integration of some neutral countries in Europe into the Alliance's military activities, which objectively destabilizes the situation, not least in the north of the continent. Although, if we look back on history, even during the most acute periods of the Cold War, Sweden and Finland pursued the prudent and pragmatic policy of the so-called northern balance, which enjoyed the well-deserved respect of the pan-European community. We should like to take this opportunity to ask the distinguished keynote speaker from the Ministry of Defence of Finland, Brigadier General Sami Nurmi, the following question. What has changed since then?

Mr. Chairperson,

At the very beginning of this meeting you mentioned the OSCE principle of equal and indivisible security, which is fundamental to the entire European security architecture. Unfortunately, lately we have seen that there are significant differences in the understanding of this principle.

To begin with, NATO and the European Union insist on their primary role in ensuring security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We categorically reject this approach. In the OSCE Charter for European Security adopted at the highest level in 1999 and in the Astana declaration of 2010, it is clearly and unambiguously stated that "no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area."

In this connection, on 28 January this year, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov sent messages to his counterparts in NATO and European Union countries and Switzerland (37 addressees in total). In these messages, he requested clarification as to how these States intend to implement in practice the commitments undertaken at the highest level at the OSCE to the indivisibility of security and not to strengthen their own security at the expense of the security of others.

We should like to recall that the Charter for European Security sets out the key rights and commitments of OSCE participating States with regard to the indivisibility of security and underscores the right of each participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve, and the right of each State to neutrality. The same paragraph makes it clear that this is conditional on the obligation of each State not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. At the OSCE Summit in Astana, the leaders of our countries endorsed a declaration that reaffirmed these interrelated commitments.

However, life itself has shown that Western countries continue to choose from these documents only those provisions that seem convenient for them. Principally, this concerns the right of States to freely choose alliances to ensure only their security. The aspect concerning

the “evolution” of blocs is consistently ignored, while it is precisely this provision that was also an integral part of the understanding of the “indivisibility of security”, associated also with the mandatory departure of military blocs from their original function of deterrence and their integration into the pan-European architecture on a collective rather than a narrow group basis. It is also worth recalling that the 1994 OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security explicitly states that the choice of military alliance should not infringe upon the security interests of any other country.

We were surprised that Minister Lavrov received responses from High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, to whom his letter was not addressed. The aforementioned commitments were made by the countries concerned in their national capacity, not as members of military blocs or integration associations. However, it is apparent that, today, the bloc or integration identity of the OSCE participating States overshadows their national identity, and the principle of the indivisibility of security is selectively interpreted to justify the course taken towards the irresponsible expansion of NATO and the European Union, as well as the creation of spheres of influence by them.

We are not satisfied with these responses, and we await the reactions of participating States in a national capacity.

Mr. Chairperson,

Unfortunately, the situation around a number of European States that have adopted the policy of neutrality is becoming less certain. We should like to hope that, in the future, instead of playing along with bloc interests, these countries will continue to play the role of “bridges” between the East and the West, fulfilling their respected mediation mission. In this connection, we look forward to a substantive continuation of the Structured Dialogue under the Finnish Chairmanship.

I should like to say a few words about the Ukrainian issue, which some participating States touched on today. Russia will insist that NATO publicly announce its refusal to accept Ukraine into its ranks. The Ukrainian Government, for its part, should declare its neutral, non-aligned status, as it was stipulated by the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine of 16 July 1990. The need to implement this Declaration was set out in the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine of 24 August 1991. Furthermore, the current Constitution of Ukraine of 28 June 1996 contains the provision that, in adopting this Constitution, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall be guided by the aforementioned Act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



1001st Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 1007, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Dear colleagues,

It was not the intention of my delegation to take the floor during today's Security Dialogue, since we consider this topic to be irrelevant, counterproductive and fraught with the risk of further fragmentation and deepening of dividing lines among the OSCE participating States. However, since the Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan spoke about his country's experience and the security situation in the South Caucasus, I should like to make a few brief remarks.

Firstly, when speaking of non-alignment, one needs to start by differentiating it from neutrality. "Neutrality" is a clearly defined legal status which implies impartiality in international relations. Unlike the concept of neutrality, that of "non-alignment" has been distorted and twisted over the years, especially in the past decade. Currently, a number of non-aligned countries have strong military ties to other countries, even to members of major military alliances, which runs contrary to the very logic of non-alignment. Moreover, the strategic bilateral partnerships and politico-military agreements of some non-aligned countries are much deeper and more comprehensive than those of countries belonging to a certain military bloc, as the example of Azerbaijan clearly demonstrates.

Secondly, OSCE participating States should be guided by the concept of common and indivisible security, and be united by common interests. "Alignment" in the OSCE area can be defined and measured only in terms of the compliance of participating States with their commitments. Under that definition, Azerbaijan is indeed a non-aligned country – a country that relies on the use or threat of force as a means of resolving conflicts and as the basis of inter-State relations, a country that has aligned with foreign terrorist fighters to wage a war of aggression against the people of Artsakh, a country that has committed crimes against humanity and glorified the perpetrators of such crimes. Furthermore, Azerbaijan is a country that has consistently obstructed the co-operation of participating States with the OSCE and the work of the Organization for the sake of implementing its own political agenda.

Such is the role played by Azerbaijan, not least through its military ties, which is in no way contributing to peace and security in the OSCE area.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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16 February 2022
Annex 3

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1001st Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 1007, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL GROUP OF FRIENDS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (LATVIA)**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
Dear colleagues,

In my capacity as Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA), I should like to express my great pleasure at the adoption of the decision on the updated Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Marking, Registration and Record-Keeping.

I wish to thank all the participating States that were involved in and supported the updating of this best practice guide (BPG). In particular, I should like to commend Germany, Austria and Switzerland for their joint efforts and for the leading role that they played in this process.

With regard to this and other guides, I should like to reiterate, as Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW and SCA, that the BPGs on SALW and conventional ammunition, although not binding in nature, are endorsed and generally accepted by all 57 OSCE participating States and provide a common understanding of the relevant approaches, procedures and terminology. They are not intended to be prescriptive or to offer a “one size fits all” solution. Rather, their aim is to present flexible and effective measures that can be tailored to the unique circumstances of each project undertaken as part of the implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA.

I invite the OSCE participating States and the Partners for Co-operation to use the BPGs as a source of guidance for national policymaking.

Dear colleagues,

Since the inception of the review and update process for the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and conventional ammunition in 2019, the participating States have already adopted several updated BPGs. I would recall that the first updated guide was adopted in the course of 2020 (BPG on Minimum Standards for National Procedures for the

Deactivation of SALW, led by Germany), and that four others followed in 2021: three US-led BPGs (on National Procedures for the Destruction of SALW; on National Procedures for Stockpile Management, Security and Destruction of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS); and on Procedures for Management of SCA) and the UK-led BPG on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security of SALW. Today, the Forum for Security Co-operation adopted the sixth updated guide, namely the BPG on Ammunition Marking, Registration and Record-Keeping, led by Germany.

I am very pleased to note that the work on updating the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and conventional ammunition continues apace.

At the next meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW and SCA, which is scheduled to take place via Zoom on Thursday, 24 February 2022, starting at 11.00 a.m., and to which you are all cordially invited, information will be presented on the progress achieved in updating the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and conventional ammunition, and on the follow-up steps. The formal invitation to this meeting will be distributed in due course.

Once again, I wish to commend the work of the participating States actively involved in the updating of the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and conventional ammunition, and invite others to join in these efforts.

Thank you for your attention. I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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16 February 2022
Annex 4

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1001st Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 1007, Agenda item 3

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

February the 12th of this year saw the seventh anniversary of the signing of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, which was supported by the leaders of the “Normandy format” countries and endorsed by United Nations Security Council resolution 2202. The document has become an integral part of international law and the sole framework for overcoming the crisis in Ukraine. The Package of Measures has made a significant contribution to ending the Kyiv nationalist government’s full-scale war against its own people in eastern Ukraine, put a stop to the forced Ukrainization in Donbas and also marked out a path towards peace and civil dialogue.

However, the Kyiv regime, with the full support of its Western sponsors and “ideological inspirers”, is blatantly violating the document’s provisions, ignoring the interests of the residents of Donbas, creating a mere semblance of efforts for a settlement and trying to shift all responsibility for the lack of progress in resolving the conflict on to Russia. We emphasize that there is no mention in the Minsk agreements about any obligations on the part of Russia. Our country is not a party to the conflict. Our status in the Normandy format is the same as that of France and Germany, and in the Trilateral Contact Group it is the same as that of the OSCE.

Unfortunately, the Forum’s regular meetings confirm that our esteemed colleagues have a very poor knowledge of the text of the Minsk Package of Measures, which clearly defines the order and sequence of actions by the parties to the conflict – the Ukrainian Government and the authorities of Donetsk and Luhansk (I would ask delegations to take note of paragraph 2) – in carrying out steps in the politico-military, socio-economic and humanitarian spheres. In the first place, this means a ceasefire and the withdrawal of weapons under OSCE monitoring. The following day comes the establishment of direct dialogue between the central authorities in Kyiv and the representatives of Donbas and the start of the agreement of modalities for elections, an amnesty, the release of detained persons according to the principle “all for all” and the granting of a special status to Donbas. Next is the full resumption of severed socio-economic ties, including social transfers (pensions and other payments), the reinstatement of full control of the State border by the Ukrainian Government, the withdrawal of foreign armed formations and the carrying out of constitutional reform

providing for decentralization and the granting of a special status to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. There is and can be no other way of implementing the Minsk Package of Measures.

Mr. Chairperson,

For our part, we are obliged to note that the Ukrainian Government has implemented practically none of the provisions of the Package of Measures. Ukrainian security forces continue to shell residential districts in Donbas. According to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, between July 2020 and mid-January 2022, the number of civilian casualties in the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic was three times higher than the figure in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian Government (35 casualties on the Ukrainian armed forces side and 93 on the militia side).

The trade, economic and transport blockade imposed by the Ukrainian Government on the population of Donbas remains in place; the exchange of detainees has come to a standstill; and the amnesty and language issues are unresolved. In the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group, Ukraine's representatives have taken a so-called consistent and principled position, which essentially boils down to not considering or even touching upon the proposals put forward by the representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk. There is no talk of granting the region a constitutionally guaranteed special status on a permanent basis.

Even the concessions made by the representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk on the recommendations of the two "Normandy format" summits – held in Paris in October 2015 and in Berlin in October 2016 – did not help. Thus, the "Steinmeier formula", according to which a special status for Donbas is introduced on election day on a temporary basis and becomes permanent after a positive assessment of the elections by the OSCE, was not signed by the Ukrainians until October 2019, with the aim of securing another Normandy Four summit in Paris in December 2019. Following that meeting, President Zelenskyy promised his colleagues that the "Steinmeier formula" would be incorporated into Ukrainian legislation by April 2020. This has still not happened.

The situation in the negotiations of the advisers to the Normandy Four leaders also remains at an impasse. Work on the draft single document submitted by our German and French partners ("Key clusters for the implementation of the Minsk agreements") has "stalled" because of their refusal to recognize the Ukrainian Government and the Donbas authorities as those responsible for implementing the agreements, and also because of the so-called constructive ambiguity persisting in the approaches of the German and French Governments to the question of who are the parties to the conflict. We once again call on our esteemed German and French colleagues to study paragraph 2 of the Minsk Package of Measures carefully.

Mr. Chairperson,

The fact that Ukrainian officials, encouraged by the West, have increasingly started making statements that merely confirm their policy of sabotaging the Minsk agreements is cause for grave concern. For example, in April 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy seriously proposed changing the Minsk agreements, which in his opinion are outdated. During a press conference following his talks in Kyiv with British

Prime Minister Boris Johnson on 1 February 2022, he said: “I no longer remember who signed the Minsk agreements, but I know exactly who should implement them.”

Last autumn, the minister for the “reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine” Iryna Vereshchuk, who had only just taken up the post, declared that “the Minsk agreements are not a road map for de-occupation and reintegration.” Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that “the Minsk agreements are not a springboard for peace.” The Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, Oleksii Danilov, recently said in an interview with Associated Press that it was “impossible” to implement the Minsk agreements, while Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the Polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* that “there will be no special status, as Russia imagines it, no veto power.” This is not true, as the Package of Measures explicitly states the need to agree with the representatives of Donbas on all issues concerning the region’s future, including its special status.

Mr. Chairperson,

The current leadership in Kyiv came to power under the slogan of seeking ways of national reconciliation. Nevertheless, as we can see, there is no positive momentum in that direction. In trying to justify their actions, the Ukrainian authorities are stubbornly continuing to impose both on the citizens of their own country and on the international community an unsubstantiated idea about some kind of “Russian aggression”. To cover up their own failures, they are trying to present our country as a participant in the events in Donbas.

It is outrageous that representatives of a number of Western countries have actively joined this campaign, turning a blind eye to the Ukrainian Government’s flagrant violations of its commitments. We have still not heard any assessment in the Forum for Security Co-operation of the statements by the Ukrainian representatives, which are at odds with the substance of the Minsk agreements and undermine the complete essence of the peace efforts. It is sad that, even today, no one has remembered the anniversary of the Minsk Package of Measures, giving preference instead to long-standing anti-Russian slogans and anti-Russian clichés that do not correspond to reality.

As a co-mediator in the peace process, Russia stresses that any further prolongation of the armed violence in eastern Ukraine is unacceptable. We believe the following steps are essential if the situation in Donbas is to be normalized. The first step is to force the Ukrainian Government to implement the Minsk Package of Measures. The second is the cessation of arms deliveries to Ukraine; the third, the recall of all Western advisers and instructors; the fourth, the refusal of NATO countries to conduct any joint exercises with the Ukrainian armed forces; and the fifth, the withdrawal of all previously supplied foreign weapons from Ukrainian territory.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that the text of this statement be attached to the journal of today’s FSC meeting.

1001st Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 1007, Agenda item 2

**DECISION No. 1/22
UPDATED BEST PRACTICE GUIDE ON AMMUNITION MARKING,
REGISTRATION AND RECORD-KEEPING**

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),

Fulfilling the mandate given by Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/17 on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA), adopted in Vienna in December 2017, and encouraged by the acknowledgement of the 2018 Milan Ministerial Council Declaration on OSCE Efforts in the Field of Norms and Best Practices on SALW and SCA of “the need for the OSCE to continue to enhance its SALW- and SCA-related norms and best practices and their implementation”,

Recognizing the outcomes of the, which took place in New York from 26 to 30 July 2021, UN Seventh Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,

Acknowledging that the updated best practice guide could also serve as a guide for national policy making on the part of participating States and encourage the voluntary implementation of higher common standards of practice among all participating States,

Noting that the updated best practice guide could also be useful to OSCE Partners for Co-operation and other United Nations Member States in their efforts developing policy guidance, operational guidelines and procedures on all aspects of ammunition marking, registration and record-keeping,

Decides to:

1. Welcome, giving it its full title, the updated Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Marking, Registration and Record-keeping, which presents examples of best practices aimed at providing information and analysis for developing policy and designing general guidelines and procedures on all aspects of ammunition marking, registration and record-keeping (FSC.DEL/81/21/Rev.2);
2. Endorse the publication of the updated best practice guide in all six OSCE languages and to encourage participating States to make the guide available as appropriate;

3. Task the Conflict Prevention Centre with ensuring the widest possible circulation of the updated best practice guide, including to the OSCE Partners for Co-operation and the United Nations;
4. Request that the updated best practice guide be presented at the Eighth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

This updated Best Practice Guide replaces the Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Marking, Registration and Record-keeping (FSC.DEL/73/07/Rev.1, 25 October 2007) welcomed by the FSC Decision No. 12/07 on the Best Practice Guide on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition dated 31 October 2007.

FSC.DEC/1/22
16 February 2022
Attachment

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of the Russian Federation:

“Having joined the consensus regarding the Forum for Security Co-operation decision adopted today on the updated Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Marking, Registration and Record-Keeping, the delegation of the Russian Federation deems it necessary to make the following interpretative statement under paragraph IV.1(A)6 of the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE.

In welcoming the adoption of the updated Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Marking, Registration and Record-Keeping, the Russian Federation proceeds on the basis that the implementation of this document will be of a voluntary nature.

We request that this statement be attached to the adopted decision.”