

Daily Report 12/2022

19 January 2022¹


Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 14 ceasefire violations, including four explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 232 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 44 ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, it recorded two ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske.
- The Mission monitored the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission monitored areas near the border outside government control and visited two border crossing points in Donetsk region.
- The SMM monitored the security situation in east and south-east Kherson region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including near non-government-controlled Korsun and at two checkpoints of the armed formations near Yasynuvata and Bezimenne in Donetsk region.

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 18 January 2022. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some SMM cameras.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 18 January 2022



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 19/01/2022

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 14 ceasefire violations, including four undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in an area north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk) and in an area south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 232 ceasefire violations in the region, some of which also occurred near Shyrokyne.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 44 ceasefire violations, all of which occurred in an area east-north-east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations in the region, one of which also occurred close to the disengagement area near Zolote.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding Measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 101,891 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 27,918 explosions, 24,491 projectiles in flight, 442 muzzle flashes, 469 illumination flares and at least 48,571 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

While positioned on the south-western edge of Berezhivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 44 bursts and shots of small-arms fire assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the area’s southern edge and inside the disengagement area. It also observed that the previously reported road barriers across road T-1316, on the area’s southern edge, continued to be closed.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM spotted ten tanks in a training area near non-government-controlled Buhaiivka (37km south-west of Luhansk), Luhansk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The Mission observed four armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and five armoured combat vehicles in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (For further information, see the table below.)

SMM facilitation of the operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

The SMM noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

Areas near the border outside government control⁶

On 13 January, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a probable military-type truck at a compound near a residential area of Markyne (94km south of Donetsk), about 4km west of the border with the Russian Federation, as well as another probable military-type truck in a field about 1km south-east of Konkove (79km south of Donetsk), about 3km west of the same border.

On the same day, 12km west of the border with the Russian Federation, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of ten probable military-type trucks stationary in a compound on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk), as well as, about 1km further north and headed south on road T-0508, the presence of two probable military-type trucks, one of which was towing a probable artillery piece. The probable towed artillery piece, as well as the two probable military-type trucks, were spotted in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed, or further proscribed, according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (For further information, see the table below.)

On 18 January, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM observed 13 cars (including six with “DPR” plates), one covered cargo truck, one bus and two mini-buses (with “DPR” plates, carrying passengers of mixed genders and ages), and 21 people (eight women and 13 men of mixed ages) entering Ukraine. At the same time, it saw nine cars (including five with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (including one with “DPR” plates), two buses and two mini-buses (with “DPR” plates, carrying

⁶ According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are officially designated as suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.

passengers of mixed genders and ages), and five people (two women and three men of mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission did not observe any traffic passing through.

Security situation in east and south-east Kherson region

From 14 to 17 January, the Mission monitored areas in east and south-east Kherson region at checkpoints near Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson), as well as at Ukrainian State Border Guard Service security posts near Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and in Valok (193km south-east of Kherson). The SMM also monitored the coast of the Sea of Azov near Prydorozhnie (177km east of Kherson), Azovske (178km east of Kherson), Stokopani (181km east of Kherson), Novyi Azov (190km east of Kherson), Pchilka (190km east of Kherson), Ozeriany (189km east of Kherson) and Novohryhorivka (183km east of Kherson) as well as areas along the North Crimean Canal. While monitoring these areas, the SMM observed no change in the security situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 4 January 2022](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial:

- On road M-03 north-north-east of Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), two visibly armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage east, citing “ongoing live-fire exercises”.
- At a checkpoint near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), two visibly armed members of the armed formations denied the Mission passage south-west towards the DFS, citing “orders from superiors”.
- At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), three visibly armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage east, citing “ongoing de-mining activities” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁷

- An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during four flights over areas near government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

⁷ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAV's positions.

Tables of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
13/1/2022	10	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk), where imagery also revealed the presence of 38 armoured combat vehicles. ⁸	Aerial imagery

Other weapons⁹

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
13/1/2022	7	Towed artillery piece (type undetermined)	In a training area near Buhaivka	Aerial imagery
	1	Probable towed artillery piece (type undetermined)	Near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.	

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone¹⁰

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
16/1/2022	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1, including one probable)	Near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB S)	Near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk)	
17/1/2022	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
18/1/2022	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near Marianivka (13km south of Donetsk)	Patrol
	4	Infantry fighting vehicle (one BMP-1 and three BMP-2)	Near Sukhodil (21km west of Luhansk)	

⁸ The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this table are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreement on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁹ The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

¹⁰ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 18 January 2022¹¹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	2-4km ENE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	18-Jan, 18:04
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	17-Jan, 18:38
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	17-Jan, 18:40
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	17-Jan, 18:48
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	18-Jan, 00:15
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	18-Jan, 18:12
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	18-Jan, 18:12
About 3km WNW of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	5-7km NW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	18-Jan, 11:48
About 3km WSW of the railway station in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 6km NW of Donetsk city centre)	1-1.5km W	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	18-Jan, 13:00-13:10
Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km SW	Heard	5	Burst		Small arms	18-Jan, 13:45
SW edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km NW of Luhansk)	2-4km NNW	Heard	42	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	Small arms	18-Jan, 13:02-13:15
	2-4km NNW	Heard	2	Burst	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	Small arms	18-Jan, 13:02-13:15

¹¹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹²



¹² The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).