

Daily Report 253/2020

23 October 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded 45 ceasefire violations, all explosions, in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 49 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The Mission followed up on reports of a boy killed by an explosive device in July in Makiivka, Donetsk region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM observed 27 weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, all in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in residential areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including to enable repairs to water infrastructure and construction work in government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 22 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Berezove were not operational.

³ Including explosions


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 22 October 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

© OSCE SMM 2019 Use, copy, reproduction, transmission, broadcasting, sale, license, or exploitation not permitted without OSCE prior written authorization.

Created: 23/10/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 45 ceasefire violations – all undetermined explosions – more than two-thirds of which were recorded within a 5km radius of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 49 ceasefire violations, including 30 explosions, also near the DFS.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, as in the [previous reporting period](#). The last time it recorded a ceasefire violation in the region was on 15 October (see [SMM Daily Report 17 October 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,832 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 542 explosions, 29 projectiles in flight, 16 muzzle flashes, 22 illumination flares and 1,223 bursts and shots).

Boy killed by explosive device in Makiivka, Donetsk region

The SMM followed up on reports of a 15-year-old boy who died on 5 July from injuries caused by the detonation of an explosive device in his family's apartment in building 6 of the Zelenyi residential district in Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk).

On 22 October, a female staff member at the Children's Clinical Hospital in Makiivka told the SMM over the phone that, according to the hospital's register, a boy had been admitted to its intensive care unit on 5 July, where he passed away after about an hour. Subsequently, his body was transported to a morgue in Makiivka for an autopsy.

On 20 October, a woman (in her seventies) living in the same building told the SMM that on 5 July, she had been at home when at around 17:00 she heard people in her building running and screaming. She said that when she stepped outside of her apartment, a teenager, standing in a group outside, had told her that the boy had been injured by an explosion. She added that on the same day, she had seen the mother of the boy in distress.

On 14 October, a female staff member at the central morgue in non-government-controlled Donetsk city confirmed to the Mission over the phone that on 5 July, the body of a 15-year-old boy had been brought from the abovementioned hospital in Makiivka, where he had died, to the morgue in Makiivka, adding that the autopsy had shown that the boy had suffered traumatic injuries to his torso and limbs that had been consistent with those caused by an explosion.

Earlier, on 6 July, the director of school no.50 in Makiivka (woman in her forties), where the boy had been enrolled in ninth grade, told the SMM over the phone that she had been notified by those in control that the boy had died as the result of an explosion at his home and that the school had posted a memorial notice on social media. On 8 July, another neighbour (woman in her forties) told the SMM over the phone that at about 17:30 on 5 July, she had seen firefighters near her building and about ten teenagers being questioned by members of the armed formations. On 17 September, the same neighbour told the Mission that the boy's mother had told her that she did not wish to speak to the SMM about the incident.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

While positioned in government-controlled areas of the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), five de-miners from non-government-controlled areas announced to the SMM that they would be conducting two controlled detonations inside the disengagement area. Subsequently, the SMM heard two explosions, about 800m and 1.3km north of the checkpoint of the armed formations, near the area's southern edge, assessed as controlled detonations matching the pre-announced locations.

Throughout the day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom, accompanied by three people in protective gear, entered the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On 12 October, while positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed 27 weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, all in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including 19 tanks in a compound in a residential area of Donetsk city and two multiple launch rocket systems in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

Aerial imagery made available to the SMM revealed the presence of 35 weapons (including tanks and self-propelled and towed artillery) beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, all in training areas in non-government-controlled parts of both regions (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in both government- and non-government-controlled-areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, north of Shchastia

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

(government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote – north and south of the disengagement area – and of road H-21 south of Shchastia; and demining activities near Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk).

North of the bridge in Shchastia, at the junction of roads H-21 and T-1309, about 190m north-west of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Mission saw 16 workers with heavy equipment, installing appliances for the provision of electricity and water supply on containers, reportedly being assembled for administrative use.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations about 2.5km east of Vesela Hora and about 3km south-east of the bridge, the SMM saw around 20 workers from non-government-controlled areas with heavy equipment laying asphalt, connecting streetlight poles with electrical wires and installing containers, reportedly being assembled for administrative use. While there, the SMM saw two pedestrian and vehicle shelters and 15 containers, reportedly for document checking purposes.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned in three locations near the station, the Mission heard 33 ceasefire violations, all explosions, within a 5km radius of the station.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska remained non-operational⁷.

While at the EECP at about 09:00, 11:00 and 15:00, the Mission saw in total 140 people (95 women and 45 men, mixed ages) queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas. A man (in his sixties) told the SMM that he had been spending nights on benches and in abandoned houses in Stanytsia Luhanska, as his request to travel towards non-government-controlled areas was rejected by the Ukrainian Armed Forces because he had allegedly not qualified as a special exception.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

⁷ Notice about the EECP's temporary closure from 15 October to 31 October 2020 was published on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 13 October. A representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reconfirmed to the SMM on 22 October that the EECP would remain closed until 31 October because of COVID-19 mitigation measures, with special exceptions.

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 12 October 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On the night of 21-22 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on four separate occasions while flying over areas near Hirne (non-government-controlled 30km east of Donetsk), Kalynivka (non-government-controlled, 55km north-east of Donetsk), Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk).⁸
- On 22 October, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on three occasions while flying over areas near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north east of Donetsk) and once while flying over areas between Yasynuvata and the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
20/10/2020	2	Multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk), where imagery also revealed the presence of 34 armoured combat vehicles ⁹	Aerial imagery
	6	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014	
21/10/2020	19	Tank (T-72B)	In a compound in a residential area in Donetsk city	Long-range UAV

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
20/10/2020	7	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	Aerial imagery
	8	Self-propelled artillery (type undetermined)		
	14	Towed artillery (type undetermined)		
	6	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk), where imagery also revealed the presence of nine armoured combat vehicles	

Other weapons¹⁰

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
20/10/2020	20	Towed artillery (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk), where imagery also revealed the presence of nine armoured combat vehicles	Aerial imagery

⁹ The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

¹⁰ The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone¹¹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
21/10/2020	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Taramchuk (29 south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
22/10/2020	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
20/10/2020	14	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014	Aerial imagery
21/10/2020	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	In a compound in a residential area in Donetsk city	Long-range UAV
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)		
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (two BMP-1 and one BMP-2)	In a compound in a residential area in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk)	
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (one MT-LB and one BTR-70)		


¹¹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 22 October 2020¹²

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	4-5km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 09:06
	3-5km WSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 09:32
	3-5km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 09:40
	3-5km N	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 09:51
	3-5km N	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 09:57
	3-5km N	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 10:00-10:03
	3-5km N	Heard	17	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 10:06-10:22
	5-8km N	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 12:09-12:15
	5-8km N	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 13:28
Railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km W	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 11:05
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	3-5km NNE	Heard	7	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 10:55-11:00
	3-5km SSE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 11:00
	4-5km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	22-Oct, 13:28

¹² The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹³



¹³ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours.)