
Daily Report 2/2022

5 January 2022¹

Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 54 ceasefire violations. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 36 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded three ceasefire violations, all explosions. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded one ceasefire violation in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The Mission facilitated the operation and repair of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and two corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission visited a border crossing point and monitored areas near the border outside government control in Donetsk region.
- The SMM observed gatherings in Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted. Its unmanned aerial vehicles encountered instances of GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming.*




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 4 January 2022. All times are in Eastern European Time

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some SMM cameras.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 54 ceasefire violations, all of which occurred in an area north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk) and north-north-east of Talakivka (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk). In the <u>previous 24 hours</u>, the Mission recorded 36 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions. All ceasefire violations occurred in an area west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the <u>previous 24 hours</u>, the Mission recorded one ceasefire violation in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding Measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 98,915 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 27,001 explosions, 23,938 projectiles in flight, 421 muzzle flashes, 453 illumination flares and at least 47,102 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

While positioned about 3km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, but within 5km of its periphery.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the area's southern edge and inside the disengagement area. It also observed that the previously reported road barriers across road T-1316, on the area's southern edge, continued to be closed.

While positioned at four locations close to the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Weapons storage sites

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At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region 4 January

The Mission noted that two mortars (M120-15 *Molot*, 120mm) were missing, compared with the previous visit on 21 December 2021.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn⁶

At one heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region 4 January

The SMM noted that all weapons observed at this site during the previous visit on 13 November 2021 were present.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 23 tanks in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The SMM saw one armoured personnel carrier in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

SMM facilitation of the operation and repair of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored repair works to a water pipeline in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the Mission observed that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

The SMM noted that the EECP near Zolote was open, but that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote was closed.

The SMM noted that the EECP near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) was open.

Areas near the border outside government control⁷

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour and ten minutes, the Mission observed 18 cars (including nine with "DPR" plates), and 13 pedestrians (seven men and six women of mixed ages) entering Ukraine. At the same time, the

⁶ The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

⁷ According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are officially designated as suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.

SMM observed 40 cars (including 24 with "DPR" plates), three covered cargo trucks (including one with "DPR" plates), one bus (with "DPR" plates) and nine pedestrians (five men and four women of mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission monitored areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in and near Amvrosiivka (56km south-east of Donetsk).

The Mission observed gatherings in Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv

On 1 January, at Taras Schevchenko Park in Kyiv, the SMM observed a gathering of about 900 people (mixed genders and ages) commemorating the birth of Stepan Bandera, with some participants holding Ukrainian flags and flags of the *Right Sector* and *Sokil* movements. Later, the Mission saw participants marching towards Independence Square, where the total number of participants rose to 2,000 (mixed genders and ages). It also observed participants proceeding towards the Office of the President, at 11 Bankova Street. Overall, the Mission saw about 300 law enforcement representatives and observed a calm situation.

On the same day, commemorating the same anniversary, the SMM saw a gathering of about 300 people (mixed genders and ages) in Ivano-Frankivsk and another one of about 250 people (mixed genders and ages) in Lviv. During its presence, the Mission observed a calm situation on both occasions.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 4 January 2022). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads
previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians'
movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other
obstacles.

Other impediments:8

- SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming during six flights: twice each while flying over areas near government-controlled Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, 40km north-east of Donetsk) and Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk), and once each while flying over areas near government-controlled Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk) and Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

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⁸ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Tables of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons		Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation			
Government-controlled areas								
4/1/2022	23	Tank (T-72)		Near Pidlisne (70km north-west of Luhansk)	Patrol			

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone9

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation
		Government-con	ntrolled areas	
4/1/2022	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk)	Patrol

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
⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 4 January 2022¹⁰

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne	5-7km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	4-Jan, 16:59
(government-controlled, 100km S of	5-7km N	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	4-Jan, 17:00
Donetsk)	5-7km N	Recorded	13	Projectile	W to E	N/K	4-Jan, 17:02
	5-7km N	Recorded	22	Projectile	W to E	N/K	4-Jan, 17:12
	5-7km N	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	4-Jan, 17:15
	5-7km N	Recorded	8	Projectile	E to W	N/K	4-Jan, 17:15
	5-7km N	Recorded	4	Projectile	E to W	N/K	4-Jan, 17:16
E edge of Talakivka (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	2-3km NNE	Heard	2	Shot		Cannon (30mm)	4-Jan, 10:34
About 3km N of Pervomaisk (non- government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	4-6km W	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	4-Jan, 12:00

The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹



¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).
